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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Aims and Background 
This research examines the impact, if any, of the introduction of casemix funding on 
public hospitals in Victoria.  The results reported here show that in Victoria, during 
the period under observation, rural hospitals showed a significantly greater 
preponderance, relative to metropolitan hospitals, to either amalgamate or close 
down.  Since 1 July 1993 public hospitals in Victoria have been compared for 
efficiency in the delivery of their services.  The casemix funding arrangements were 
installed, among other reasons, to improve efficiency in the delivery of hospital 
services.  Duckett, 1999, p 107 states that under casemix funding ‘The hospital 
therefore becomes more clearly accountable for variation in the efficiency of the 
services it provides’.  Also, ‘Generally, case-mix funding is seen as being able to 
yield efficiency improvements more rapidly than negotiated funding…’.  Hospital 
comparisons provide State bodies with information on how to allocate funding 
between hospitals by means of annual capped budgets.  Budgets are capped because 
funding is restricted to a given number of patients that can be treated in any given 
year.  Thus, casemix funding relies heavily on cost comparisons between hospitals, 
and the way that hospital output is measured relies on the use of diagnosis related 
groups (DRGs). 
 
DRGs identify groups of diagnoses that require a similar level of resources to treat a 
patient.  This makes it possible for the cost of treating a particular diagnosis to be 
compared across hospitals.  Historically this comparison was not possible since 
hospitals could claim that their casemix (i.e., the mix of conditions as classified) 
contained diagnoses that required more intensive use of resources, justifying higher 
costs.  The DRG weights take these differences into account, since diagnoses that 
have a higher resource utilisation are attributed a higher DRG weighting.  The use of 
DRGs makes it possible to measure and compare costs, since patients within the 
same DRG should consume similar amounts of resources.  DRGs can be used, 
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therefore, to standardise for differences in the casemix of hospitals and allow 
comparisons of hospital costs. 
 
The aim of this work is primarily to use survivor analysis and production frontier 
techniques to assess the impact, if any, that the new funding regime had on Victorian 
public hospitals.  Together with institutional evidence provided, this will show 
whether the Victorian State Government’s objectives, one of which was to achieve 
increased hospital efficiency, were in fact realised.   
 
There are several reasons why health reforms were undertaken in Victoria at this 
time.  As far back as the mid 1980s Victoria’s hospital system was being scrutinised 
in efficiency terms, with a view to introducing global funding.  In early 1982 the 
Victorian Health Department had already gathered comparative data on cost per 
patient treated, adjusted for casemix using DRGs.  Various reports published in the 
late 1980s concluded that hospital services in Victoria were inefficient.  As a 
consequence, a Commission of Audit was appointed shortly following the 1992 State 
election.  The Commission of Audit was charged with the task of reporting on State 
finances generally and, among its findings, concluded that Victorian acute hospitals 
were 18 per cent more expensive than hospitals in other States (Lin and Duckett, 
1997, p 49).  Findings from data published by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission corroborated this finding by indicating that Victorian hospitals were 
relatively inefficient. 
 
A further reason why reforms were undertaken in Victoria was that prior to the 
introduction of casemix funding, hospitals were funded annually on an historical cost 
basis.  This was a perverse system that provided hospitals with increased budgets 
each year regardless of activity or productivity levels.  Under this system there was 
an in-built incentive for hospitals to spend their full allocation of funds each year in 
order to secure a subsequent funding increase.  This funding arrangement needed to 
be addressed, since it was held partly responsible for Victoria’s debt blow-out which 
is outlined in section 1.2 below. 
 
Hospital outputs are commonly referred to as separations.  A separation is an episode 
of care following which the patient is either discharged or deceased; that is, it does 
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not take into account patient outcome.  The output measure used throughout this 
thesis is weighted inlier equivalent separations (WIES1), which account for DRG 
weighting.  WIES are weighted relative to other separations.  That is, each diagnosis 
carries a group weighting that ranks the average cost of treatment of the diagnosis 
relative to the average cost of treatment of other diagnoses.  For instance, a simple 
endoscopy has a weight of 0.3, meaning that on average it costs 30 per cent of the 
cost of a diagnosis with a weight of one.  Similarly, a liver transplant has a weight of 
40.  All discharged patients are coded to their correct group and allocated the 
appropriate group weight.  Weights are then summed across all discharged patients to 
determine a hospital’s casemix-weighted output or casemix-weighted number of 
cases discharged.  The casemix may then be used to determine funding for the 
hospital by multiplying by the average cost of a diagnosis with a weight of one.  For 
instance, if the average cost of a diagnosis with a weight of one is $2,400, the 
endoscopy would be priced at $720, while the liver transplant would cost $96,000.  
The cost of a diagnosis with a weight of one is known as the WIES (Johnson, et al., 
2003). 
 
1.2 Significance 
The period 1992-93 to 1994-95 was characterised by a Victorian State debt in excess 
of $30 Billion (Victorian Budget Papers, 1999/2000, p 5).  The newly elected Liberal 
coalition was committed to reducing this debt and so undertook expenditure cuts 
across many sectors.  According to Duckett (1994), in its first year, 30 per cent of the 
total State budget reduction2 was achieved solely by funding cuts to Acute Health.  
This was a considerably disproportionate reduction, given that Acute Health absorbs 
approximately 17 per cent of the State budget. 
 
Budget cuts were thus implemented alongside the new funding regime, making it 
difficult for the news media in particular to distinguish between the two.  Casemix 
funding received a considerable amount of negative press, which may partially 
explain why many other Australian States have hesitated in adopting similar hospital 
funding methods. 
                                                 
1 For a full description of WIES see section 2.4 in Chapter 2. 
2 By 1999/2000 State debt was reduced by over 80 per cent to $6.1 billion (Victorian Budget Papers, 
1999/2000, p 5) 
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 By 1998 New South Wales still did not fund hospitals on a casemix basis (Duckett, 
1998).  The other four States that had implemented casemix funding had done so by 
either adopting the Victorian model, or by using casemix to inform their budget 
setting process.  South Australia’s model was adopted in 1994-95 and, though 
substantially modelled on the Victorian funding scheme, it made no distinction 
between payments for private and public patients.  It also had access subsidies in 
place for very small hospitals in terms of prices charged.  The new funding model 
was also accompanied by budget cuts in this State. 
 
Western Australia and Tasmania implemented casemix funding in 1996-97.  
According to Duckett (1998) both States adopted the standard price capped, full price 
model that covers both fixed and variable costs.  In the case of Western Australia, it 
has a block intensive care unit payment based on historical expenditure as well as 
payments for public and private patients also based on historical expenditure.  In the 
case of Tasmania, casemix funding was only applied to the State’s three major 
hospitals. 
 
Queensland began phasing in the casemix funding process in 1998.  It adopted the 
Victorian model of standard price by hospital group, capped with fixed and variable 
payments separate.  That is, the model involves a fixed grant for hospital overhead 
costs and a variable payment per patients treated.  The model also has separate 
medical cost weights for medical payments for public patients (Duckett, 1998).  It 
should be noted, however, that the adoption of the casemix funding model by these 
States does not necessarily correspond with its full adoption.  In the case of 
Queensland, for example, Surrao et al. (2002) note that Queensland Health does not 
use casemix funding for its public hospitals, but uses casemix as a management and 
information tool.  ‘Although casemix budgets are provided to public hospitals, these 
are used mainly to allow benchmarking and encourage performance improvement’ 
(Surrao et al., 2002, p 117). 
 
1.3 Efficiency Measurement Methodologies 
The frontier methods utilised in this thesis provide useful information for comparing 
the performance of hospitals in terms of their relative efficiency.  Efficiency in 
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production can be viewed in two ways; technical efficiency and allocative efficiency.  
Technical efficiency is attained by either maximising output for given inputs, or 
producing a given output with fewer inputs or at a lower cost.  Allocative efficiency 
ensures that resources are devoted to the combination of goods and services most 
wanted by society (Jackson and McIver, 2004).  The analyses in this thesis provide 
efficiency measures of the former type.  
 
The frontier methods used in this thesis estimate a technical efficiency score for each 
hospital under observation.  Since hospitals provide services of varying intensities, 
the output chosen must be weighted in such a way to standardise outputs and enable 
comparison of input usage.  This is the reason why weighted separations have been 
used to measure output, and not inpatients treated or separations.  Both frontier 
techniques relied on in this thesis compare the technical efficiency of hospitals based 
on their number of WIES.  It is clear that, although hospitals cannot control the rate 
at which patients present themselves for treatment, they have some influence over the 
amount of resources applied to patient treatment and recovery. 
 
The frontier techniques used are Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic 
Frontier Estimation (SFE).  DEA is a non-parametric mathematical programming 
approach that envelopes the data such that the most efficient firms under observation 
form a frontier, to which all other firms are compared.  The DEA technique can 
estimate production and cost frontiers.  In this thesis DEA has been used to construct 
production frontiers, since cost frontiers require accurate price data, which was 
unavailable for the purpose of this study. 
 
SFE is a parametric modelling technique that estimates a frontier but does not derive 
the frontier from the data, as is the case for the DEA model.  The fact that the frontier 
is estimated means that no firm will achieve a perfect technical efficiency score equal 
to 1.  Firms are compared for their relative efficiency, rather than any absolute 
measure of efficiency, or benchmark, as generated by DEA.  SFE with a decomposed 
error term is also able to separate statistical noise from technical inefficiency.  This 
technique can be used to produce cost and production frontiers but, for reasons 
provided in the previous paragraph, only production is addressed in this thesis. 
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 1.4 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 2 sets out a review of the literature that informs this thesis.  It contains 
literature on the issue of hospital funding, such as reimbursement schemes and 
casemix funding; its history and application.  The review also considers the issue of 
new technology on hospital costs, adverse selection and moral hazard effects 
resulting from reimbursement systems, and efficiency measurement applied to 
hospitals.  Chapter 2 also considers literature that addresses health sector reform in 
Victoria and in Australia generally.  Chapter 3 provides detail on the three methods  
in this thesis that are applied to Victorian data; survivor analysis, DEA and SFE, 
their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Chapter 4 contains information on the Australian healthcare market, why government 
intervention is necessary in health, an overview of the development of funding 
arrangements in Victoria, and the Victorian health system and its structure.  In 
particular, the operations of the Acute Health sector are examined, together with 
health reforms in that State, and the application of AN-DRGs.  This chapter also 
presents evidence on total health expenditure in Victoria, together with the number of 
hospitals that existed during the timeframe under consideration.  There is also an 
appendix to this chapter that sets out hospital specific data for WIES, inpatients 
treated, non-medical staff and average available beds for Victorian hospitals for each 
of the four years under consideration.  Summary tables of this data are also contained 
in this chapter, and enable comparison and analysis. 
 
Chapter 5 examines economies of scale and analyses their existence in the sector for 
public and private hospitals in Victoria and Australia.  The survivor technique is 
applied by grouping hospitals into size according to average available beds, and then 
comparing the change in each group’s market share over time.  Market share is 
measured with average bed days.  This chapter also sets out the amalgamation and 
closure activity of public hospitals that took place in Victoria between 1991/92 and 
1995/96.  This activity is shown to have occurred mostly among small rural 
hospitals, as a consequence of difficulties experienced under the output based 
funding system in place. 
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Chapter 6 contains two Data Envelopment Analyses, one under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale, and the other under the assumption of variable returns to 
scale.  Both sets of results are also outlined, with overall technical efficiency scores 
showing a slight improvement over time.  The results show that prior to closure 
hospitals tended to be poor performers in terms of their relative position to the 
frontier.  As the DEA frontier improved over time, it is apparent that there was room 
for improvement even among the technically efficient hospitals at the beginning of 
the period under observation. 
 
Chapter 7 estimates a parametric SFE technique with decomposed error term 
showing technical inefficiency effects, and which uses panel data of 116 hospitals 
over a four year period.  The results show that metropolitan hospitals and teaching 
hospitals both lower the technical inefficiency effect.  These results are compared 
with the DEA results, and show that there was no significant improvement in 
technical efficiency over the period under investigation.  Concluding comments are 
contained in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
The literature that forms the basis of this thesis is varied.  There exists abundant 
literature on incentive effects of hospital reimbursement schemes and casemix 
funding, a discussion of which is outlined in section 2.1 below.  Other relevant 
papers deal with the application of SFE and DEA methodologies to hospitals and 
healthcare markets (section 2.2) as well as general applications of DEA and SFE 
(section 2.3).  Section 2.4 provides a review of the literature dealing with Australian 
and Victorian healthcare issues, and section 2.5 outlines some findings regarding 
hospital mergers.  Coelli (1996a) and Coelli (1996b) provide the DEA and SFE 
computer programs used, and Chambers (1997) details duality in production and 
explains the mathematical process involved. 
 
2.1 Incentive Effects of Hospital Reimbursement 
In order to analyse the effects of casemix funding in Victoria, it is necessary to firstly 
identify the issues that arise when policymakers decide to reimburse hospitals 
according to some pre-specified requirement or incentive.  Clearly the choice of 
reimbursement scheme will impact on hospitals’ provision of healthcare services 
depending on how the incentives are structured.  There currently exists significant 
literature that addresses hospital reimbursement incentives which purports to 
measure their degree of success. 
 
Public funding incentives for hospitals are necessary in order to prevent over-use of 
costly resources that, it may be considered, provide little improved benefits.  
Although innovation and new technologies reduce costs in most markets, it is the 
reverse for the services sector in general and hospitals/healthcare in particular.  Some 
of the findings are summarised below [see Rice (1998), Newhouse (1993), Pauly 
(2005), Weisbrod (1991) and Bodenheimer (2005) for a comprehensive discussion of 
the effect of new technology on health expenditure]. 
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According to these authors, in the longer term, the adoption of new technologies by 
hospitals results in increasing costs.  Rice (1998) argues that this is partly due to the 
fact that people come to expect new technologies and so demand more.  Newhouse 
(1993) argues that the main cost driver of healthcare in the US, and other developed 
economies, is new technology and its ability to increase the capabilities of medicine.  
Newhouse makes the distinction between the level of healthcare spending as a 
percentage of GDP, and the rate of growth of spending.  He challenges the 
widespread view that healthcare expenditure in the US has grown at a greater rate 
than other developed economies.  Newhouse (1993) shows that the main reason that 
healthcare expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, has grown over time is due to 
people’s willingness to pay for new technologies, and that this phenomenon is not 
restricted to the US.  Given this finding, the upshot for managed competition is that 
‘…[It] will not, apart from a transitory period, slow the rate of increase in medical 
care costs’ (Newhouse, 1993, p 165).  Cost-containment of new technology (and its 
rate of growth) is, therefore, central to the discussion of incentive effects of hospital 
reimbursement schemes since, as the literature bears out, there is a close link 
between treatment choice, available technology (which increases medical 
capabilities) and costs. 
 
McClellan (1997) discusses the Prospective Payment System (PPS), which uses fixed 
payments based on the diagnosis-related group (DRG) of a hospital admission in the 
U.S.  Indeed, according to McClellan, the PPS was implemented to provide stronger 
incentives to minimise spending on costly technologies that generates little expected 
benefit.  In terms of incentives, this paper posits that in the US reimbursement 
incentives are not the same across diagnoses, demographic groups and types of 
intensive treatments.  That is, reimbursement is only partially prospective.  
Increasingly, some reimbursement is made retrospectively.  McClellan also discusses 
cost sharing.  This is defined as the degree to which hospitals share the reported costs 
of production with the payer.  By way of explanation, the removal of cost sharing 
leads to supply-side moral hazard.  That is, if hospitals receive a dollar 
reimbursement for a dollar of increased costs, there would be less incentive on their 
part to minimise resource use. 
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Given this scenario, McClellan (1997) finds that over 40 per cent of DRGs are 
related to the performance of procedures rather than the actual diagnosis.  That is, 
there is a positive relationship between the actual cost of procedures undertaken by a 
hospital and the amount of reimbursement received. 
Payments for these specific intensive procedures are consequently 
based on the average cost of patients undergoing the procedure 
rather than all patients with a particular associated diagnosis.  By 
performing the procedure, the hospital incurs higher costs but also 
obtains more reimbursement.  (McClellan, 1997, p 93). 
 
McClellan’s finding of this positive relationship thus defeats the purpose of the 
incentive scheme, which was designed to minimise the use of costly technologies.  
Clearly, the higher the cost of the intensive procedure (eg. coronary by-pass surgery), 
then the higher is the reimbursement.  Indeed McClellan (1997, p 93) notes that this 
treatment-based payment system would ‘…encourage investments in expanding the 
use of certain kinds of medical technologies, particularly those singled out for 
separate reimbursement’.  By passing on the costs of more intensive treatment, 
hospitals are encouraged to continue purchasing new technology, leading to patients 
being treated more intensively. 
 
McClellan’s (1997) findings show that retrospective cost sharing of intensive 
treatment is increasingly enabled by the PPS.  At the end of the period of observation 
the author finds that an additional dollar of reported cost is associated with 55 cents 
additional reimbursement, and that ‘…more than half of this additional 
reimbursement was related to treatment decisions rather than fixed characteristics of 
an admission’ (McClellan, 1997 p 94). 
 
The situation of increased retrospective reimbursement arises because of the fact that 
over 40 per cent of DRGs are treatment-related and not solely based on diagnosis.  
Patients within a diagnosis may be treated in a number of ways ranging from 
medication to surgery.  Treatments by medication tend to have low DRG weightings 
(less than or equal to 1), and surgical treatments have DRG weightings greater than 
1. McClellan notes that these DRGs (with higher weights) are more likely to 
represent more intensive treatment options available.  That is, they represent invasive 
surgical procedures made possible by costly medical technology.  The higher is the 
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DRG weight, the higher the level of retrospective cost sharing and reimbursement 
(McClellan, 1997). 
 
Another important issue raised by McClellan (1997) is that DRGs based on 
diagnoses alone do not provide information about the true cost of treatment.  That is, 
retrospective features were incorporated in the PPS because not all intensive 
procedures (and therefore patient costs) can be identified prospectively.  It is not 
always certain at the time of admission to what degree a patient will be treated, even 
after initial diagnosis.  For this and other reasons, the incentive effects of the PPS 
remain uncertain. 
The complexity of the reimbursement system suggests that the 
magnitude of the limits on cost sharing, and the extent to which it is 
actually prospective, are not well understood, and so the incentive 
effects of PPS may not be fully appreciated. 
(McClellan, 1997, p 101). 
 
McClellan’s empirical analysis of reimbursement incentives within PPS provides 
some new insights.  The author finds that the average cost-sharing rate falls by 
approximately 0.08 due to the prospective part of PPS.  The reduction in cost-sharing 
rate rises to 0.16 or more due to the retrospective part of reimbursement associated 
with specific intensive treatments (McClellan, 1997, p 125).  Although this analysis 
does not tell us anything about responses to incentives, it does provide a means to 
measure reimbursement incentives.  Clearly the rate of technological change has a 
significant impact on the extent of retrospective cost-sharing, and the author 
acknowledges that a proper understanding of the complexities of the PPS may lead to 
a deeper understanding of reimbursement incentives on hospital treatment decisions. 
 
Gilman (1999) challenges McClellan’s (1997) use of endogenous costs in the model 
as problematic, and analyses the potential effects of using endogenous costs on 
McClellan’s cost-sharing model results.  As a result of this analysis Gilman finds that 
‘[e]ndogenous shifts in non-payment-related services…will underestimate increases 
in cost sharing.  Endogenous shifts in payment-related services…can cause either 
over- or under-estimation of cost sharing’ (Gilman, 1999, p 451).  Furthermore, ‘in 
the case of the HIV-related DRG refinements implemented by New York Medicaid 
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in 1994, McClellan’s model caused the cost sharing incentives to be overestimated’ 
(Gilman, 1999, p 451). 
 
Pauly (2000) addresses the issue of supply-side reimbursement, where the existence 
of health insurance may give rise to moral hazard.  The author notes that one way to 
prevent, or lessen, the existence of moral hazard is to introduce cost-sharing, as is the 
case with co-insurance.  Pauly argues that requiring patients (insureds) to make some 
percentage payment of an approved charge, ‘…gives providers an incentive to be 
technically efficient…’ (Pauly, 2000, p 545).  This is because providers compete by 
charging a fee that is sufficiently low to attract price-sensitive patients. 
 
In the case of service benefit insurance where benefits are stated in physical terms, 
such as providing insurance for a private hospital room, for example, Pauly (2000) 
discusses the reimbursement incentives regarding upper limits.  Insurers are able to 
set per unit upper limits to a particular charge in order that patients search for 
providers that charge the lowest price for a particular service.  Providers would, 
likewise, seek out price-sensitive patients by competing on price.  This argument 
overlooks the fact that in highly concentrated geographical markets with few 
providers, such as rural areas, patients may find little or no difference between prices 
charged and, therefore, face much higher out-of-pocket expenses as a result of upper 
limits to reimbursement. 
 
Pauly (2000) also discusses the link between accounting cost reimbursement, and 
productive inefficiency.  Where reimbursement is made dollar for dollar for costs, 
there is no incentive for hospitals to minimise costs.  The price or quantity of inputs 
need not be altered since, regardless of input levels, profits would not be affected.  
The author proposes that the best way to offer an incentive to minimise costs is to 
base reimbursement on outputs and pursuant to some price schedule.  However, 
using a price schedule gives rise to the problem of having to define services. 
 
Another issue that affects reimbursement incentives is that patients are not 
homogeneous.  Pauly (2000) posits that this will have an impact on the quality of 
treatment received by patients because fully prospective payments, in particular, do 
not allow for differing severity of illness.  The insurer will base reimbursement on 
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the average cost to treat a patient with a given illness, but patients are heterogeneous 
and severity varies from case to case.  The incentive, in this case, would be to either 
under treat or dump high cost patients, once hospitals have determined that severity 
of illness is above average (Pauly, 2000).  Pauly states that since the information 
regarding severity is not known on admission, but gained over time during the 
hospital stay, it is not necessary for insurers to make a marginal payment for sicker 
patients on admission.  However, patient dumping (usually onto the public system) 
can be avoided by providing an incentive payment later on in the admission once 
severity is known.  This strategy by the insurer would result in a mixed payment 
system. 
 
Pauly (2000) acknowledges that supply-side reimbursement is limited in its ability to 
control moral hazard.  The issue is made complex due to the existence of asymmetric 
information and variable treatment quality (depending on severity) resulting from 
fixed price reimbursement.  He posits a combination of fixed and variable payments, 
with adjustments for quality and quantity to achieve at least a second best optimum. 
 
Similarly, Ellis (1998) addresses the issue of reimbursement effects on treatment 
decisions.  In particular he examines the effect of payment incentives on creaming, 
skimping and dumping of patients by hospitals.  The author defines creaming as 
over-treatment of low severity patients, skimping as under-treatment of high severity 
patients, and dumping as the explicit avoidance of high severity patients.  The 
hospital response in terms of how patients are treated is a function of the type of 
incentive structure in place; fully prospective payment, traditional cost-based or 
mixed payment.  The prospective payment system, such as Medicare in the U.S., 
provides a lump sum payment per patient in a given DRG at the time of discharge 
regardless of the level of services provided.  Intuitively, we would expect hospitals to 
over-treat low severity cases, and skimp or dump high severity patients under this 
system (as the reimbursement could be insufficient to cover the true cost of 
treatment).  The model utilised by Ellis (1998) shows that this is, in fact, the case. 
 
Under the cost-based reimbursement system the model shows that hospitals 
‘…provide services up to the point where marginal benefit is zero, and “cream” to 
attract all types of patients’ (Ellis, 1998, p 549).  This system encourages providers to 
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compete to attract patients even though the benefits of treatment may not exceed the 
costs.  Prospective payment reimbursement reduces the intensity of services provided 
relative to cost-based reimbursement, but exacerbates the incentive for insurers to 
compete to attract low severity patients.  Under this system Ellis finds that if 
dumping occurs, and hospitals avoid high severity patients, then skimping also 
occurs.  However, in the case of the mixed payment method Ellis shows, using 
comparative statics, that there is a ‘third best’ solution superior to the fully 
prospective or fully cost-based systems. 
…and movements away from a fully prospective system appear to 
be welfare improving. 
(Ellis, 1998, p 553). 
 
Indeed Ellis (1998) provides the theoretical underpinnings for an earlier paper by 
Ellis and McGuire (1996) that developed a panel data model to disentangle the 
effects from changed reimbursement.  That is, Ellis and McGuire (1996) address the 
issue of how hospitals altered their patient mix, treatment intensity or even market 
share according to how they are reimbursed following the introduction of U.S. 
Medicare in 1983.  The issue of moral hazard emerges from the differing levels of 
treatment intensity (referred to as creaming and skimping by Ellis, 1998) for any 
given patient.  Change in patient mix is termed ‘selection’ effect, and market share 
change is termed ‘practice-style’ effect since it has an impact on average resource 
use across hospitals. 
 
In the two years following the introduction of Medicare, the average length of stay 
per discharge fell sharply for hospitals paid under PPS.  Also, the total number of 
discharges fell for this group, with market share for non-PPS hospitals rising (Ellis 
and McGuire, 1996).  Since these effects all impact on one another, it is difficult to 
attribute the reduction in length of stay solely to moral hazard.  Therefore, the 
authors use a natural experiment to examine the changes in treatment patterns in New 
Hampshire following a change in reimbursement system from cost-reimbursement to 
a per-discharge payment according to DRG.  The results show an overall reduction in 
length of stay of 4.5 days.  The authors attribute 1.8 days to pure moral hazard effect, 
and 3 days to practice-style effect. 
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In 1994 Medicaid in New York switched from a system based on patient 
characteristics to one based on a refined set of diagnoses and procedures (defined 
over treatment decisions).  A later study by Gilman (2000) extends the analysis to 
this second generation of DRGs.  Under the new Medicaid system, the weights given 
to procedural DRGs increased, and the weights to non-procedural DRGs fell.  Using 
the group of HIV-related DRGs, Gilman (2000) shows (in Table 2 of that paper) that 
on average procedural DRG weights rose from 0.95 to 1.42, and non-procedural 
DRG weights fell on average from 1.62 to 1.10.  Overall, however, HIV-related 
DRG weights fell from 1.49 to 1.12, a considerable reduction in average 
reimbursement and profitability.  The consequences of this policy change, in terms of 
hospital response, are analysed by the author.  Specifically Gilman decomposes 
‘…the overall impact of PPS refinements on hospital resource use into its selection 
and moral hazard effects, including both its marginal and its average reimbursement 
incentive components’ (Gilman, 2000, p 279). 
 
Using a modified version of Ellis and McGuire’s (1996) model, Gilman (2000) 
shows the changes in length of stay and severity of both procedural and non-
procedural DRG patients due to both moral hazard and selection effects (Table 6 in 
Gilman, 2000).  With a reduction in severity, length of stay fell for non-procedural 
and procedural DRGs (-1.19 and -3.34 days respectively).  This is termed the 
‘selection effect’.  For moral hazard effects, the average reimbursement incentive 
component led to a reduction of 3.32 days in average length of stay for non-
procedural, low priced patients, and an increase of 1.06 days for high priced, 
procedural patients.  The total effect of the average payment incentive components 
was a reduction in length of stay by 2.75 days. 
 
The author also shows that the marginal reimbursement incentive component of the 
moral hazard effect resulted in an increase in length of stay of 0.42 days for all HIV-
related DRGs.  The net effect, taking into account moral hazard and selection effects, 
was a reduction in length of stay of 3.91 days for all HIV-related DRGs.  From these 
results it is clear that the marginal reimbursement component has only a minor 
impact on length of stay and resource use.  It is also evident that hospitals increased 
the intensity of services provided to procedural patients and decreased services to 
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non-procedural patients (a shift from medical to surgical forms of treatment), 
resulting in lower average severity of both types of patients (Gilman, 2000). 
 
2.2 DEA and SFE - Applications to Hospitals/Healthcare 
This thesis examines inefficiencies in hospital service delivery in Victoria using both 
parametric and non-parametric frontier methods.  Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
is non-parametric and involves the use of linear programming methods to construct a 
frontier over the data so that each firm’s performance can be compared to this 
frontier (Coelli, 1996b).  Work on modern efficiency measurement began with Farrell 
(1957) who drew upon the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) to define a 
simple measure of firm efficiency that could account for multiple inputs under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale.  Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) 
advanced the original work by accounting for variable returns to scale.  The refined 
stochastic frontier production function (SFE) is parametric, and was independently 
proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), Battese 
and Corra (1977), and refined by Jondrow et al. (1982).  This technique was initially 
developed for use as a cross-sectional approach to measuring inefficiency until it was 
further modified to allow for the use of panel data (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984).  Both 
of these techniques have been applied to hospitals and other healthcare organisations, 
as is borne out by the ensuing discussion. 
 
Zuckerman et al. (1994) use a cross-sectional stochastic frontier multiproduct cost 
function to derive hospital-specific measures of inefficiency.  The authors recognise 
that one of the goals of Medicare’s PPS in the United States is to ‘…promote 
efficiency by rewarding hospitals that are able to keep their costs below PPS rates 
and penalizing those that are not’ (Zuckerman et al., 1994, p 256).  They also observe 
a wide range of profitability among hospitals in 1990, which they attribute in part to 
the changes in the way that hospitals are paid.  The existence of high profits for some 
hospitals and losses for others, leads the authors to question whether profitable 
institutions are efficient, and those experiencing losses are not.  If this is the case, it 
follows that inefficient hospitals should cut their costs and profitable hospitals should 
expand production (Zuckerman et al., 1994).  Their stochastic frontier model 
measures the relative efficiency of hospitals so that they can better assess the 
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relationship between profits and efficiency, thereby providing an answer to this 
question. 
 
Among their findings, the authors conclude that inefficiency ‘…accounts for 13.6 
percent of total hospital costs’ (Zuckerman et al., 1994, p 255), and that the PPS, 
which rewards efficiency and penalises inefficiency, provides ‘…hospitals with 
appropriate incentives’ (Zuckerman et al., 1994, p 275).  This is because a reduction 
in inefficiency reduces costs.  Their model shows that by removing the 13.6 percent 
estimated inefficiency this would have reduced hospital costs in the U.S. in 1991 by 
approximately $31 billion (Zuckerman et al., 1994, p 274).  The findings also 
indicate some specific relationships with inefficiency. 
 
Firstly, the model shows that there is a negative relationship between profitability 
and inefficiency, with profit rates significantly higher among relatively less 
inefficient hospitals (Zuckerman et al., 1994, p 272).  Furthermore, hospital 
occupancy rates are inversely related to inefficiency.  An increase in occupancy is 
related to lower inefficiency and lower costs in the industry.  Following on from that 
finding, therefore, a reduction in productive capacity of the average hospital, as well 
as a reduction in the number of hospitals per population, could reduce inefficiency 
(Zuckerman et al., 1994).    With regards to the degree of competition in the market, 
the findings show ‘…weak evidence that competition from other hospitals is related 
to inefficiency’ (Zuckerman et al., 1994, p 272).  As expected, the authors find a 
positive relationship between average salaries paid and inefficiency.  They note that 
this could be due to the fact that there are differences in the qualifications and mix of 
nursing staff, for example, employed at different hospitals.  Despite the advantages 
of employing higher quality staff, the results would indicate that hospitals that pay 
higher average salaries are inefficient.  This issue of quality difference is also 
relevant to the number of staff per adjusted admission.  The findings show a positive 
relationship between staff numbers, quantity of assets (intensity of input use), and 
inefficiency. 
 
This issue of quality of care is dealt with by the use of 30-day post-admission 
Medicare mortality rates and board certification of medical staff.  The authors 
acknowledge that quality is difficult to measure and they do not present their results 
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as conclusive proof of their findings.  In particular the authors examine the 
relationship between quality of care and inefficiency.  In relation to this, the findings 
show that ‘…the least efficient group of hospitals is not staffed by a more highly 
board certified staff nor is it achieving a lower observed-to-expected mortality rate 
ratio than the most efficient group’ (Zuckerman et al., 1994, p 273).  This finding 
would imply that inefficiency is not associated with higher quality healthcare. 
 
Their cost function, which relies on maximum likelihood estimators (MLE), includes 
direct measures of illness severity, output quality and patient outcomes to reduce the 
likelihood that the inefficiency estimates are capturing unmeasured differences in 
hospital outputs.  In relation to output endogeneity, although the authors reject this 
hypothesis they do treat one output, namely inpatient days, as endogenous.  
 
The motivation for Zuckerman et al. (1994) is that other studies of hospital efficiency 
estimation apply the DEA method, and many consider that method to be inferior to 
the stochastic frontier.  Hofler and Folland (1991) [as cited in Zuckerman et al. 
(1994)], for example, note that the DEA, which estimates a deterministic frontier, 
does not necessarily identify truly efficient benchmarks in the data. 
As Hofler and Folland point out this is not entirely satisfactory 
because it assumes that some observed production process (or 
combination or processes) is efficient, while ignoring that the 
observations in any data set may be subject to random fluctuations. 
(Zuckerman et al., 1994, p 258). 
 
This is particularly problematic when estimating cost functions, as it is not possible 
to establish what is the appropriate level of minimum costs, i.e. the benchmark.  The 
stochastic frontier relaxes the implicit structure embodied in DEA, and allows the 
model to identify deviations from the frontier that are not due to a hospital’s 
behaviour and, therefore, out of their control (Zuckerman et al., 1994).  These 
deviations could be the result of unusually high rates of a particular illness or 
unexpected expenditures on plant and equipment, and could be misinterpreted as 
inefficiency.  Despite the obvious thoroughness of this paper, Skinner (1994) 
challenges the use of stochastic frontiers with cross-sectional data for hospital 
efficiency measurement. 
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Skinner (1994) presents an argument based on the efficacy of basing policy decisions 
involving ‘millions of dollars’ on a statistical assumption.  Specifically, Skinner 
considers two scenarios; one where the stochastic frontier finds inefficiency where 
there is none, and one where it fails to distinguish inefficient from efficient industries 
either statistically or visually.  The argument is based on the accuracy of the error 
term of the cross-sectional stochastic frontier model, which is decomposed into noise 
and inefficiency.  In the first instance the occurrence of a random event that happens, 
for example building repairs, every 5 years, and that gives rise to increased costs, 
may be misinterpreted as inefficiency prevailing in an industry.  The use of panel 
data (a number of years of observations for a number of hospitals) would overcome 
this problem since the occurrence of a random event would not affect the results to 
any great extent.  Secondly, Skinner (1994) notes that the distribution of noise and 
that of the total error term are visually not significantly different from each other, 
leading him to question whether policy recommendations involving health 
expenditure can be based on such an error term. 
 
Skinner (1994) contends that a non-parametric DEA frontier model with panel data 
yields more robust estimates of cost differences among nursing homes or hospitals.  
It is Skinner’s view that the use of panel data will allow researchers to estimate a 
fixed effect for each health facility.  The author, therefore, prefers the non-parametric 
approach taken by Kooreman (1994a) in the same volume, notwithstanding the fact 
that it too uses cross-sectional data. 
 
In his study, Kooreman (1994a) analyses the technical efficiency of Dutch nursing 
homes with respect to the use of labour inputs using the DEA production function 
technique.  The data is based on a survey held in 1989 among all 320 nursing homes 
in The Netherlands.  Missing observations for some homes reduce the sample to 292 
homes.  Kooreman states that an important advantage of DEA, in addition to not 
having to pre-specify a functional form for the production function, is that it is 
relatively easy to handle the case of multiple inputs and outputs.  However, the 
author also states that DEA is a relative efficiency criterion.  DEA does not detect 
inefficiency of the nursing home sector as a whole, but rather the performance of 
nursing homes relative to the sector’s best performers. 
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Kooreman (1994a) differs from previous studies of the nursing home industry in that 
he estimates a primal production function whereas others estimate cost functions.  He 
posits that technical efficiency is a prerequisite for cost efficiency, so it stands to 
reason that the technical efficiency estimates of the production function will also 
provide useful insights of cost efficiency in the nursing home industry. Another 
notable difference is that his data is taken from The Netherlands, whereas others use 
U.S. data. 
 
The nursing home industry in The Netherlands is financed on the basis of prospective 
payments for the number of beds, treatment days and capital costs.  The budget 
allocated to a nursing home may result in a surplus, which is available to the home 
for future expenditure (Kooreman (1994a).  The system is regulated in that there is 
very little scope for a nursing home to select patients; rather an ‘indication 
committee’ of health care experts allocates patients to homes.  This point alone 
makes any comparisons to the hospital sector rather weak since, in the former case, 
budgets are based on historical cost with no apparent incentives built in to the 
payment system to encourage technical efficiency.  Nevertheless, the results are 
topical and relevant to the application of DEA in healthcare, and are reported here. 
 
Kooreman (1994a) shows that the nursing home sector operates under constant or 
decreasing returns to scale.  According to this assumption, the results also show that 
an unusually high number (50 percent of nursing homes) operate on the technically 
efficient DEA frontier (Kooreman, 1994a, p 309).  The stricter efficiency criterion of 
constant returns to scale produces a frontier with 21 percent of nursing homes 
operating efficiently.  Since the constant or decreasing returns criterion eliminates 
the effects of size of home from the efficiency estimates, the author proposes that this 
one is more appropriate.  In any event, the existence of government regulation 
reduces a home’s ability to determine its own size (Kooreman, 1994a). 
 
There is a second stage to Kooreman’s analysis, which examines the characteristics 
of efficient nursing homes so that the causes of inefficiency can be identified.  The 
author uses censored regression models, however he acknowledges that these models 
produce ‘…estimates that are asymptotically biased toward zero…’ (Kooreman, 
1994a, p 310).  The size of the nursing homes is explained using the number of beds, 
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the number of beds squared, and the presence of day care facilities.  The equation 
used (constant and decreasing returns), however, measures efficiency conditional on 
a given size, and eliminates size effects.  The author notes that a high occupancy rate 
would be translated into higher efficiency even though it could also be an indication 
of poor quality.  This is because if the demand for beds increases suddenly, the inputs 
required (e.g. nursing staff) cannot be increased quickly.  The efficiency score will 
improve because the ratio of inputs to outputs falls.  Therefore, quality of care is 
inversely related with efficiency since higher quality requires more inputs for a given 
output level.  The author includes quality variables such as presence of a patients’ 
council, presence of a council of patients’ relatives, presence of a procedure for 
handling complaints and a variable that indicates the absence of visiting hour 
restrictions, in order to determine this relationship (Kooreman, 1994a).  The author 
also notes that the various care requirements of patients in nursing homes will 
determine the level of resource requirements.  Volunteer staff provides some of these 
activities, and this would result in lower inefficiency.  The author also controls for 
age of patients since, generally, older patients require more resource use.  The results 
show that on average non-efficient homes use 13 percent more labour inputs per unit 
of output compared with efficient homes (Kooreman, 1994a). 
 
However, Dor (1994), in reviewing the DEA and SFE techniques, observes that DEA 
does not include a stochastic error term.  He states that in practice all random noise in 
the DEA is combined with the true inefficiency, resulting in suspect inefficiency 
scores.  The SFE method, conversely, has an advantage over DEA in that it separates 
the two sources of error.  Although Dor prefers the technique used by Zuckerman et 
al. (1994) outlined above, he acknowledges that an improved method would be to use 
panel data. 
 
Dor’s (1994) criticism of Zuckerman et at. (1994) is aimed at their use of cross-
sectional data, and the necessary reliance on maximum likelihood estimators (MLE).  
MLE have omitted variable problems in that omitted variables appear as inefficiency.  
Panel data estimators are preferable because they ‘…are less likely to yield biased 
estimates of the βs due to omitted variables, and because they require fewer 
distributional assumptions about the deterministic error (ui)’ (Dor, 1994, p 332).  
Another reason for using a panel data approach is that it allows the analyst to test for 
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endogeneity of outputs directly, rather than having to cross to the ordinary least 
squares model and then back again to the SFE, as is the case in the cross-sectional 
approach taken by Zuckerman et al. (1994). 
 
Newhouse (1994) looks at frontier estimation in health care and concludes that such 
estimates cannot be relied on when trying to apply these measures of efficiency to 
reimbursement decisions.  He states that the major difficulty is the measurement of 
output, which tends to be measures of patient days or stays.  According to Newhouse, 
the generic problem is the variation in quality of the product and its dimensionality; 
frontier techniques, in his opinion, work best when the product is homogeneous and 
one-dimensional.  Newhouse (1994) addresses the use of frontier estimation as 
generic, without acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of both techniques and 
the different results obtained from both cross-sectional and panel data.  He notes that 
omitted inputs appear as inefficiency, but this is only the case for the SFE using 
cross-sectional data.  He also attributes differences in severity of illness between 
hospitals as being mistaken for differences in efficiency since the resources required 
for treatment also differ.  It is possible to some extent to overcome this problem by 
using DRG weighted separations as measures of outputs. 
 
Kooreman (1994b), in reply to Dor (1994), Skinner (1994) and Newhouse (1994), 
suggests that DEA and SFE are complementary tools because each addresses a 
different question.  DEA uses input and output quantities to determine the level of 
technical efficiency, and SFE uses input prices, output quantities and total costs to 
determine both technical and allocative efficiency.  According to Kooreman the 
strengths of both techniques can be demonstrated in future research by using panel 
data.  He agrees that DEA and SFE results should not be simplistically taken to 
determine hospital reimbursement levels.  However, the fact that policymakers may 
prematurely base reimbursement decisions on the results of these methods ‘…does 
not impair the usefulness of DEA and SFE as descriptive and analytical tools’ 
(Kooreman, 1994b, p 346).  The use of these methods and the results they produce, 
therefore, provide a mechanism for identifying hospitals where special circumstances 
have given rise to differences in efficiency scores.  The author posits that once this is 
known, it is possible for policymakers to investigate those hospitals more closely 
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before deciding on whether or not the hospital is operating inefficiently.  ‘Thus, in 
my view DEA and SFE primarily serve as signal devices’ (Kooreman, 1994b, p 346). 
 
Following on from the above debate in 1994, another paper published in the same 
journal in 1998 uses both techniques.  Linna (1998) investigates the development of 
hospital cost efficiency and productivity in Finland in the period 1988-1994 by 
comparing both parametric and nonparametric panel models.  The parametric panel 
methods use stochastic cost frontier models with a time-varying inefficiency 
component.  The nonparametric panel methods use various DEA models to calculate 
efficiency scores and the Malmquist productivity index. 
 
Linna’s main objective in undertaking this study was to determine if the use of panel 
data models would improve the estimates of individual efficiency scores compared to 
earlier cross-sectional analyses.  The author finds that results using panel data 
suggest that a reduction in inefficiency will reduce total hospital costs by between 
‘…1.0 [and] 1.2 billion Finnish marks annually’ (Linna, 1998, p 425).  These figures 
are slightly lower than those obtained using cross-sectional models, however the 
author notes that it is difficult to measure the significance of reliability improvement 
from cross-sectional data to using a panel.  The results further indicate that the choice 
of modelling approach does not affect the results.  SFE and ‘…DEA models were 
both able to reveal that productivity progress in 1988-1994 was due to both the 
exogenous rate of technical change and to the effect of time-varying cost efficiency’ 
(Linna, 1998, p 425).  The author finds, however, that SFE and DEA methods 
produce different average efficiency scores.  Nevertheless, he concludes by saying 
that nonparametric and parametric methods used together with panel data provide a 
sufficiently clear understanding of the development of efficiency in hospital 
production to justify future studies of frontier models in health care. 
 
In an earlier journal issue of the same year Puig-Junoy (1998) uses a cross-sectional 
DEA to examine technical efficiency among Intensive Care Units (ICUs) in 
Catalonia (Spain) using a two-stage approach.  In the first stage environmental 
factors, over which the ICU has no control, are ignored.  In the second stage 
variation in operating efficiency is captured by a regression model.  By focusing on 
the services provided by ICUs, the model alleviates the problem of measuring 
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heterogeneous outputs, since all ICUs treat patients that are critically ill.  Also, the 
analysis uses patient-level data rather than aggregate data, and incorporates quality 
measures, such as mortality probability.  Despite the emphasis on quality variables, 
the author acknowledges that the analysis does not attempt to measure whether 
patients receive an appropriate amount of care; rather it presents mortality probability 
data showing severity of illness at admission.  Also, the outcomes for these patients 
are determined by survival status at discharge.  The measurement of technical 
inefficiency requires that ICUs minimise inputs given the amount of outputs 
produced.  The paper acknowledges that measuring technical efficiency is adequate 
when comparing the performance of not-for-profit institutions, such as those found in 
the hospital sector (Puig-Junoy, 1998). 
 
The choice of input set for Puig-Junoy’s model is made up of both patient illness 
characteristics and clinical practice characteristics (Puig-Junoy, 1998).  The seven 
inputs are: survival probability at admission, mortality risk level, weighted ICU days, 
non-ICU hospital days, available nurse days per patient, available physician days per 
patient, and technological availability.  The output set contains:  the number of days 
surviving in the hospital, and the surviving discharge status (Puig-Junoy, 1998, p 
268-9).  Many of the inputs used by the study, such as availability of nurse days, are 
determined exogenously and termed ‘non-discretionary’ because they cannot be 
modified when taking decisions to treat a patient.  Therefore, it is not the use of these 
non-discretionary inputs that is being examined for efficiency.  The efficiency 
estimates are determined ‘given’ these input levels, and calculated as ‘short run 
efficiency’.  The question being asked, is therefore: 
 Given the level of labour (nurses and physicians) and technology 
available in the hospital, which is the efficiency level of clinical 
management in the treatment of a critically ill patient? 
 (Puig-Junoy, 1998, p 268). 
 
The answer to this question is somewhat obvious.  In his conclusion the author notes 
that higher risk patients are managed less efficiently than lower risk patients.  The 
existence of high risk, critically ill patients indicates a need for more resource use, 
with the intention being to prevent impending death.  The author posits that devoting 
more resources to patients who eventually die is a form of inefficiency, since death 
could have been predicted to some degree. 
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  These results indicate that changes in clinical decisions may 
improve efficiency, given that the present resource allocation 
decisions do not seem to be closely related to the expected outcome. 
 (Puig-Junoy, 1998, p 275). 
 
The thrust of Puig-Junoy’s study is to determine efficiency levels of clinical 
managers in ICUs based on the fact that financing ICUs accounts for 1 percent of 
GDP and 28 percent of hospital costs in the U.S. (Puig-Junoy, 1998, p 263).  
Corresponding figures are not provided for ICUs’ health expenditure share in 
Catalonia (Spain), the subject of this study.  This could be a significant factor if the 
financing and/or reimbursement methods in the two healthcare markets (US and 
Spain) differ. 
 
Also, with the introduction of more radical surgery, made possible with better 
technology, the use of ICUs has been increasing (see Hayes, 1991).  The result is that 
with technological change and an ageing population it is increasingly possible to use 
surgical interventions on patients who were not considered good candidates prior to 
the introduction of the latest technological innovation.  This increases the reliance on 
ICUs to provide post-operative care.  Puig-Junoy’s analysis does not take this into 
account since it is based on resources used per patient.  However, technological 
innovation clearly has an effect on total health expenditures, as discussed in section 
2.1, which may be better explained using aggregate data. 
 
The author outlines various limitations of using DEA, among which are omitted 
inputs and outputs, the assumption of no measurement error, and the assumption of 
no random fluctuations in the input-output set (Puig-Junoy, 1998, p 276).  Another 
limitation of the DEA applied to healthcare, is to incorporate variables that attempt to 
measure quality, requiring value judgments and for which data is less reliable. 
 
Street (2003) provides another application of stochastic frontier estimation to the 
hospital sector using cross-sectional data for English public hospitals.  More 
specifically this paper compares the results obtained using corrected ordinary least 
squares (COLS) with results obtained using the SFE cost functions.  There are two 
alternative results obtained for the SFE model since the model is run under two 
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assumptions of the distribution of the inefficiency term, ui.  One of the SFE models 
assumes a half-normal distribution, and the other an exponential distribution.  
Furthermore, the author produces confidence intervals relating to each hospital’s 
point estimate of relative efficiency.  For the COLS model this shows the prediction 
error associated with uncertainty of parameter estimates.  For the SFE models, the 
parameter estimates are taken as known.  However the author imposes a distribution 
around the value of the inefficiency term conditional upon the total error term, εi.  
This provides critical values for the upper and lower bounds of ui. 
 
Findings from Street (2003) show quite different levels of efficiency for each 
technique.  The COLS model suggests hospitals are on average 69 percent efficient, 
whilst the SFE model reports a mean efficiency of 90 percent (Street, 2003 p 904).  
Although both models agree on which hospital is the most efficient and which is the 
least, the rate of efficiency varies, as does the ranking of hospitals in between these 
two extremes.  Quite rightly, Street posits that ‘…if the objective is to set hospital 
specific efficiency targets, it would be inadvisable to rely on a single specification of 
the error distribution’ (Street, 2003, p 904).  Clearly the use of cross-sectional data in 
these models suffers from the same problems outlined previously, namely that 
omitted variables appear as inefficiency and that periodic expenditures, which are not 
spread evenly over many years, would also appear as inefficiency for hospitals where 
they occur in the year of observation.  Street lists a number of other reasons why the 
error distribution cannot be relied on, without attributing these to the use of cross-
sectional data.  Rather, the reasons given are based specifically on the hospital 
sector’s unique characteristics such as society, regulators and hospital management 
having different notions of what they consider to be ‘efficiency’, the existence of 
excess capacity to enable emergency admissions, the inaccuracy of coding practices, 
and different accounting practices throughout the sector. 
 
Craycraft (1999) identifies the necessity for nonprofit organisations to measure 
efficiency due to the growing reliance, in particular in the US hospital sector, for 
government to base reimbursement on efficiency.  The author notes that hospitals are 
reimbursed a fixed rate to compensate for efficient treatment.  This, combined with 
the rapid increase in hospital costs, ‘…has put pressure on hospitals to improve 
efficiency’ (Craycraft, 1999, p 19).  This author’s main concern is to show how 
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important accurate efficiency measurement is in order to identify inefficiencies.  This 
process in turn provides the information necessary to realise cost savings through 
targeted inefficiency reduction. 
 
Craycraft (1999) reviews various statistical techniques used in previous research to 
measure efficiency in hospitals and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of each 
method.  The techniques compared are Ratio Analysis, Regression Analysis, and 
Frontier Analysis (DEA and SFE).  The author notes that measuring efficiency is 
difficult, and inaccurate measures of efficiency may lead to poor decisions.  If 
efficiency is improperly measured, it may lead to a misallocation of resources among 
and within hospitals.  If hospitals are considered inefficient when they are truly 
efficient, resources may be inappropriately allocated away from these hospitals. 
 
Craycraft’s overview on the SFE technique sets out its limitations when using cross-
sectional data and promotes the use of panel data to overcome these limitations.  
Specifically, the use of panel data overcomes the need to impose a functional form 
on the data.  The author nevertheless states that caution should be exercised in basing 
policy decisions on the results from any of these techniques, but notes that the SFE 
compares favourably to other techniques.   
 SFE allows better estimates of an individual hospital’s efficiency 
measure and the sources of the inefficiency (whether technical or 
allocative).  SFE also allows for the statistical and sampling errors 
common in empirical research.  However, the lack of knowledge of 
the correct functional form to use or the effects of using an 
inappropriate functional form makes interpreting the results 
difficult. 
 (Craycraft, 1999, p 25) 
 
Clearly, the SFE with panel data is superior in measuring relative efficiency because 
it overcomes the main objection to using a cross-sectional SFE, which is to impose a 
functional form on the data.  Also, panel data models require fewer assumptions 
because repeated observations on a number of decision-making units, such as 
hospitals, can take the place of strong distributional assumptions (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). 
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2.3 General Applications of DEA and SFE 
There are many general applications of frontier measurement in the literature but 
only some are outlined here.  Schmidt and Sickles (1984) provide one of the first 
applications of the SFE using panel data.  They explain that there are many 
advantages in panel data estimation, namely it is able to overcome the three serious 
difficulties inherent in SFE using cross-sectional data.  These are: 
• Increasing the sample size does not reduce the variance of the distribution of 
technical inefficiency. 
• There is unknown robustness associated with the assumptions made about the 
distribution of noise and technical inefficiency.  Statistical noise is assumed 
to have a normal distribution, and the distribution of technical inefficiency is 
assumed to be half-normal. 
• It may be incorrect to assume that inefficiency is independent of the 
regressors since firms that are aware of their levels of inefficiency will 
change their input choices. 
 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) suggest a method for testing whether some 
portion of inefficiency departures from the frontier can be systematically explained.  
That is, they modify the basic frontier estimation approach so that it incorporates 
effects of conditions that may be associated with inefficiency.  In this way their 
approach provides a framework for the analysis of the effects of potential 
determinates of inefficiency.  The authors define a production frontier as one that 
specifies maximum outputs for given sets of inputs and existing production 
technologies.  Similarly, a cost frontier defines minimum costs given output levels, 
input prices and the existing production technology.  A cross-sectional model is 
specified for three separate time periods and incorporates firm-specific effects.  The 
inefficiency model is developed to determine the reasons why inefficiency arises. 
 Inefficient performance as measured by nonattainment of the 
production or cost frontier could reflect a conflict of objectives 
among participants…, alternative objectives…, shadow factor prices 
…, or simple ineptitude. 
 (Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991, p 719). 
 
This model is applied to electricity generation data obtained for a sample of electric 
utilities. 
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 Similarly Huang and Liu (1994) develop a cross-sectional SFE that estimates 
simultaneously the production frontier and the sources of efficiency in a single-stage 
model.  That is, the model is a hybrid of the conventional stochastic frontier 
regression and a truncated regression inefficiency model.  The authors identify a 
major drawback of the conventional models of frontier estimation to be that they fail 
to recognise that some inputs contribute more to inefficiency than others.  That is, 
conventional models assume that an improvement in efficiency will shift the 
production function with no change to marginal rates of technical substitution. 
 Firms may have acquired more information, knowledge, and 
experience with respect to one input productivity than another.  
Similarly, government policy or regulation on the use of inputs and 
production processes may either be constraining or beneficial to 
some, but not to all, inputs. 
 (Huang and Liu, 1994, p 172). 
 
According to this important development, the shift in the production frontier 
resulting from improved efficiency is non-neutral because it involves both a change 
in the productivity of inputs, and a change in the marginal rates of technical 
substitution.  This is the rate at which one input can be substituted for another, for 
example capital for labour (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005).  One reason given for the 
difference in input utilisation is that, although firms may have the same production 
technology, older firms may be more efficient than younger firms due to increased 
experience in the production process.  This model is applied to data of the Taiwan 
electronics industry (Huang and Liu, 1994). 
 
Battese and Coelli (1995) note that Pitt and Lee (1981) and Kalirajan (1981) both 
adopt a two-stage approach to estimating technical inefficiency effects.  They note 
that the first stage involves estimating the stochastic frontier production function and 
predicting the technical inefficiency effects under the assumption that these 
inefficiency effects are identically distributed.  In the second stage the predicted 
technical inefficiency effects are regressed.  This contradicts the assumption of 
identical distribution made in the first stage.  Battese and Coelli (1995) proceed to 
acknowledge the work of Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu 
(1994) (outlined above), among others, and develop the single-stage SFE further by 
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introducing panel data.  This model shows that, provided the inefficiency effects are 
stochastic, it can allow for time-varying inefficiency as well as the estimation of 
technical change in the stochastic frontier.  This model is applied to the production of 
paddy farmers from an Indian village, with the null hypothesis being that the 
inefficiency effects are not stochastic and do not depend on the farmer-specific 
variables or time of observation. 
 
2.4 Australian/Victorian Healthcare 
Given that this thesis is concerned with Victoria’s public hospitals’ performance over 
four years of observation, it is not intended to thoroughly detail Australia’s health 
system and its relative performance as a whole.  Nevertheless, in order to put the 
Victorian experience into context, it is important to provide evidence of Australia’s 
health sector and funding arrangements that were in place during this period.  Donato 
and Scotton (1999), Duckett (1994), (1995) and (1999), Fetter (1991), Hall (1999), 
Lin and Duckett (1997), Magarry (1999) and Scotton and Owens (1990) provide 
evidence on the Australian and/or Victorian health care systems.  Antioch et al. 
(1999), Southon (1994), Braithwaite and Hindle (1998), Phelan (1998), Walsh 
(1996), and Hanson (1998) all contribute to the debate over whether or not DRGs 
and casemix funding will benefit the Australian health market. 
 
The Australian healthcare system is complex in the way it is funded and structured.  
Donato and Scotton (1999) provide an overview of health care arrangements in 
Australia, and the problems and issues in the system.  The authors provide detail on 
the mixed private/public nature of funding and health provision.  They also provide 
expenditure comparisons with OECD countries for the years 1975 to 1995 (Donato 
and Scotton, 1999, Table 2.2).  These figures show that Australia’s health 
expenditure trend (on average between 8 and 8.5 percent of GDP over this period) is 
consistent with most other OECD countries. 
 
Donato and Scotton distinguish between expenditure on medical services (via 
Medicare) and expenditure on health care.  They note that ‘[b]etween 1988/89 and 
1994/95 expenditure on medical services grew at an average real rate of 5.4 per cent 
per annum, compared with 3.5 per cent for health care expenditure as a whole’ 
(Donato and Scotton, 1999, p 28).  The authors note that the reason this has occurred 
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relates to the fact that medical services, provided by private practitioners (GPs and 
consultant physicians), are uncapped.  Health expenditure, however, is subject to 
high-level negotiation between the States and Territories, and the Commonwealth, 
and is set out in Medicare Agreements/Australian Healthcare Agreements (see 
Section 3.3.3 below).  Contributing to this disparity is that during the early 1990s in 
Australia there was an increase in the amount of medical services bulk-billed [see 
footnote 3].  The authors note that in 1992/93 65 per cent of medical services were 
bulk-billed, and by 1995/96 this figure rose to 71 per cent (Donato and Scotton, 
1999, p 28). 
 
Donato and Scotton (1999) acknowledge that many problems associated with 
Australia’s health system are common among OECD countries.  However, they also 
identify some problems that are unique to Australia.  These problems, according to 
the authors, exist due to the peculiar nature of the institutional and structural 
characteristics of the Australian health system.  Firstly is the problem of vertical 
fiscal imbalance, which is brought about by the dual funding of healthcare services 
by both the Commonwealth and the States.  The fact that the Commonwealth cannot 
fund public hospitals directly (under the Constitution), and the States are restricted in 
how they can raise revenue within their boundaries, results in conditional 
government grants being distributed to States according to need.  It is then the States’ 
responsibility to administer their health programs subject to the level of funding 
received.  Secondly the issue of declining private health cover has arisen due to the 
universality3 of the Medicare system.  The authors note that in 1983, the year prior to 
the introduction of Medicare, 63.7 per cent of the population was privately insured.  
One year later, following the introduction of Medicare, this figure fell to 50 per cent 
(Donato and Scotton, 1999, p 37).  The authors posit that structural instability in 
financing originates from the fact that private cover is voluntary, and the universal 
system, funded through compulsory taxation, is available to all. 
 In a private voluntary insurance system, substantial regulatory 
controls are required to mitigate the socially undesirable effects of 
competitive outcomes and market failures.  When a universal public 
program is introduced, private voluntary insurance contracts to a 
 
 
                                                 
3 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of Medicare, universal insurance coverage and bulk-billing 
arrangements in Australia. 
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 supplementary role as the social welfare function is taken over by 
the public system. 
 (Donato and Scotton, 1999, p 37). 
 
For a historical description of the evolution of casemix funding in Victoria see 
Duckett (1994) and Duckett (1995).  The author presents descriptive evidence on the 
reasons why casemix funding was designed (to improve overall efficiency and to 
reduce waiting lists) as well as providing a useful history of the development of 
diagnosis related groups in the US and Australia.  Duckett (1995) discusses the effect 
of combining budget cuts with the introduction of casemix funding in Victoria.  
Budget cuts to healthcare were proposed by the newly elected Coalition Government 
as a solution to excessive debt in that State.  The cuts were brought in over a three-
year period (July 1992 to June 1995) and were given significant assistance through 
the Government’s aggressive industrial stance.  New industrial relations laws, 
together with once-off funds, provided hospitals with the ability to make forced 
redundancies and offer early retirement, thereby reducing staffing costs.  This 
combination of circumstances resulted in a restructuring in hospitals ‘...changing the 
fixed/variable ratio – rather than simply cost reduction’ (Duckett, 1995, p 118). 
 
One of the arguments put forward against the implementation of casemix funding 
was aimed at the issue of teaching hospitals providing training and development, the 
additional costs for which would appear as greater inefficiency when compared with 
non-teaching hospitals.  This problem was addressed by dividing hospital activities 
into four categories of outputs, namely inpatient services, outpatient services, 
training and development, and other specified programs (Duckett, 1995).  This 
separation into sub-programs meant that each sub-program could be funded 
differently. 
 Separate funding arrangements were developed for each of these 
sub-programs with the inpatient sub-program being funded on a 
casemix basis and the other sub-programs being funded on a 
mixture of casemix, historic and output bases. 
 (Duckett, 1995, p 119). 
 
Duckett (1995) details the process by which resource weights for inpatient services 
were developed in Victoria, namely by utilising patient level costing systems.  The 
basic unit for payment became the weighted inlier equivalent separation (WIES).  
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This is a measure that firstly deals with exceptional cases or outliers, which are 
‘...folded into the inlier payment to create an inlier equivalent separation...’ (Duckett, 
1995).  In 1993/94 the calculation for an inlier equivalent separation was: 
)(
DRG for thestay  oflength  Average
point imoutlier tr above days Total  1   separation equivalentInlier +=  
Thus, cases with zero days above the outlier trim point would result in an IES equal 
to 1.  The denominator in the IES calculation was altered in 1994/95 to ‘2 x Average 
length of stay for the DRG’.  In this way the calculation better deals with the 
situation where costs in the first few days of admission are higher than later days, 
which is particularly relevant for long stay cases. 
)(
DRG for thestay  oflength  Average  2
point imoutlier tr above days Total  1   separation equivalentInlier ×+=  
The IES is then multiplied by the resource weight for that DRG to arrive at the 
Weighted Inlier Equivalent Separation (WIES) (Duckett, 1995).  Once this figure 
was calculated in Victoria, it was possible for payment to be made with both a fixed 
and variable component.  The total ‘benchmark efficiency price’ was set at $1650 per 
private WIES.  The fixed component was calculated to be $850 per WIES and the 
variable payment $800 per WIES (Duckett, 1995).  The variable component was 
only guaranteed up to a hospital’s activity level (separations) in 1992/93 (the base 
year).  The fixed component was also calculated using hospital activity in a base year 
(the 1992 calendar year).  Both of these components were set to reflect the costs of 
an ‘efficient’ hospital, against which all hospitals would be measured. 
 In particular, the variable payment needed to be set to reflect 
marginal costs in an efficient hospital but not to provide too great an 
incentive to expand activity. 
 (Duckett, 1995, p 120). 
 
For the variable component, activity above the base year activity level was 
reimbursed from an ‘additional throughput pool’. 
 In 1993/1994, sufficient funds were set aside to pay for a 7% 
increase in patients treated in the first year of casemix funding. 
 (Duckett, 1995, p 121). 
 
The additional throughput pool was a political tool to provide the incentive for 
hospitals to increase throughput.  The total payments from the pool were capped, in 
that the amount available in the pool was fixed, and the price per additional patient 
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treated was allowed to fluctuate.  This was necessary because Government set the 
total amount available in the pool, and the increased throughput was determined by 
hospital activity on a quarterly basis.  Thus, changing the price for additional patients 
treated ensured that the pool did not expire.  There was also an incentive in place to 
reduce waiting lists by making access to the additional throughput pool conditional 
upon meeting certain targets with regard to category 1 and 2 patients that were on the 
waiting list (Duckett, 1995). 
 
Duckett (1995) also outlines the treatment of teaching hospitals under Victorian 
casemix funding.  The author notes that, despite standardisation of cases using 
DRGs, teaching hospitals still exhibited higher costs than their non-teaching 
counterparts due to the nature of education and research conducted by them.  These 
extra costs and ‘products’ were addressed through additional funding.  This 
“...separate teaching product [was] to be funded by a ‘Training and Development 
Grant’” (Duckett, 1995, p 125). 
 
The issue of quality maintenance in hospitals was also of concern to those 
responsible for implementing casemix funding in Victoria.  Many considered that the 
move to casemix funding in pursuit of improved efficiency would endanger health 
outcomes.  This concern led to the requirement that all hospitals produce a quality 
assurance plan annually (Duckett, 1995).  Hospitals were also encouraged to 
participate in the Australian Council of Healthcare Standards accreditation process.  
Accreditation by hospitals to this organisation was rewarded with an annual specified 
grant.  Data also began to be collected from hospitals on unplanned re-admission 
rates as this was considered to be ‘...the best indicator of potential quality problems’ 
(Duckett, 1995, p 127).  Furthermore, consumer experience of hospitals was 
measured with a consumer satisfaction survey that provided data on patients’ 
perception of care received (Duckett, 1995). 
 
Duckett (1995) concludes by elaborating on the perverse incentives which are 
inherent in casemix funding, and which may work to counter ethical practice.  These 
are identified as increased unnecessary admissions, hospitals providing only 
activities for which they are paid, the neglect of altruism in health provision, and 
ethical/medical risks of medical practitioners’ early discharge decisions. 
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 Duckett (1998) compares inpatient funding arrangements across the five States that 
have either already implemented casemix funding or are intending to in the near 
future.  The author concludes by stating that differences between States should not 
preclude the possibility of learning across State boundaries, in order to achieve best 
practice in this area. 
 
Duckett (1999) deals with hospitals in Australia; their capacity and utilisation, 
funding arrangements, and how hospital services are categorised.  The author 
provides an overall picture of the Australian healthcare landscape, including statistics 
showing State and Territory comparisons for 1995/96 of the number of hospitals, 
beds, beds per 1000 population and beds per hospital for both the public and private 
sectors (Duckett, 1999, p 94, Table 5.14).  Further data are provided on the provision 
and use of acute hospitals in Australia between 1985/86 and 1993/94.  These data 
show a declining trend in the number of public acute hospital beds per 1000 
population (22 per cent) and private acute beds (7.7 per cent) over the period.  
Separate data are provided for metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions.  In rural 
areas the decline in public acute hospital beds has been more marked at almost 30 per 
cent.  The author attributes this decline to ‘...specific government policies to reduce 
bed provision...’ (Duckett, 1999, p 96).  Conversely, the rural trend for private acute 
beds per 1000 population shows an increase of over 42 per cent over the period.  The 
author attributes this trend partly to a reduction in population in those areas, and 
partly to new private hospitals being constructed in rural areas (Duckett, 1999). 
 
Duckett (1999) also identifies productivity changes with the use of data on 
admissions, average length of stay (LOS) and occupancy data.  For both public and 
private sectors over the period there is an increase of admissions per 1000 population 
of 21.6 percent and 27 per cent respectively.  These data, coupled with reduced LOS 
(by 30 and 25 percent) and increased occupancy rates (by 11 and 8 percent), show 
significant productivity improvements overall.  The author notes that LOS reduction 
is due to the increase in day-only patients and reduction in stays of long duration.  He 
attributes this trend to the effect of improvements in medical technology over the 
                                                 
4 Table 5.1 is reproduced in Chapter 4 (Table 4.5) of this thesis. 
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period (Duckett, 1999).  The author continues with an outline of the historical 
development of hospital funding in Australia, the development of the Medicare 
Agreements, and the changing share of hospital expenditure by State and 
Commonwealth sources. 
 
Duckett (1999) notes that casemix funding places incentives on hospitals to provide 
appropriate care in an efficient manner.  This is because casemix funding is paid to 
hospitals per patient treated and as a reimbursement.  Although the author 
acknowledges that hospitals cannot determine how many people present themselves, 
with varying types of illness, they do have control over the length of stay, the number 
of tests ordered, and the costs associated with hospital stays.  The incentive for 
hospitals to be more efficient with their allocated funds lies in the way that the 
‘...funder or purchaser assumes the risk for cost variations caused by variations in the 
number and type of patient treated, by setting differential prices for different types of 
patients and allowing budgets to vary with volume’ (Duckett, 1999, p 107).  The 
prices noted here are determined by grouping diagnoses by their characteristics.  
These Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs) provide a standard for differences in the 
case-mix of hospitals.  Duckett (1999) sets out the development and adoption of 
DRGs by Australian States up to 1999.  Broadly, casemix funding relies on DRG 
cost weights as a standard payment for a particular DRG.  Cases either above or 
below this ‘normal case’ (outliers) attract higher or lower payments.  These 
developments and increased reliance on economic incentives are proposed to direct 
efficiency and effectiveness of the hospital system into the new century.  Duckett 
(1999) also stresses the need for improvements to be made in the measurement of 
efficiency and, accordingly, the changing nature of hospital services/products and 
how these are defined. 
 
The literature on hospitals and government expenditure shows that there is some 
relationship between the type of government funding and overall expenditure.  
Antioch et al. (1999) compare Victoria and New South Wales using the benchmark 
funding rates for WIES.  They use data on per capita health spending in different 
States, and per capita hospital spending, after adjusting for dispersion and scale.  
From this analysis, Antioch et al. (1999) show the change in per capita public 
hospital costs in Victoria from 1991-92 to 1995-96. 
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 These comparisons showed that Victoria’s per capita public hospital 
costs, which were some $65 above New South Wales in 1991-92, 
were about $20 lower in 1995-96. 
 (Antioch et al., 1999, p 135). 
 
Antioch et al. (1999) produce multiple regressions that identify independent variables 
impacting on Victoria’s per capita expenditure (adjusted by the CPI) on recognised 
public hospitals.  These variables include Victorian Gross State Product per capita, 
the unemployment rate in Victoria, the proportion of public beds to total public and 
private beds in Victoria, a dummy variable for the introduction of casemix funding 
and funding cuts, and the ratio of non-same-day separations to same-day separations 
in Victorian public hospitals.  The authors take results from the OECD’s 1993 cross-
country econometric work that explores factors affecting health spending, and use 
them to estimate their model.  The OECD results indicate that countries that pay 
physicians by capitation, countries where patients pay the provider and then seek 
reimbursement and countries with more doctors per capita all have lower overall 
expenditure.  Among the key findings for their research Antioch et al. (1999) note 
that, as expected, funding cuts and the introduction of casemix funding led to falls in 
expenditure on recognised public hospitals.  They stress, however, that the 
introduction of casemix funding did not cause funding cuts. 
 Clearly, casemix funding did not cause funding cuts; it was 
introduced at the same time as the funding cuts.  Casemix funding 
simply provided the incentives to change the method allocating the 
funds that were available. 
 (Antioch et al., 1999, p 148). 
 
Phelan (1998) provides an explanation as to why DRG-based funding was 
necessarily implemented in Victoria.  He notes the overall cost savings generated 
since its implementation and provides both the benefits and possible problems 
associated with DRG-based funding.  The author acknowledges that budget cuts 
were necessary in Victoria, and that DRGs assisted the process by making budget 
cuts more equitable across hospitals.  Also, DRG-based funding improved work 
practices, and altered the management mix in hospitals. 
 Many hospitals realised that, if they were to manage the changes 
successfully, they had to involve clinicians in senior management, 
as their decisions are responsible for about 80% of healthcare costs. 
 (Phelan, 1998, p 560). 
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Phelan (1998) notes other successes in Victoria stemming from the introduction of 
DRG-based funding.  Among these were less (expensive) investigations, better 
managed length of stay, and the deliberate move to day-only surgery.  Also, 
discharges were no longer delayed pending the twice-weekly consultant ward round 
(Phelan, 1998). 
 
In terms of deficiencies of the way DRGs were applied in Australia, Phelan (1998) 
notes that the version of DRGs adopted by the Commonwealth was out of date and, 
therefore, resisted by clinicians.  Also, with the exception of Victoria, there were 
insufficient incentives for hospitals to collect patient-level data for costing purposes.  
The issue of heterogeneity of cases also impacts on the effectiveness of DRG-based 
funding.  Phelan (1998) posits that DRGs should only be used to fund hospitals with 
similar patient mix.  He also notes that small hospitals are disadvantaged because 
they ‘...do not have sufficient throughput to balance out variability’ (Phelan, 1998, p 
560). 
 
Hanson (1998) provides evidence on the limitations to using Australian National 
DRGs (AN-DRGs).  These limitations include inadequate measures of severity of 
illness being incorporated into DRGs, and the poor quality of patient data available 
to form the groups.  The author also suggests that DRG-based funding was 
developed too quickly and resulted in perverse incentives as healthcare providers 
struggle for survival. 
 A DRG-based payment system is meant to be about allocative 
efficiency, and not about increased throughput and profiteering.  In 
an underfunded healthcare environment it should have come as no 
surprise that perverse incentives would be difficult to control, and 
that the focus would not be on quality and outcomes, but rather on 
the survival of healthcare services. 
 (Hanson, 1998, p 561). 
 
This point regarding the reason why DRG-based funding was implemented is central 
to the controversy over whether the new funding arrangements are viewed as 
beneficial or not.  Clearly, the issue of whether the intention is to improve allocative 
efficiency or technical efficiency is important in whether or not the funding method 
is accepted by clinicians and commentators.  Those authors who are not entirely 
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against the use of casemix funding based on DRGs5 present arguments for casemix 
funding based on improvements in productivity.  Productivity is defined as increased 
output for a given input, and forms part of technical efficiency.  Those authors who 
present arguments against the use of a DRG-based payment system do so with 
concerns of reduced quality and reduced services provided by hospitals.  These are 
issues of allocative efficiency because they deal with the combination of 
products/services being produced due to the alteration in the way that resources are 
allocated in the production process.  The new funding arrangements alter the 
incentives to produce and, therefore, may impact negatively on allocative efficiency.  
The point of contention is whether these negative effects (by not producing what 
society wants) on allocative efficiency counteract the positive impact (improved 
productivity) that casemix funding has on technical efficiency. 
 
Another contrary view to using DRGs in the casemix funding process is provided by 
Braithwaite (1994) and Braithwaite and Hindle (1998).  The authors argue that DRGs 
take a simplistic view of variations in patients’ needs (including severity of illness 
and comorbidity).  They state that DRGs fail to respond with sufficient speed to 
developments in technology and science and are out of date by the time they are 
used.  They also argue that there are data problems involved in the clinical process 
such as coding errors, misdiagnoses and medical uncertainties.  The use of DRGs, 
however, suggests that classifying patients can be scientific and precise.  Braithwaite 
and Hindle (1998), although generally in agreement, contradict Hanson (1998) 
above, to the extent that they consider that DRG funding attempts to promote 
technical efficiency, whereas Hanson (1998) (see above) posits that DRG-based 
payment systems are about allocative efficiency. 
 DRG funding attempts to promote technical efficiency in only one 
part of the healthcare sector – the acute care of inpatients. 
 (Braithwaite and Hindle, 1998, p 558). 
 
Braithwaite and Hindle (1998) also point to some ethical considerations in applying 
economics to healthcare.  The authors note that neoclassical economists espouse that 
productivity and efficiency are driven by incentives, whereas healthcare workers are 
motivated ‘from within’ to provide quality care to patients (Braithwaite and Hindle, 
                                                 
5 See for example Walsh (1996), Phelan (1998) and Duckett (1999). 
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1998, p 559).  Whilst it is true that paid nursing staff and allied workers do 
exceptional work with regard to improving health outcomes of patients, the issue of 
efficiency deals with the way that resources are managed.  That is, the focus of DRG-
based funding is on managerial decision-making, and not individual staff job 
descriptions.  Ethical arguments against DRG-based payments are emotionally 
charged and offer populist viewpoints that do not necessarily aid in the advancement 
of finding better ways to apply increasingly scarce resources to the growing market 
for healthcare. 
 
Walsh (1996) contends that casemix funding is a major advance over the historical 
budgeting procedure that existed in Victoria prior to July, 1993.  He also argues that 
under casemix funding there is a focus on efficiency and much greater accountability 
for the use of funds and hospital management performance.  Among the 
achievements under casemix funding, the author notes an increase in productivity in 
Victorian hospitals with ‘...15% more work with 10% less money since 1992-93’ 
(Walsh, 1996, p 133).  The list of achievements includes a 30% increase in day-only 
cases (spanning over 2 years), increased throughput, declining waiting lists, and 
improved emergency access.  Among the disadvantages of casemix funding, the 
author notes that ‘[t]here is still too much emphasis on inpatients and too much 
emphasis on throughput’ (Walsh, 1996, p 133).  The issue of ‘averaging’ is also 
considered a disadvantage since hospitals that specialise have only a limited number 
of patient categories and many of these may require intensive care treatment, which 
is costly and requires longer stays. 
 
Southon (1994) offers a perspective on Victoria’s health reforms in light of long-
term effects.  He argues that hospitals do not operate like traditional markets since a 
third party is involved in payment for patient services, and outlines the existence of 
perverse incentives in health markets6.  Southon (1994) notes that the move to a 
‘managed market’ for healthcare in Victoria may significantly increase 
administrative costs rather than reduce them.  The author argues that costs may rise 
due to increased workloads associated with maintaining the fee schedule, responding 
to hospital appeals for special treatment, and ongoing alteration of hospital strategies 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of market failure and asymmetric information in health markets, see Evans (1984) 
(outlined in Chapter 4 of this thesis) and Donato and Scotton (1999) in this chapter. 
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to ensure that they remain competitive (Southon, 1994).  Furthermore, the author 
identifies institutional effects of hospitals that, together with change in management 
style required under reforms, could impact detrimentally on hospital performance in 
the longer term (Southon, 1994).  In conclusion, the author states that the Victorian 
experiment is a brave initiative that has been met with some early successes.  He also 
states that inherent management costs in health reforms could detract from service 
provision, degrading long-term clinical capabilities. 
 
Lin and Duckett (1997) provide a summary of the health reform process in Victoria 
in terms of the introduction of casemix funding.  The authors express concerns over 
the effect of DRGs on quality outcomes where hospital activity could be 
misinterpreted as efficiency without regard to outcomes.  Further descriptions of the 
Victorian health reform agenda can be found in Fox (1996), and Tonti-Fillippini 
(1996). 
 
In 1997 the Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service 
Provision published a report with various applications of the DEA technique to 
government services.  One of the case studies in this report details the results of an 
application of DEA to Victorian hospitals for a single year, 1994-95.  Since only a 
single year’s data is collected, the analysis reports on relative technical efficiency of 
hospitals, rather than efficiency scores over time (Steering Committee, 1997). 
 
2.5 Hospital Mergers 
Given that Victorian hospitals experienced considerable merger activity during the 
period under observation, it is relevant to review literature on hospital mergers.  
Lynk (1995) measures efficiencies in hospitals following mergers, and finds that 
significant real efficiencies are created through mergers.  This arises because mergers 
between hospitals result in increased specialisation, where particular clinical services 
are consolidated.  For example, one hospital campus would contain all paediatrics, 
and another all cardiac surgery.  Lynk also ascribes efficiencies arising from staffing 
cost reductions due to less variability of daily patient census following mergers.  This 
paper is challenged by Keeler et al. (1999) and Dranove and Ludwick (1999). 
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Keeler et al. (1999) find that higher hospital concentration leads to higher prices.  
This is corroborated by Dranove and Ludwick (1999) who find that mergers of non-
profit hospitals result in higher prices.  The authors propose that they are able to 
correct for the problems in Lynk’s analysis associated with the endogeneity of 
market share, the need to control for severity/quality of illness and the need to 
exclude low concentration markets.  With regard to severity and quality, the authors 
contend that these are inversely related to concentration.  Dranove and Ludwick 
(1999) also quote evidence that suggests that scale economies enable hospitals in 
more competitive markets to offer more ‘hi-tech’ services that may enhance quality 
of care.  Also, they note that the most up-to-date technology attracts better skilled 
physicians, leading to improved outcomes. 
 
In response to this challenge, Lynk and Neumann (1999) present arguments that 
defend the findings in Lynk (1995).  The authors suggest that Dranove and Ludwick 
(1999) and Keeler et al. (1999) focus their attention on an empirical finding that was 
not central to the 1995 paper.  They also contend that these recent findings confirm 
Lynk’s earlier work and that hospital pricing data cited by Dranove and Ludwick and 
Keeler et al. actually confirms that the non-profit hospital pricing tendencies in 
Michigan are consistent with allowing a hospital merger to take place.  They also 
note that their own evidence is consistent with the other authors in that they find that 
non-profit and for-profit hospitals behave differently in terms of the characteristics of 
hospital pricing. 
 
Frech and Danger (1998) deal with exclusive contracts between hospitals and 
physicians, and explore antitrust issues in rural markets.  The article analyses the 
economic motivation for hospital-physician exclusive contracts and assesses under 
what circumstances such contracts may be anticompetitive in intent and effect.  They 
conclude that both hospital and physician market power is declining as managed care 
plans make the environment more competitive.  However, they also note that there 
are developments, such as large provider networks, that could decrease competition. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
This review of the literature highlights the key issues that are significant in the 
development of this thesis.  Whether hospitals manage their inputs (resources) 
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efficiently relies to a great extent on policymakers putting in place the correct 
incentives to bring about desired behaviour.  Policymakers have many issues to 
consider when determining the structure of incentives, since the operations of public 
hospitals are complex and exhibit relationships and processes that do not exist in the 
competitive market.  The cost-increasing effect of new technology, for example, is an 
area requiring particular attention.  It is widely recognised that innovations stemming 
from research and development are a desirable outcome in the pursuit of improving 
living standards generally.  In medicine, technological advances improve medical 
capabilities, thereby reducing patient recovery time, and/or improving procedural 
success rates.  These benefits accrue directly to patients and also indirectly to the 
wider community when consideration is made of reducing the amount of work time 
lost to hospitalisation and/or illness.  The increased costs, however, accrue to the 
healthcare sector and are subject to the funding arrangements in place. 
 
Casemix funding arrangements were implemented in Victoria in order to put an end 
to historical budgets, reduce costs, and to put in place incentives to improve technical 
efficiency in healthcare.  One point that arises in the literature is predicated upon 
whether DRG weights used in casemix funding should be related to the performance 
of procedures (retrospective), or whether they should be related to actual diagnoses 
(prospective).  Payments based on retrospective DRGs are associated with increased 
reimbursement since these DRGs are treatment-related and, depending on severity of 
illness, carry relatively higher weights.  More intensive treatment is further enabled 
by the existence and use of new technology which, in turn, provides patients with 
surgical options that increase treatment costs.  DRGs that capture actual diagnoses, 
and that are prospective, are a better tool for ensuring that resources will be used 
efficiently in treatment.  Uncertainty arises, however, due to the fact that initial 
clinical diagnoses are not always correct and, concomitantly, retrospective DRGs 
better reflect the imprecise nature of clinical practice decisions. 
 
Frontier methods have previously been applied to hospitals and healthcare providers 
elsewhere.  These methods are all aimed at identifying inefficiency and the reasons 
why it exists in healthcare.  The findings show that inefficiency and hospital 
profitability are inversely related, whereas excess capacity, higher costs, and 
inefficiency are positively related.  Results that purport to measure quality of care are 
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proffered cautiously due to the subjective nature of the data being considered.  The 
use of frontier methods in comparing hospital efficiency is defended, however, on 
the grounds that both the DEA and SFE techniques provide ‘signal devices’ that alert 
policymakers to possible differences in the way that individual hospitals manage 
their funding.  A great deal of debate in the literature centres on the issue of whether 
to use DEA or SFE, with either cross-sectional or panel data.  On balance it would 
appear from the literature that the strongest arguments put forward for comparing 
hospitals for efficiency favour the use of the SFE using panel data. 
 
In order to develop an understanding of Victoria’s experience with casemix funding 
arrangements, the evidence is reviewed for the Australian healthcare system.  It is 
clear from this that Australia is unique in the way that healthcare is funded and 
structured.  Vertical fiscal imbalance (spawned by the Australian Constitution) 
provides the backdrop for understanding the separation of health funding by the 
Commonwealth and States.  Similarly, the parallel existence of public and private 
health systems, and the incentives that direct consumer choice between the two are 
issues that impact directly on total public health expenditure.  This literature feeds 
into the issue of policymakers determining where and how limited funds are 
allocated such that the growing demand for health services is adequately met without 
wasting resources.  Casemix funding is a tool, therefore, designed to enable 
policymakers to execute these objectives.  For all the objections raised to casemix 
funding being implemented, it is apparent that on balance the Victorian experience 
has successfully aided our ability to at least influence the allocation of scarce 
resources, even if not to improve productivity.  This thesis will show that it was, in 
fact, hospital merger activity following Victoria’s move to casemix funding that 
secured the efficiency gains that Victorian policymakers were seeking, and not 
improved efficiencies within individual hospitals. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Background to the Methods 
 
 
3.1 Overview 
There are three techniques used in this thesis that, collectively, contribute to 
understanding the effect of health reforms and casemix funding in Victoria.  The first 
is survivor analysis, which identifies economies of scale and optimum organisational 
size.  The second is data envelopment analysis, which compares efficiency of public 
hospitals by producing a deterministic frontier.  The third is the stochastic frontier 
estimation technique, which also compares efficiency of public hospitals, but with a 
frontier that contains a stochastic error term.  These three techniques are discussed 
individually to clarify and expose their underlying assumptions, advantages and 
limitations. 
 
3.2 Survivor Analysis 
The survivor analysis technique was developed to measure and reveal the optimum 
size of organisations, where ‘optimum’ refers to efficient size given the environment 
within which firms operate (Stigler, 1958).  An organisation’s scale is therefore 
closely aligned with its use of resources, leading to either economies or diseconomies 
of scale, depending on how well those resources are combined.  Stigler’s work that 
develops this technique provides some useful insights into the theory of economies 
of scale.  This theory forms the foundations upon which the survivor technique is 
built. 
 The theory of the economies of scale is the theory of the relationship 
between the scale of use of a properly chosen combination of all 
productive services and the rate of output of the enterprise. 
 (Stigler, 1958, p 54). 
 
 
Although the technique relies upon the existence of the competitive market 
mechanism to drive efficiency, it can be used to examine efficiency in hospitals, for 
example, where public policy has altered such that funding becomes conditional 
upon hospitals attaining improved efficiency in production.  In the case of California, 
public policy changes in the 1980s resulted in a deregulated private and public health 
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insurance industry, presenting an opportunity to apply the survivor technique (Frech 
and Mobley, 1995).  Similarly, this thesis shows that health reforms in Victoria, 
which included the switch to casemix funding, had an analogous effect in that the 
new policy mimics the competitive market by requiring public hospitals to improve 
efficiency levels (Duckett, 1994). 
 
Stigler posits that the survivor technique is able to determine efficient organisational 
size due to its underlying assumption, which is that ‘...competition of different sizes 
of firms sifts out the more efficient enterprises’ (Stigler, 1958, p 55).  This 
assumption was first made by Mill (1909) who recognises that firms in the same 
business, that are able to undersell their competitors, will prevail since they are more 
profitable. 
 
The basic technique works by classifying firms in an industry by size and calculating 
market share for each class over time.  As the market share of a particular class falls 
over time, then that group is considered relatively inefficient.  The quicker the 
reduction in market share, then the more inefficient is the particular sized group 
(Stigler, 1958).  Stigler also notes that firms that survive do so because they are 
better able to cope with ‘strained labor relations, rapid innovation, government 
regulation, unstable foreign markets, and what not’ (Stigler, 1958, p 56); 
environmental factors that all firms in the industry are subjected to at the time.  Frech 
and Mobley (1995), in their application of this technique to California short-term 
general hospitals, note that grouping hospitals according to number of beds, rather 
than bed days, best represents size.  This obviates the problem of confusing the 
results obtained from medium sized low-occupancy hospitals with small sized high-
occupancy hospitals. 
 
Stigler (1958) acknowledges that the survivor technique does not attempt to measure 
the socially optimum efficient size; which may be altogether different from the 
survivor optimum.  The social optimum would take into account misuse of market 
power arising from monopoly power and discriminatory practices in labour relations.  
Stigler notes that the social optimum is ‘...fundamentally an ethical concept...’ 
(Stigler, 1958, p 56).  This point is also pertinent in measuring optimum size of 
hospitals.  Clearly, the existence of either economies or diseconomies of scale is not 
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necessarily analogous to the social optimum size of hospitals.  Rather, the survivor 
technique provides descriptive estimates of optimal size, which helps to identify the 
surviving size ranges (Shepherd, 1967). 
 
Shepherd (1967, p 114) provides some advantages and limitations of survivor 
analysis.  Three advantages are that the technique: 
1. Finesses the problem of the capitalization of rents into costs; 
2. Deals directly with plant size; and, 
3. Reflects trends and adaptive processes in industries, rather than dealing only 
with single periods. 
The first advantage deals with the process that drives average costs towards equality.  
Shepherd notes that this problem has been long recognised and has ‘seriously 
undermined the cross-section and time-series cost studies’ (Shepherd, 1967 p 114).  
The second point means that there are no problems in having to define the unit of 
output to allocate joint costs correctly.  The survivor estimates deal directly with the 
plant size.  Thirdly, Shepherd notes that this technique ‘...embraces dynamic 
elements which could tie its results in with an analysis of industrial behaviour which 
tries to go beyond traditional static-equilibrium assumptions’ (Shepherd, 1967, p 
114).  Despite these advantages, Shepherd notes that the technique cannot be used on 
its own, rather it may generate ‘...preliminary or supplementary indications of certain 
ranges in industry cost functions’ (Shepherd, 1967 p 116).  The reason for caution is 
borne out by the technique’s limitations, some of which, identified by Shepherd, are 
noted below. 
 
According to Shepherd the first limitation of the technique is the fact that its 
estimates of optimality are descriptive, not normative, and do not provide 
information on what the level of efficiency should be.  The estimates of optimality 
tell us ‘...what is, not necessarily what is optimum or efficient in terms of net social 
costs (Shepherd, 1967, p 115)7.  Furthermore, Shepherd states that this limitation is 
most severe in those industries where normative estimates are warranted, such as 
industries with market imperfections; industries that require public policy.  Also, in 
terms of the scale economies that result from the technique, Shepherd notes that the 
                                                 
7 Stigler (1958) acknowledges this limitation, as noted above. 
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results show the borders of a range, not the more indicative degree of scale 
economies.  He goes on to describe how the survivor technique, in identifying a 
range of ‘optimal size’, mistakenly purports to equate this range with one of 
‘constant costs’.  However, firms within an optimal size range may exhibit increased 
revenues over the period, not necessarily lower costs.  Since firms within a size range 
still vary in size, they may also therefore vary in costs (Shepherd, 1967).  Another 
limitation is that the technique treats single-plant and multi-plant firms alike, without 
regard to the fact that large firms are more likely to have relatively larger plant than 
small firms.  Similarly, the years chosen for analysis will affect the results if, for 
example, a firm temporarily reduces output during the period under investigation. 
 
Frech and Mobley (1995) note that an advantage of survivor analysis is that it 
includes ‘...factor which often cannot be measured and used in statistical studies of 
cost or production’ (Frech and Mobley, 1995, p 288).  This is because as market 
shares change over time, it is an indication of a firm’s unique situation; i.e., its 
management strategy and output quality.  In order to overcome the limitations of the 
basic survivor technique outlined by Shepherd (1967), Frech and Mobley also extend 
the technique to a second analysis by utilising the multivariate model originally 
proposed by Keeler (1989).  Frech and Mobley’s second analysis estimates a binary 
model (the firm grew or did not grow) but stresses a continuous growth version.  
This multivariate model controls for other factors such as chain affiliation, adverse 
selection and local market conditions on survivorship, in addition to efficiency, all of 
which enhance growth of firms.  They find, nevertheless, that the results from this 
second model are similar to Stigler’s basic univariate model for scale economies. 
 The multivariate approach is intrinsically interesting but it is not 
important for estimating scale economies in this data...These 
equations are similar in spirit to the basic Stigler-type survivor 
analysis presented above.  The results are very close to those of the 
three multivariate equations.  Focusing on the unweighted versions 
for simplicity, the predicted scale economies are identical. 
 (Frech and Mobley, 1995, p 292). 
 
These results suggest that the basic univariate model is an appropriate and useful tool 
in determining hospital scale economies, especially when the results are viewed in 
conjunction with results using other methods, such as frontier estimation techniques. 
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3.3 Data Envelopment Analysis 
Measures of efficiency provide economic policymakers with the tools necessary to 
compare firms or industries in relation to their use of inputs in the production of 
outputs.  Farrell (1957) identifies the problems that arise when efficiency is measured 
using a theoretical function specified by engineers, and develops an empirical 
function based on best results obtained in practice.  The theoretical function, 
although useful when looking at a single production process, fails to accommodate 
the complexities known to exist in a single manufacturing firm or in industries.  One 
such complexity is the use of indirect labour, which cannot be easily estimated 
theoretically.  ‘Thus, the more complex the process, the less accurate is the 
theoretical function likely to be’ (Farrell, 1957, p 255).  The author argues that a 
benchmark for comparing efficiency should be realistic (i.e., best results obtained in 
practice) to avoid ‘unfortunate psychological effects’ that may arise when 
performances are measured against some unattainable ideal. 
 
In a simple case, the efficiency model proposed by Farrell illustrates a measure of the 
technical efficiency of a firm using two factors of production (inputs) to produce a 
single output under conditions of constant returns to scale.  In order to explain the 
workings of the model, Farrell assumes that the efficient production frontier is 
known8.  The author uses a production isoquant diagram which illustrates the 
technical and allocative efficiency measures.  It is duplicated in Fig. 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 –Technical and Allocative Efficiency Measures 
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   Source:  Farrell (1957) p 254. 
 
                                                 
8 The efficient frontier is of course estimated from the data using the linear programming technique, 
data envelopment analysis, later developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). 
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From Fig. 3.1 it is possible to identify technical efficiency, allocative efficiency and 
economic efficiency9.  Point P in Fig. 3.1 is the actual level of input combination of a 
firm, and the isoquant SS′ is the assumed efficient production frontier for the 
industry.  The assumptions made for the production isoquant are that it is convex to 
the origin and secondly, that the isoquant is nowhere positive.  Convexity ensures 
that if two points are attainable, then so is a weighted average of the two.  The non-
positive requirement must hold otherwise ‘…increased applications of both factors 
would result in reduced output’ (Farrell, 1957, p 256).  The firm operating at point P 
is inefficient because, according to the frontier, it could reduce the quantities of 
inputs x and y and still produce the same level of output on the isoquant at point Q.  
Thus, technical efficiency of firm P is given as the ratio 0Q/0P. 
 
Figure 3.1 also shows an input price ratio (also assumed) of AA′.  Given this tangent 
to the isoquant, it is possible to identify allocative efficiency at point Q′.  Thus, even 
though any point along the isoquant is considered technically efficient, there is only 
one point on the isoquant that is considered to be the optimal combination of both 
inputs to produce the efficient level of output.  This optimal point is determined by 
the ratio 0R/0Q, which shows by how much factor costs will further need to be 
reduced in order for the firm to have allocative efficiency.  Thus, total economic 
efficiency is the product of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency: 
   EE = (0Q/0P) x (0R/0Q) = 0R/0P 
It should be noted that when Q′ is achieved by altering the combination of inputs, it 
may be the case that technical efficiency will also change, thus altering the position 
and/or shape of the production isoquant10.  This qualification is acknowledged by 
Farrell when he notes that, regardless of this, EE is the best measure of total 
efficiency available (Farrell, 1957).  Notwithstanding Farrell’s qualification, it is 
intended to focus solely on the measurement of technical efficiency in this thesis. 
 
The production isoquant can be better understood if illustrated as a piecewise linear 
convex isoquant.  At the very foundation of constructing a production isoquant is the 
                                                 
9 These are noted by Farrell as technical efficiency, price efficiency and overall efficiency 
respectively. 
10 The main reason that DEA is used in this thesis to measure technical efficiency, and not total 
efficiency, of Victorian hospitals is due to the uncertainty surrounding the shape of the production 
isoquant following a change in input combination. 
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assumption of convexity for which two observed points on the isoquant share a 
weighted average of all points between them.  Thus a straight line between two 
observed points (actual firms) contains a hypothetical firm that produces the same 
level of output.  Fig. 3.2 illustrates the piecewise linear convex isoquant with many 
firms using inputs x and y in differing combinations in the production process.  
Actual firms that lie on the isoquant determine its shape, with hypothetical firms 
(unmarked) lying on the straight line portion in between observed firms. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Piecewise Linear Convex Isoquant 
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From Fig. 3.2 the dashed line from the origin represents the input proportions of x 
and y of an inefficient firm.  Where the dashed line passes through the straight line 
portion of the isoquant represents the hypothetical firm’s production, ie a weighted 
average of two existing ‘efficient’ firms11, but using the same input proportions (x 
and y) of the inefficient firm, most notably in smaller quantities.  The formation of a 
hypothetical firm is noted by Farrell as being the essence of the method, and not the 
use of an isoquant diagram.  In the case of multiple inputs and outputs the diagram is 
abandoned, however the principle of forming a hypothetical firm remains. 
 
Farrell (1957) also provides the mathematical generalized case of multiple inputs and 
outputs to show how to calculate inefficient firms’ distance from the assumed 
isoquant.  Since this is a problem of minimising inputs, the first consideration is to 
find the efficient points (firms) that establish the best results obtained in practice.  
Therefore a pair of points, and the straight line between them, must satisfy two 
conditions: 
                                                 
11 The two points on the isoquant are actual firms that are labelled in the literature as ‘peers’ of the 
inefficient firm. 
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(i) that the slope of the line is not positive; and, 
(ii) that no observed point lies between it and the origin (Farrell, 
1957, p 256). 
 
With these conditions satisfied, the two chosen points will provide the best results 
obtained because they represent firms in an industry that are able to use the relatively 
minimum amount of inputs in the production process.  These firms, along with others 
that satisfy the above conditions, form an efficiency benchmark for the industry 
under consideration.  This discussion relates only to the estimation of technical 
efficiency, and Farrell observes that this is a relatively uncomplicated measure of 
efficiency when compared to the difficulties associated with the measurement of 
allocative efficiency.  For example, there is the assumption that firms face identical 
prices in the measurement of allocative efficiency12, but this is not a consideration 
for measuring technical efficiency.  Despite this relative advantage, Farrell also 
makes certain qualifications when interpreting technical efficiency. 
 
Among the limitations of the measurement of relative technical efficiency is that any 
increase in the number of firms under consideration may reduce technical efficiency 
of a given firm relative to other firms, but never increase its relative technical 
efficiency.  This is because as the size of the sample increases, the probability 
increases that additional firms will produce in relatively more efficient ways.  Farrell 
illustrates this by observing that ‘…a firm may be highly efficient by British 
standards, but not by world standards’ (Farrell, 1957, p 260).  Secondly, inputs are 
not always homogeneous and there may be significant quality differences, such as 
the quality of skilled labour.  This point highlights the difficulty in separating 
managerial decision-making from the differences in quality of factors of production 
in the efficiency estimate.  Farrell notes that ‘…it is never possible to decide 
precisely…how far the laziness and intractability of a particular firm’s labour force is 
ingrained and how far the product of bad management’ (Farrell, 1957, p 260).  
Furthermore, the omission of an input that is utilised by one firm more than others 
will result in that firm having a higher technical efficiency estimate.  Despite these 
limitations, Farrell notes that technical efficiency is a satisfactory way of measuring 
efficiency. 
                                                 
12 Refer to Fig. 3.1 for an illustration of identical prices using price line AA′. 
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 Technical efficiency is, therefore, a measure that provides information to the 
policymaker on whether to alter management practices, without the factor price 
problems associated with allocative efficiency.  Farrell notes that the allocative 
efficiency measure is dubious due to the fact that it is sensitive to the introduction of 
new observations.  Problems arise when new observations affect the slope of the 
price line together with the curvature of the production isoquant.  This is because a 
straight price line indicates an unrealistic perfectly elastic supply curve for each 
input.  However, the supply curve is usually positively sloped, resulting in higher 
prices for increased use of an input.  At the inelastic end of the production isoquant, 
therefore, the ratio for allocative efficiency, 0R/0Q from Fig. 3.1, will understate the 
firm’s true allocative efficiency (Farrell, 1957, p 261). 
 
These concepts drawn together by Farrell (1957) provide the foundations for later 
developments of efficiency measurement using linear programming methods.  
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) were the first to label the method Data 
Envelopment Analysis with their mathematical programming model for constant 
returns to scale (CRS).  The model was further developed to accommodate variable 
returns to scale (VRS) by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984).  The computer 
program that conducts the calculations based on this work is produced by Coelli 
(1996b).  This section has outlined some advantages and limitations of the use of 
technical efficiency measurement as a tool for comparing firms.  Advantages and 
limitations of the DEA technique are set out in Chapter 2 (sections 2.2 and 2.3) of 
this thesis. 
 
3.4 Stochastic Frontier Estimation13
The origins of efficiency measurement discussed above also influenced the 
development of Stochastic Frontier Estimation (SFE).  SFE is the econometric 
(parametric) method of efficiency estimation.  Traditionally, econometricians 
estimated production, cost and profit functions under the assumptions that producers 
operate on the functions and that they maximise or minimise accordingly.  The SFE 
model recognises that these assumptions are unrealistic; that, due to a number of 
                                                 
13 Also referred to as Stochastic Frontier Analysis in the literature. 
 53
reasons, not all producers are successful in minimising inputs or maximising profits.  
Modern efficiency measurement uses econometrics to reformulate the functions into 
frontiers.  In the case of a production frontier, the model calculates the minimum 
input bundle required to produce a given output.  Firms who do not restrict their 
inputs to this minimum bundle are identified as being inefficient; their production 
lies beneath an estimated production frontier.  The distance from the frontier is 
measured using a composed error term.  Part of the error term captures the traditional 
symmetric random noise (v) and the other part (u) captures the inefficiency 
component and is one-sided.  For a production frontier the error term is (v - u), is 
negatively skewed and has a negative mean.  The production frontier model is 
stochastic because it recognises the existence of random variation in the operating 
environment.  The inefficiency component is one-sided due to various types of 
inefficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) set out an interesting historical development of 
modern efficiency measurement, with a sequence of development that clarifies the 
separation of efficiency measurement into the two separate streams, namely DEA 
and SFE.  The sequence begins in the 1950s with a paper that defines technical 
efficiency (Koopmans, 1951), work that develops distance functions (Debreu, 1951 
and Shephard, 1953), and Farrell (1957) who was the first to measure productive 
efficiency empirically. 
 
Farrell’s contribution to the literature is largely responsible for the emergence of both 
SFE and DEA.  On the one stream, Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes’ (1978) DEA paper 
is a direct extension of Farrell’s paper.  Development of the DEA technique followed 
directly from this point.  However, earlier work (in the late 1960s and early 1970s), 
which led directly to the estimation of the SFE, was also heavily influenced by 
Farrell’s paper.  This earlier work was undertaken by Aigner and Chu (1968), Seitz 
(1971), Timmer (1971), Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974).  These five papers are 
similar in that they all estimate a deterministic production function ‘…either by 
means of linear programming techniques or by modifications to least squares 
techniques requiring all residuals to be nonpositive’ (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p 
7).  Together with Schmidt (1976), these models still consisted of a combined error 
term to measure inefficiency and ‘…they were purely deterministic frontier models 
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lacking a symmetric random-noise error component’ (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, 
p 7). 
 
The above literature refined the efficiency measurement process to the point where in 
1977 three independent papers were published that are now credited with SFE 
origination.  These papers are Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977).  The element of the model that 
marks the new step to SFE lies in the error term.  Common to all three papers is that 
they all consist of a composed error term, making their models stochastic, and they 
all develop models based in the context of production frontiers (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000).  The SFE model is expressed as: 
 ( ) { }uvxfy −⋅= exp;β  (3.1) 
where y is scalar output, x is a vector of inputs, and β is a vector of technology 
parameters.  Thus, if u = 0, firms operate on the production frontier, and if u > 0, 
firms exhibit some inefficiency and operate beneath the production frontier.  The 
model relies on a distributional assumption on u.  Battese and Corra (1977) assign a 
half normal distribution to u, such that: 
  [a]fter estimation, an estimate of mean technical inefficiency in the 
sample was provided by E(-u) = E(v – u) = -(2/π)1/2σu … 
 (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p 9). 
 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) assign an exponential distribution to u, such 
that: 
 E(-u) = E(v – u) = - σu 
 (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p 9). 
 
Either distributional assumption on u implies that the composed error (v – u) is 
negatively skewed.  In the case of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) the paper 
considers both distributions for u.  Maximum likelihood estimation of the model is 
required for statistical efficiency, and the parameters to be estimated include β, σ2v 
and σ2u.  In the time since the SFE was originated, other more flexible distributions 
have been proposed with two- and four-parameters, however ‘…the two original 
single-parameter distributions remain the distributions of choice in the vast majority 
of empirical work’ (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p 9). 
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From this point the SFE model was refined for panel data with fixed-effects and 
random-effects in order to obtain results for producer-specific estimates of technical 
efficiency, also known as the management effect.  The assumption of time-invariant 
inefficiency for panel data was relaxed in the early 1990s [Cornwell, Schmidt and 
Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992)] due to the fact that 
panels that spanned very long periods made this assumption untenable.  The use of a 
single-stage approach (Battese and Coelli, 1995), to incorporate explanatory 
variables into the inefficiency error component, was adopted to explain why 
efficiency varies through time or across producers.  This extension of the model 
makes either mean or variance of the inefficiency error component to be a function 
of the explanatory variables (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
The main advantage of the SFE model is the separation of random noise from 
inefficiency.  Unlike the DEA model where any deviation from the frontier is 
attributable to inefficiency, the SFE permits a composed error term (Worthington, 
2004).  Further advantage is secured when panel data (rather than cross-sectional 
data) is utilised.  The advantages of using panel data include being able to test for 
endogeneity of outputs directly, having a model that is less likely to yield biased 
estimates of the βs, and the requirement for fewer distributional assumptions about 
the inefficiency term (u) than would be required with cross-sectional data.  One 
possible limitation regarding the use of SFE is that it constructs a benchmark 
frontier.   Farrell (1957) referred to the ‘unfortunate psychological effects’ when 
performances are measured against some unattainable ideal.  Also, arguments against 
SFE (for producing measurement errors when using prices, costs and quantities 
together) only apply to estimating cost, revenue and profit frontiers.  They do not 
apply to technical efficiency estimation using production frontiers, since input prices 
are not required in their estimation.  This is the main reason for choosing to estimate 
the production frontier in this thesis and measuring technical efficiency, not 
allocative efficiency.  The following discussion, therefore, is restricted to production 
frontier models using panel data. 
 
The choices to be made when estimating a production frontier involve the decision 
on whether to allow technology to vary through time, or to assume constant 
technology, and whether to adopt a fixed-effects or a random-effects model.  As 
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mentioned above, the assumption of time-invariant technology was relaxed when 
using panel data.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe the difference in the two 
models.  Equation 3.2 shows a Cobb-Douglas production frontier with time-invariant 
technical efficiency, where producers i = 1,…,I, over time period t = 1…, T: 
iitnit
n
noit uvxy −++= ∑ lnln ββ  (3.2) 
Here the structure of the production technology ( oβ ) is assumed constant over time.  
Adapting the model for fixed-effects is straight forward and generates the simplest 
panel data model (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  Equation 3.3 shows the time-
invariant model in equation 3.2, with fixed-effects. 
itnit
n
noiit vxy ++= ∑ lnln ββ  (3.3) 
In this model )( iooi u−= ββ so that these are producer-specific intercepts.  That is, 
the  are treated as fixed and are to be estimated along with the iu nβ s.  Here there is 
no distributional assumption on the , and the  are iid iu itv ( )2,0 vσ  and uncorrelated 
with the regressors.  The  are allowed to be correlated with the regressors or with 
the  and are non-negative.  Thus, in the fixed-effects model there will always be at 
least one producer assumed to be operating on the technically efficient frontier.  All 
other producers are compared to this technically efficient producer (Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). 
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We can observe the random-effects model by allowing the  to be randomly 
distributed with constant mean and variance.  In this case the  are uncorrelated 
with the regressors and with the .  There is still no distributional assumption on the 
 and they remain non-negative.  Equation 3.2 is re-written as: 
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In equation 3.4 the  are random and this allows for some of the  to be time 
invariant (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
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Time-varying technical efficiency is a more appropriate assumption for panel data 
particularly if the operating environment is competitive.  Technical efficiency change 
was incorporated into models of productivity change by Bauer (1990).  Earlier work 
on productivity change referred to the residual between an index of the rates of 
growth of outputs and an index of the rates of growth of inputs as ‘a measure of our 
ignorance’ [(Abramovitz, 1956) cited in Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000].  It is now 
well accepted that efficiency change is a source of productivity change, and Bauer 
(1990) was able to decompose these by deriving ‘…detailed primal and dual (cost) 
decompositions of productivity change’ (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p 308).  
Thus, the assumption that technical efficiency is constant over time is too strong an 
assumption to make.  
The longer the panel, the more desirable it is to relax this assumption. 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p 108). 
 
 
Incorporating time-varying technical efficiency requires Equation 3.2 to be adjusted 
in the following way: 
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Equation 3.5 is the stochastic production frontier panel data model with time-varying 
technical efficiency.  otβ  is the frontier intercept that is common to all producers in 
period t, and itβ  is the producer specific intercept in period t, ie. itotit u−= ββ .  The 
introduction of time-varying technical efficiency has a cost in that additional 
parameters must be estimated.  With an I x T panel it is not possible to obtain 
estimates of all I · T intercepts itβ , the N slope parameters nβ , and .  Fortunately, 
this was addressed in the literature [Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990)] and the 
model was simplified somewhat to reduce the number of intercept parameters to I · 3 
as shown by equation 3.6. 
2
vσ
2
321 tt iiiit Ω+Ω+Ω=β  (3.6) 
As with the time-invariant model, the time-variant model is adjusted for fixed-effects 
and random-effects, and detailed in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) p 109-110.  In 
addition, these authors set out a third approach to estimating time-varying and time-
invariant technical efficiency; a maximum likelihood approach. 
 58
 The maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) method can estimate the parameters of 
the stochastic production function by numerical maximisation of the likelihood 
function.  Traditionally this method was computationally demanding, however the 
availability of new econometric software14 has greatly simplified the process by 
automating the method (Coelli, Rao and Battese, 1998).  According to Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000, p 106 ‘…MLE is generally more efficient than either LSDV15 or 
GLS16, since it exploits distributional information that the other two do not.’ 
 
3.5 Discussion 
This chapter has outlined the background to the three techniques adopted in this 
thesis.  These techniques have been clarified to set out their strengths and limitations, 
as well as to provide some information of their development.  Although survivor 
analysis cannot provide us with socially optimum efficient size, it can be utilised to 
determine hospital scale economies.  The information garnered from survivor 
analysis, when added to results from frontier estimation techniques, provides another 
dimension to efficiency estimation.  Similarly, the two frontier techniques discussed 
(DEA and SFE) generate results that add to understanding individual firms’ relative 
efficiency levels.  Restricting the analysis to technical efficiency estimation obviates 
the necessity for price data and avoids the problems associated with estimating 
allocative efficiency.  Also, the use of panel data has been shown to produce superior 
results than cross-sectional data because information on many firms or producers 
over time is far richer than at any one point in time.  The acknowledgment that firms’ 
operations are suboptimal led to the development of the SFE and advanced 
production theory from functions to frontiers.  For production frontiers, this means 
that firms do not always minimise inputs, but operate in environments that contain 
random variation, and are therefore prone to varying levels of inefficiency. 
 
                                                 
14 For example, the LIMDEP and the FRONTIER computer programs are both able to estimate SFE 
parameters using MLE. 
15 Least squares with dummy variables. 
16 Generalised least squares. 
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Chapter 4 
Health Reform and the Victorian Health System 
 
4.1 Overview 
Health services in Australia are funded by State and Federal Governments (via tax 
revenue), private health insurance premiums as well as by individuals through out-
of-pocket payments.  The collection of tax revenue occurs via a compulsory 
Medicare levy on income tax, with extra funding taken from consolidated revenues.  
The extent to which each of the sources of funding is relied on for the provision of 
healthcare varies according to the availability of government funds and the level of 
private health insurance taken out.  Although incentives are built into the tax system 
for individuals to purchase private health insurance, the decision to purchase remains 
voluntary.  
 
Medicare has funded public health services in Australia since 1984.  Medicare is a 
universal, tax-funded public insurance system that covers treatment in public 
hospitals and subsidises access to medical practitioners, allied health professionals 
and pharmaceuticals.  The combination of universality, voluntary private health and 
co-payments for using private hospitals creates strong demand for public hospitals.  
Under Medicare any person, regardless of income, is entitled to free treatment in 
public hospitals.  Furthermore, Medicare is utilised by public hospital patients who 
do not possess private health insurance, as well as those who have private cover, but 
elect to be treated as public patients. 
 
There is a Medicare levy funded through the progressive tax system.  Singles earning 
less than $50,000 taxable income per annum and families with a combined income of 
not more than $100,000 per annum are required to pay 1.5 per cent of their taxable 
income in Medicare levy.  Singles and families earning in excess of these amounts 
respectively who do not hold private hospital insurance cover are required, since 1 
July 1997, to pay a Medicare surcharge of an additional 1 per cent of their taxable 
income (Private Health Insurance Incentives Scheme fact sheet, 1997).  The 
Medicare levy contribution towards the cost of health services accounts for only 10 
per cent of Medicare’s total operating cost, with the remainder coming from 
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Commonwealth general revenue sources (Magarry, 1999).  In 2001 the level of total 
health expenditure in Australia represented 9.3 per cent of GDP (AIHW, 2003). 
 
Traditionally, public hospitals in Australia were funded on an historical cost basis.  
This means that a hospital’s budget increased each year in line with costs, and 
without regard to efficiency or productivity levels.  Recently, however, health 
reforms across the nation have led increasingly to the adoption of casemix funding.  
Casemix funding is a method of allocating resources based on the definition and 
measurement of a hospital’s output.  Casemix funding uses sophisticated hospital 
output measures, such as diagnosis related groups (DRGs), which identify the 
different groups of diagnoses (Donato and Scotton, 1999).  Since patients in the same 
DRG consume similar amounts of resources, DRGs are used to standardize for 
differences in the casemix of hospitals, thus allowing for hospital cost comparisons. 
 
The State Government of Victoria was under considerable pressure in 1993 to 
undertake healthcare reforms due to that State’s poor economic performance overall, 
as well as a perceived lack of efficiency in the operation of its acute hospital system.  
Casemix funding was, therefore, implemented on 1 July 1993 and has been operating 
in Victoria ever since.  It is evident from the literature, however, that the 
implementation of casemix funding has met with a mixed reaction from medical 
practitioners and hospital administrators alike.  This study uses Victoria as its focus 
because, although DRGs have been adopted in most Australian states, Victoria was 
the first state to begin data collection and the first state to implement casemix 
funding.  The speed with which the new funding system was adopted in Victoria was 
indirectly driven by the need to implement expenditure cuts by that State’s 
government.  Furthermore, the commencement of the new government’s term of 
office was the ideal time, politically, to develop strategies for health reform and 
budget cuts to acute hospitals. 
 
4.2 Hospitals, Healthcare and Asymmetric Information 
Healthcare markets, in general, differ from most consumer markets for goods and 
services because in healthcare it is not always the case that the individual consumer 
of health services is the payer.  For the most part the payment for health service is 
made by a third party such as the government and/or a private health insurer.  Evans 
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(1984) suggests that there are sources of market failure in the market for healthcare 
that necessitate government intervention.  One of the reasons market failure exists is 
due to the fact that individuals receive medical treatment based on the necessary 
diagnosis of a medical practitioner, and not based on their own assessment of their 
condition.  The service provided relies upon the practitioner’s professional 
perception of an individual’s needs, not on an individual’s wants, which would 
normally be the case in goods’ markets.  Evans (1984) suggests that this asymmetry 
of information leads to consumers being unable to make judgments about the value 
and efficacy of health care. 
This asymmetry of information leaves open the possibility (or 
certainty) of severe exploitation of buyers by sellers in an arms-
length, caveat emptor market environment. 
(Evans, 1984, p 71) 
In healthcare markets informational asymmetry impacts, not only on the 
characteristics of a product or service, but on the effect that product/service (health 
care) has on the user.  Evans (1984) notes that, in this case, buyers and sellers cannot 
be arms-length, since the seller is directly responsible for serving the buyer’s 
interests.  Furthermore, since health care is administered to patients who may be 
unconscious or unable to make use of information, even when it is provided, the 
postulate of consumer sovereignty becomes inappropriate. 
 
In relation to private health insurance, market failure also arises out of asymmetrical 
information in the form of adverse selection and moral hazard (Evans, 1984), 
(Industry Commission, 1997).  Adverse selection exists when the same price is 
charged for products or services of different quality.  In the case of government 
purchasing of health services, hospitals (suppliers) may decide to treat only some 
patients, i.e. select those that will be less costly to treat, but charge the government 
and/or insurer (purchaser) the higher price applicable to high cost patients.  This 
‘payoff’ falls to the supplier because the purchaser does not possess all of the 
information available regarding treatment costs (Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000). 
 
According to Evans (1984) moral hazard results in a tendency for expenditure on 
health care services to be larger due to their increased usage.  This is because people 
with insurance may use more services than they otherwise would (Glied, 2000).  In 
the case of suppliers, moral hazard arises when they promote the use of costly 
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technologies to patients, knowing that the cost will be reimbursed by the insurer or 
Medicare.  Glied (2000) promotes managed care plans as a way to overcome 
information asymmetry through cost-sharing provisions in indemnity insurance for 
patients, and utilization monitoring of costly technologies.  Ellis and McGuire (1995) 
show that there was a moral hazard effect following the implementation of a new 
hospital reimbursement system in New Hampshire.  Their model decomposes the 
impact of the reimbursement change on average resource use.  That is, whether 
resources used in treatment increased with a more generous reimbursement system.  
‘The moral hazard effect is the change in LOS17 due to the change in treatment 
policy, holding patient severity (V) constant’ (Ellis and McGuire, 1996, p 262). 
 
Many economists, policymakers and governments consider that government 
intervention in the form of health provision, funding and regulation is necessary for 
equity and efficiency reasons (Industry Commission, 1997, p 10).  They believe that 
low-income earners should not be precluded from basic health care (equity); and the 
existence of asymmetric information suggests that consumers have difficulty in 
judging their own best interests (efficiency).  Whilst it is generally accepted that the 
existence of market failure requires government intervention, it is the extent of 
intervention that draws considerable debate.  In Australia the healthcare market has 
been described as one that is unique among developed nations due to the fact that it 
combines universal taxpayer funded health cover with a voluntary private health 
insurance sector (Hall et al., 1999). 
 
4.3 Health Funding in Australia 
The State and Territory governments are responsible for and administer public 
hospital services in Australia.  These responsibilities include psychiatric hospital 
services, public health services such as school, dental, child and occupational health, 
and the control of diseases.  Other major responsibilities of the State/Territory 
governments are the provision and regulation of nursing homes and control over the 
number of private hospitals, including bed numbers and locations (Clinton et al., 
1995, p 34). 
 
                                                 
17 Length of stay. 
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The manner in which health funding is distributed in Australia has been the subject 
of some criticism.  Essentially, the Federal Government controls how much funding 
is distributed to the States and, through Medicare, forces the States to provide free 
hospital care to public patients.  At the time of the introduction of casemix funding 
specific purpose payments were issued to the States, with the distribution based on 
fiscal equalisation, and not on a State’s ability to generate revenue. 
 
A major source of friction between the Federal and State/Territory governments has 
been the existence of vertical fiscal imbalance.  This occurs because under the 
Australian Constitution, States are limited in their ability to generate revenue via 
taxation.  In order, therefore, for States to remain viable they must rely, to a great 
extent, on conditional grants from the Federal government to fund health and other 
programs administered by them (Donato and Scotton, 1999).  Section 96 of the 
Constitution gives the Federal government the power to make these grants, even 
though the Federal government does not have explicit powers to administer the 
provision of public hospitals.  Furthermore, an amendment to the Constitution in 
1946 (section 51 xxiii A) confers powers on the Commonwealth with respect to 
pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services.  Under 
this amendment, and under Section 96, the Commonwealth has been able to 
influence health policies implemented by the States based on its leverage and 
authority (Bloom, 2000). 
 
The universal health system is administered by Health Care Agreements (HCA) 
(formerly known as Medicare Agreements), each having a duration of five years, 
between the Commonwealth government and the six State and two Territory 
governments.  The first HCA began in 1998 and expired in 2003 (Magarry, 1999).  
The principles under which the negotiated HCAs operate are currently contained in 
the Health Care (Appropriation) Act 1998.  These include the provision of public 
hospital services free of charge to public patients, access to treatment based on 
clinical need, and equitable access to services for people regardless of their 
geographical location (Maskell-Knight, 1999).  Each State and Territory agrees to 
abide by certain criteria over each agreement’s five-year duration to enable the 
Federal Government to implement its funding policy.  The current Agreement was 
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structured in such a way that it now addresses the problem of cost shifting by the 
States, with the insertion of a penalty clause. 
 
Cost-shifting was an inherent part of the 1993-98 Medicare Agreements due to the 
existence of barriers that prevented any exploration of possible improvements in 
health care effectiveness (Magarry, 1999).  In an attempt to halt this cost-shifting 
behaviour, the Commonwealth imposed a cost-shifting penalty on the States in the 
context of the 1996 Budget.  The penalty clause has also been inserted in the HCA 
and states that the Commonwealth Minister may reduce funding if the Minister 
perceives that the Agreement has been breached by any deliberate cost-shifting by 
the States (Maskell-Knight, 1999).  However, it has been argued (Magarry, 1999) 
that these penalties have resulted in a reduction in the level of cooperation between 
the States and Territories and the Commonwealth, and have had no real effect on the 
management of the health care system. 
 
The agreements also contain provision for demand growth risk.  Under the first HCA 
the Commonwealth and States negotiated a different risk-sharing package, consisting 
of the Commonwealth accepting a 2.1 per cent per annum risk for demand growth.  
This is growth in excess of population and ageing and also in excess of output costs 
and insurance participation rate changes (Maskell-Knight, 1999). 
 
In the lead up to the 2003-2008 HCA, negotiations between the Federal and State 
Health Ministers centred on making significant changes.  In particular the Ministers 
acknowledged that past agreements focused more on health funding than they did on 
health outcomes [Paterson (2002), Reid (2002)].  Evidence on the current HCA 
suggests that this focus has not altered.  The then Federal Health Minister’s Media 
Release of 29 August, 2003 notes that the States will be able to run their hospitals 
more efficiently and with greater certainty since funding has now been put in place 
for 5 years instead of the previous 1 year.  The Minister also mentions an increase in 
funding to the States of $10 billion (17 per cent above inflation) (Patterson, 2003). 
 
As the level of funding has altered over the years, so too has the sophistication of the 
allocation of funds.  State governments have had to invent more efficient ways of 
allocating funds to public hospitals within their borders.  Cutbacks in health 
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expenditure at the Commonwealth level mean that ultimately hospitals have become 
more accountable for the funding that they receive.  Hospitals can now be compared 
for relative efficiency, and funds can be directed to those hospitals that have been 
successful in reducing operating costs.  This was not possible in the past, in the 
absence of any standardised measure. 
 
The development of DRGs has enabled State Governments to now compare acute 
hospitals for efficiency such that reduced government funding can be distributed 
according to performance, as opposed to historical cost.  DRGs have been 
implemented in the Australian health system to varying extents.  Some states use 
DRGs as a management and information tool, whilst others have adopted DRGs for 
payment purposes. 
 
4.4 Casemix Funding using Diagnosis Related Groups 
Originally developed in the United States, DRGs were designed to facilitate hospital 
management to measure and evaluate hospital performance (Fetter, 1991).  This 
process became necessary shortly after the implementation of Medicare in the U.S. in 
1965 due to the requirement for hospitals to undertake utilization review and quality 
assurance as a condition for receiving Medicare funds.  Over the first decade of 
Medicare in the US, DRG measurement developed into a means of simulating the 
open market to the extent of establishing a rate of payment that prevented hospitals 
operating at high production cost levels.  It was evident that there existed an absence 
of cost and quality information in health care, which would otherwise provide health 
consumers with the necessary means of selecting among hospitals as they would in a 
competitive market.  Furthermore, in many instances health consumers were not 
required to pay for the services they received and, therefore, were less inclined to 
attach importance to hospital cost reductions.  It was proposed that this cost 
containment initiative, which was designed to put a cap on hospital revenue, be 
combined with a peer-review mechanism to ensure that the minimum level of service 
quality prevailed (as would be the case if all information was available to consumers) 
(Fetter, 1991).  
 
In Australia the use of DRGs, and applying similar measurements of hospital 
activity, developed in response to the prospect of reduced government funding due to 
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State budgets being in deficit.  Cost containment policies were in place in Victoria 
for almost twenty years prior to health reforms (Duckett, 1994).  Steps were taken to 
commission Prof. R.B. Fetter (Yale University) and Prof. G.R. Palmer (University of 
NSW) in 1985 to provide advice on the applicability of DRGs to the Australian 
system.  Various other reports were commissioned in the early 1990s that were 
aimed at developing a ‘national DRG grouper and an Australia-wide costing project’ 
(Duckett, 1994, p 3).  One such report commissioned by the Commonwealth 
Department of Community Services and Health was a major contributor to the 
development of the use of DRGs for casemix funding.  Scotton and Owens (1990) 
provide a clarification of the issues and sentiment behind the rationale for 
introducing casemix funding using DRGs in the first instance. 
The central idea behind the use of case payment for hospital 
reimbursement is that payment geared to output will result in more 
efficient performance than other formulae.  The key concepts 
involved are the treated case as the payment unit and a casemix 
model which enables cases with different treatment requirements to 
be categorised and costed. 
 (Scotton and Owens, 1990, p 1)18
 
 
It was found that, at least for an interim period, the US DRG groupings could be used 
in the Australian context, although it was recognised that the financial information 
systems in Victoria needed to be further developed.  Indeed, it was the lack of 
available financial data that prevented many States from adopting the DRG method 
sooner.  In Victoria the Health Department began to publish the Victorian Hospital 
Comparative Data in 1987/88, which provided data on comparative hospital 
efficiency as measured by cost per DRG-weighted patient treated.  This data was 
initially only used for comparison purposes and not for funding purposes.  In 1992 
the report of an independent review of Victorian Health Services, submitted to the 
then Labor Government, recommended a four-year phased introduction of casemix 
funding for hospitals of more than one hundred beds.  Due to a general expectation 
that the impending election would result in a change of government, hospitals took 
little action at that time to prepare for a move to casemix funding.  With the election 
of the Kennett Liberal Government in October 1992, and the Commission of Audit 
                                                 
18 Words in bold are as per original cited. 
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[refer section 4.7] that followed, casemix funding was subsequently implemented on 
1 July 1993. 
 
The basic philosophical argument put forward by proponents of the DRG formulae 
was that by introducing casemix funding using DRGs, hospitals could be compared 
for efficiency, with the most efficient being rewarded, and those that were inefficient 
being penalised.  In this way the public would not be expected to subsidise the 
operations of inefficient hospitals, since penalties took the form of reduced 
government funding (Averill et al., 1991, p 220).  Furthermore, it was suggested that 
the failure to reward efficient providers could result in reduced motivation of all 
providers to improve their performance, resulting in the prospect of spiralling costs. 
 
4.5 Structure of Victorian Health 
The Victorian health system is administered by the Department of Human Services 
(DHS), which was formed in April 1996 by the amalgamation of the former 
Department of Health and Community Services with the Office of Housing and the 
Office of Youth Affairs (DHS, 2001a).  There are nine divisions under the DHS. 
 
The Acute Health Division has program responsibility for purchasing services from 
public hospitals, which accounts for almost 50 per cent of the Department’s budget.  
Aged, Community and Mental Health Division is made up of Mental Health 
Services, Aged Care Services and Primary Health Care.  The Community Care 
Division was formerly known as Youth and Family Services, and is responsible for 
supporting families.  DisAbility Services Division provides and funds services for 
people with intellectual, physical, sensory and neurological disabilities and acquired 
brain injury.  The main aim of the Office of Housing is to cost effectively provide 
affordable housing assistance to those most in need of such assistance.  The Policy 
Development and Planning Division consists of a Tax Implementation Unit and a 
project known as Victorian Nurse Practitioner.  The Public Health Division is 
charged with responsibility for the health of populations, rather than treatment of 
individuals.  It is also concerned with the underlying causes of ill health, preventative 
strategies, and has a strong scientific, analytical and statistical basis.  The Resources 
Division deals with the dissemination of information to Agencies, as well as the 
development of privacy principles.  The Rural Health Services Unit develops and 
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coordinates the strategic response to rural health issues and provides the lead role in 
the development of modern health services in small rural communities (DHS, 
2001b). 
 
4.6 Acute Health Division 
In the 1999/2000 Budget, the State Government of Victoria allocated $6,707 million 
to the Department of Human Services.  As shown below in Chart 4.1, this amount 
represents 35 per cent of the total Victorian State Budget. 
Chart 4.1
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For the purpose of this study, the division within Human Services that is of particular 
interest is the Acute Health Division.  This division accounts for approximately 50 
per cent of the Department’s budget and, therefore, approximately 17 per cent of the 
State Government’s overall financial commitment.  Acute Health is responsible for 
funding the delivery of acute and sub-acute services, the provision of ambulance 
services, and ensuring the provision of adequate and safe supplies of blood and blood 
products (DHS, 99/00, p10).  Within these parameters Acute Health delivers 
strategies to promote efficiency and accountability in public hospitals, and ensures 
the continued development of the casemix funding system.  It is also charged with 
improving ambulance responsiveness, inpatient and rehabilitation services, maternity 
care and the general delivery of healthcare in Victoria. 
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Prior to the introduction of casemix funding, Victorian hospitals were funded on 
historical cost, based on inputs such as salaries and pharmaceuticals.  Any budget 
reductions made during this period usually resulted in reduced services.  This was 
followed by the period in the mid-1980s when detailed input controls over hospitals 
began to be relaxed and hospitals moved to ‘global budgeting’.  Under this system 
hospitals were able to shift funds between the various classes of inputs, and between 
salary and non-salary expenditure.  Although this change was accompanied by an 
increasing emphasis on measuring a hospital’s total activity levels, the link between 
inputs and outputs remained weak.  This funding system (and varying political 
strengths within the hospital) rewarded advocacy skills rather than promoting 
efficiency of input use (Lin and Duckett, 1997, p 48). 
 
4.7 Health Reforms 
There are several reasons why health reforms were undertaken in Victoria.  One 
reason was that in the period 1992-93 to 1994-95, State debt exceeded $30 Billion 
(Victorian Budget Papers, 1999/2000, p 5).  The newly elected Liberal coalition was 
committed to reducing this debt and so undertook expenditure cuts.  As mentioned, 
Acute Health absorbs approximately 17 per cent of the State’s budget, and so cuts in 
this area were viewed as having the most effect on debt.  Consequently, 30 per cent 
of the total State budget reduction was achieved solely by funding cuts to Acute 
Health (Duckett, 1994, p 19).  At the same time there was evidence that Victorian 
hospitals were less efficient than hospitals in the other Australian states.  Shortly 
after the 1992 state election the Liberal coalition government appointed a 
Commission of Audit whose purpose was to assess and report on state finances.  The 
Report presented to the Premier in 1993 ‘claimed that Victorian acute hospitals were 
18 per cent more expensive than hospitals in other states’ (Lin and Duckett, 1997, p 
49).  The Report further claims that ‘with the introduction of output-based funding 
using casemix data, annual efficiency gains could be as much as 14 per cent ($373m) 
of the current hospitals (sic) budget if a new hospital funding base is set based on 
comparable NSW benchmarks’ (Victorian Commission of Audit, 1993, p 81).  The 
Report also found that a significant determinant of cost inefficiencies in Victorian 
hospitals, relative to those in New South Wales, was excessive staffing levels.  The 
Government also had evidence from the Commonwealth Grants Commission, which 
had collected data that corroborated the Commission of Audit’s findings, that 
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Victorian hospitals were relatively inefficient.  In view of these findings and in view 
of the necessary expenditure cuts, it was considered that an across-the-board funding 
reduction would not be equitable to those hospitals operating efficiently.  The 
funding cuts were thus targeted at hospitals found to be operating inefficiently. 
 
A further reason put forward for reform of the health sector was the existence of 
growing hospital waiting lists.  Of the 30,000 people on waiting lists in Victoria, 5 
per cent were in need of Category 1 urgent care.  Since the Government had made 
pre-election promises to reduce these waiting lists, it had to also ensure that funding 
cuts would not have the opposite effect.  Thus, the objectives of reform were: 
• To introduce a fair basis for funding hospitals in the context of an 
overall budget reduction; 
• To improve the efficiency of public hospitals, and; 
• To provide for an expansion in the number of patients treated and thus 
to allow a reduction in waiting lists. 
(Duckett, 1994, p 20) 
 
According to Duckett (1994) it was the Government’s intention to introduce casemix 
funding as the means of restructuring hospital funding arrangements so that the right 
financial incentives could be put in place to achieve these objectives.  It could be 
argued, however, that casemix funding was the means of achieving considerable 
reductions in government expenditure at a time when the newly elected government 
was at the height of its popularity.  Health reforms were also necessary due to the 
Federal Government’s broader concerns for microeconomic reform.  That is, the 
provision of health care was not immune to the legislative amendments to anti-trust 
legislation that focused on increased competition and efficiency in Australia 
generally. 
 
4.8 Victorian Health in a Competitive Environment 
Health and community services in Australia received considerable attention with 
regard to conforming to new competition legislation.  The Trade Practices Act 
(1974) was amended in 1995 to reflect the need for a movement toward increased 
competition in Australian industry (private and public).  The aim of the change in 
anti-trust legislation is to eliminate anti-competitive conduct resulting in 
misallocation of resources and income transfers.  Central to this change was the 1993 
report of the independent committee of inquiry, headed by Professor Fred Hilmer and 
 71
entitled National Competition Policy (Hilmer, 1993).  The committee’s report 
provided the basis on which new competition legislation was later able to be 
promulgated in the form of the Competition Policy Reform Act (1995).  This section 
outlines the impact that the new policy environment had on Victorian public 
hospitals. 
 
In 1996 the Victorian Department of Human Services (DHS) published a discussion 
paper seeking submissions concerning health insurance reforms for private patients 
in public hospitals.  The paper notes that the principles of the National Competition 
Policy are consistent with a more level playing field between public and private 
hospitals.  The paper then discusses the Victorian public hospital system in light of 
the new competition policy’s impact on the private health insurance industry (DHS, 
1996). 
 
Under the Commonwealth reforms of the private health insurance legislation19, the 
former basic table minimum benefits payable to insured persons treated in any 
registered hospital were replaced with applicable benefit arrangements (ABA).  
These are more flexible than the basic table, and can provide cover in all hospitals.  
Another significant change brought about by these reforms is that public and private 
hospitals can now enter into contracts with insurers (Hospital Purchaser-Provider 
Agreements [HPPAs]), which set out the treatments that the insurer agrees to cover 
(DHS, 1996). 
 
With respect to complying with the principles of the National Competition Policy, 
the DHS proposed that increased competition between private and public hospitals 
could be addressed by developing a more equitable funding system.  The various 
funding systems put forward for comment at the time were all designed so that both 
types of hospital could compete for private patients on an equal footing, eliminating 
the ‘unfair advantage’ exercised by public hospitals (DHS, 1996). 
 
                                                 
19 The legislation governing private health insurance is enshrined in the National Health Act (1953), 
and requirements governing health insurance were contained in the Medicare Agreement current at the 
time of reforms.  These requirements and provisions dictate the way in which benefits are to be paid to 
members who receive treatment in public hospitals.  
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Briefly, the treatment of increased competition between private and public hospitals 
was designed to adhere, in particular, to the issue of competitive neutrality between 
private and public sector organisations: 
• Moving to full cost recovery charging is broadly consistent 
with the National Competition principles of competitive 
neutrality and pricing transparency. 
• The Australian Private Hospital Association has suggested that 
the current subsidised public hospital prices give public 
hospitals an unfair advantage when competing for private 
patients. 
• Despite raising concerns about unfair advantages enjoyed by 
public hospitals, the private hospitals sector is likely to be 
critical of any attempts by public hospitals to compete directly 
for full cost recovery patients. 
(DHS, 1996, p 13) 
 
The Victorian legislation governing public health is the Health Act (1958).  In 1998, 
following the adoption of National Competition Policy, and in response to its 
recommendations and requirements, the Department of Human Services published a 
Discussion Paper on the review of the Health Act (1958) (DHS, 1998).  This Act 
deals mainly with public and environmental health, radiation safety, pest control, 
infectious diseases, vaccines and health information.  In relation to prescribed 
accommodation, the review specifically states that public hospitals or health service 
establishments registered under the Health Services Act (1988) are exempted from 
Part 12 of the Health Act (1958) (DHS, 2000, p 63). 
 
Under the Health Services Act (1988) Part 6 deals with Health Purchasing Victoria 
(HPV).  As it stands in 2004, Section 130 of Part 6 states that HPV is a public 
authority and it represents the Crown.  The outline of functions of the HPV clearly 
shows its relationship to Victorian public hospitals.  Section 131 outlines these 
functions as follows: 
HPV has the following functions – 
 
(a) to supply or facilitate access to the supply of goods and 
services to public hospitals and other health or related services 
on best value terms; 
 
(b) in relation to the supply of goods and services to public 
hospitals and the management and disposal of goods by public 
hospitals - 
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(i) to develop, implement and review policies and practices 
to promote best value and probity; and 
(ii) to provide advice, staff training and consultancy 
services; 
 
(c) to provide advice, staff training and consultancy services in 
relation to the supply of goods and services to, and the 
management and disposal of goods by, health or related 
services other than public hospitals; 
 
(d) to monitor compliance by public hospitals with purchasing 
policies and HPV directions and to report irregularities to the 
Minister; 
 
(e) to foster improvements in the use and application of 
purchasing systems and trading by electronic transactions by 
health or related services; 
 
(f) to establish and maintain a database of purchasing data of 
public hospitals and supply markets for access by public 
hospitals; 
 
(g) to ensure that probity is maintained in purchasing, tendering 
and contracting activities in public hospitals; 
 
(h) any other functions conferred on HPV by this or any other 
Act. 
(Health Services Act, 1988) 
 
The Act also sets out Health Purchasing Victoria’s responsibilities under the new 
Competition Code under Section 134O: 
(1) Any act or thing of or relating to HPV in carrying out its 
functions or exercising its powers under this Part is authorised 
for the purposes of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 of 
the Commonwealth and the Competition Code within the 
meaning of the Competition Policy Reform (Victoria) Act 
1995. 
 
(2) Any act or thing of or relating to a public hospital or a member 
of a board of a public hospital or a person who is engaged or 
employed by a public hospital in complying with an HPV 
direction or a purchasing policy of HPV under this Part or in 
relation to the purchase by, or supply to, a public hospital of 
goods or services in accordance with this Part is authorised for 
the purposes of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 of the 
Commonwealth and the Competition Code within the meaning 
of the Competition Policy Reform (Victoria) Act 1995. 
(Health Services Act, 1988) 
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In terms of the overall health services policy review in Victoria, a Final Report by 
Casemix Consulting and Phillips Fox, solicitors, was presented to the Victorian 
Health Minister in November 1999.  Pursuant to the National Competition Principles 
Agreement, the report analyses the various Victorian health Acts and Regulations for 
evidence of any restriction of competition.  Under the Agreement’s guidelines 
legislation should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that: 
• the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole 
outweigh the costs; and 
• the objective of the legislation can be achieved only by 
restricting competition. 
(Casemix Consulting, 1999, p 1) 
 
The recommendations made in that final report were varied and relate to the review 
of the Health Services Act, 1988, the Health Services (Private Hospitals and Day 
Procedure Centres) Regulations, 1991, and the Health Services (Residential Care) 
Regulations, 1991, all of which contain legislative restrictions on competition in 
public and private markets for health care.   
 
4.9 AN-DRGs and Casemix Funding in Victoria 
The first version of DRGs adopted by the Victorian Government in 1993 was 
Australian National Diagnosis Related Groups (AN-DRGs).  Using this particular 
measure the Minister for Health was able to implement casemix funding so that 
hospital services followed patients, rather than hospitals receiving funding as 
institutions in control of their own budgets.  As casemix funding was espoused by the 
Minister, it was a matter of putting the patients’ needs ahead of all else (Stoelwinder 
and Viney, 2000, p214). 
 
Since 1993 DRG codes have been altered to address certain requirements of the 
medical profession and to reflect advances in medical technology and the 
introduction of new diagnosis and procedure codes (Commonwealth of Australia, 
1998, p1).  In particular, the Australian Casemix Clinical Committee (ACCC), which 
comprises clinicians of all disciplines including medical, nursing and allied health, 
has been the main driver for changes to AN-DRGs.  There have been four versions of 
DRGs since 1993, and the main reason for this has been the need to improve their 
clinical coherence (Reid et al., 2000, p29).  As part of the more recent review process 
(Australian Refined (AR) DRGs version 4) the definition of severity of illness was 
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improved to better reflect resource use.  The measure, known as complications and 
comorbidities (CCs), has a severity level assigned to it such that patients with a 
number of CCs are likely to have more severe illness and to be more resource 
intensive to treat.  A recent study (Reid et al., 2000) into the performance of the 
various versions of DRGs has resulted in the finding that the most recent version 
(AR-DRG version 4) is a more significant improvement on versions 1.0 to 3.0.  The 
Commonwealth released AR-DRG version 4 over a period of 2 years from April 
1998, and AR-DRG version 4.1 cost weights were scheduled to be released in March 
2000 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998, p 42). 
 
Victoria adopts the various versions of DRGs as they become available.  However, 
there has been considerable backlash against casemix funding from some quarters 
that claim that the new funding system has had a negative effect on hospital 
outcomes and quality of care.  As mentioned [refer to section 4.7], the newly elected 
government needed to overcome the problem of budget cuts resulting in longer 
waiting lists.  It was decided that the best way to achieve this was to provide an 
incentive to hospitals to increase throughput.  Extra revenue from an additional 
throughput pool could be achieved by hospitals that were able to meet their waiting 
list performance criteria.  However, this incentive proved to be too effective by the 
second year of operation, when the increase in throughput was double that previously 
anticipated by the Department.  This extra throughput resulted in additional pressure 
on funds in the pool, and meant that there was difficulty keeping within the pool’s 
budget.  In response to this situation the Government decided to limit any hospital’s 
call on the pool to 5 per cent of its base throughput target.  The result of this 
decision, however, was to reduce patient throughput as a consequence of budget cuts; 
something that the additional throughput pool was designed to overcome 
(Stoelwinder and Viney, 2000, p215). 
 
Reductions in throughput led eventually to bed closures, staff sackings and the 
sudden increase of people on hospital waiting lists.  Casemix funding received 
significant negative media attention that held the Government responsible for its 
implementation.  That is, although budget cuts were responsible for bed closures, it 
was the fact that budget cuts were undertaken within the new casemix funding 
regime that drew criticism from the media and political opponents.  Commentators 
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took the view that casemix funding led to budget cuts and, therefore, casemix 
funding was responsible for bed closures and increased waiting lists.  The additional 
throughput pool was subsequently abolished in 1995/96 (Duckett, 2000). 
 
As the purchasing arrangements currently operate in Victoria, hospitals receive a 
capped annual budget from which to provide inpatient services.  That is, hospitals 
know in advance the total number of WIES annually that will be funded.  It is 
therefore necessary that hospitals plan ahead to ensure that funding will be available 
for the full year.  There is ‘…no capacity for additional funding in the event of 
budget overrun’ (Brook, 2006, p4).  According to the Victorian Department of 
Human Services, budget caps dictate planning measures by hospitals which ensure 
efficiency in resource utilisation. 
…the system utilises capital and recurrent resource restrictions to 
ensure that duplication, particularly of highly expensive high 
technology care, is minimised…[and]…It [casemix funding] 
emphasises technical (cost) efficiency and…has been instrumental 
in transforming Victoria’s hospital system from arguably 
Australia’s least efficient, to a highest level of efficiency. 
(Brook, 2006, p4) 
 
In tandem with budget caps, the author states that there are in place price signals, 
through bonus and penalty arrangements, ‘…which encourage desired policy 
outcomes – such as meeting emergency and elective surgical waiting time targets’ 
(Brook, 2006, p4).  Thus, on the one hand budgets are capped to fund a given 
number of WIES annually and, on the other hand, hospitals are required to maintain 
waiting list targets which, if they are successful, may lead to budget overruns.  Under 
these circumstances it is probable that hospitals will allow waiting lists for non-
emergency elective surgery to grow rather than risk receiving insufficient funding for 
a given year. 
 
Patients are categorised into clinical categories when they are placed on the waiting 
list.  The three categories were established to identify the relative clinical priority of 
patients needing hospital admission.  These categories are: 
Category One:  Admission within 30 days desirable for a 
condition that has the potential to deteriorate quickly to the point 
that it may become an emergency. 
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Category Two:  Admission within 90 days for a condition causing 
some pain, dysfunction or disability but which is not likely to 
deteriorate quickly or become an emergency. 
 
Category Three:  Admission at some time in the future acceptable 
for a condition causing minimal or no pain, dysfunction or 
disability, which is unlikely to deteriorate quickly and which does 
not have the potential to become an emergency. 
(Clarke and Bennett, 1998, p16) 
 
The Review of Elective Surgery Waiting Lists was set up in 1998 to determine 
whether there was any evidence to support allegations made by the Australian 
Medical Association (AMA) of widespread manipulation of hospital waiting lists 
throughout Victoria (Clarke and Bennett, 1998).  The Review’s findings, that this 
was not the case, were presented to the Victorian Minister for Health in September 
1998.  The findings show that ‘There has been a steady increase in both the total 
number of patients treated in Victoria’s public hospitals and in elective surgery 
patients since 1991’ (Clarke and Bennett, 1998, p24).  This is represented by two 
charts which show a comparison of waiting lists and throughput trends (reproduced 
below). 
 
Chart 4.2 –  Victorian Waiting List and Total Hospital Throughput 
 Jan. 91 – Oct. 97 
 
 Source:  Clarke and Bennett, 1998, p24 
 
 78
According to Chart 4.2 throughput fluctuates widely over a rising trend over the 
period to meet the increased demand for hospital services.  It is also apparent from 
Chart 4.2 that there was an initial reduction in the waiting list over 1993-1994, but 
then the waiting list rose again to slightly more than pre-existing levels in 1995.  
Chart 4.3 shows the separation of Category One and Category Two patients on the 
waiting list. 
 
Chart 4.3 –  Victorian Patients Waiting for Elective Surgery 
 Jul. 91 – Oct. 97 
 
 
 Source:  Clarke and Bennett, 1998, p24 
 
It is clear from Chart 4.3 that the number of Category One and Category Two 
patients on the waiting list fell following the implementation of casemix funding in 
July 1993.  Taking Charts 4.2 and 4.3 together it is apparent that, because the total 
waiting list rose to above pre-existing levels, it must be the case that Category Three 
patients on the waiting list rose over the period.  These are not reported separately in 
the Review’s findings.  Also the two charts show different scale on the vertical axis.  
Chart 4.3 appears to show relatively large fluctuations, however for Category Two 
data the change from peak in 1993 to trough in 1997 is less than 5,000 patients.  
These data confirm that the number of Category Three patients on the waiting list did 
in fact rise over the period.  The incentives in place to reduce Category One and Two 
patients on the waiting list appear to be working, however at the expense of Category 
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Three patients.  The result, therefore, is that there has been a deterioration of the total 
waiting list under casemix funding with budget caps. 
 
In the first two years of operation, casemix funding was comprised of a number of 
component grants.  Table 4.1 shows the change in component grants between the 
years 1993-94 and 1994-95.  The compensation component was only intended for the 
first year of operation of casemix funding, as a transitional grant from the old 
funding system to the new.  It was calculated on the difference between funding 
received by hospitals pre-casemix funding (1992-93) and that received post-casemix 
funding (1993-94) (McLean, 1994).  This component resulted in the removal of the 
effect of casemix funding in the first year of operation.  Clearly, without this 
compensating grant, funding would have decreased by approximately 8 per cent 
between 92-93 and 93-94. 
 
 Table 4.1: Victorian Casemix Funding Components 
  1993-94 to 1994-95 
 
Component Grants 
Proportion of 
Funding 
1993/94 
Proportion 
of Funding 
1994/95 
Non-admitted 
patients 18 17 
Overhead 27.1 26 
Specified/training 
grants 13.4 16 
Compensation 8.1 0 
Variable Payments 33.4 41 
Total 100 100 
 Source:  McLean, 1994, p 34. 
 
According to Table 4.1, with the exception of the overhead and non-admitted patient 
components, the remaining two components increased proportionally in the second 
year of casemix funding.  The largest increase occurred for variable payments.  
These include payments for public hospital medical officers, unit DRG 
reimbursements to hospitals, rural/isolated patient transfer costs and nursing home 
type patients.  With regard to Group E hospitals, located in rural Victoria, an 
additional $50 per patient treatment episode was paid by DHS ‘to reflect higher 
staffing costs in smaller institutions’ (McClean, 1994, p 34). 
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 The specific period that this thesis investigates is 1992/93 to 1995/96.  Over this 
period there was some change in expenditure trends.  Duckett (2000) shows, by 
constructing an index, how budgeted expenditure for acute health services in Victoria 
fell by 9 per cent initially between 1991/92 and 1993/94, and rose by 9 per cent 
above 1991/92 levels in 1996/97 (Duckett, 2000, Table 8.1, p155).  The same table 
shows an index of separations which rises steadily from 100 to 131.  However, the 
author states that separations rose over the period by 75 per cent, as a response to the 
introduction of casemix funding.  He notes, nevertheless that some of the increase in 
activity may be due to the reclassification of some outpatients to inpatient status.  
Duckett (2000) also notes that the WIES figure, which was introduced in 1993/94, 
rose at a much slower rate over the period.  The index for WIES rises from 100 to 
109. 
The extent of actual versus nominal growth is difficult to estimate.  
Assuming that all the activity increase is real, the costs per 
separation have declined by 25 per cent over the period 1991/92 to 
1996/97. 
(Duckett, 2000, p156). 
 
Graph 4.1 has been constructed using historical data20 from the Victorian 
Government’s Statement of Finances 2005-06, Budget Paper No. 4 (State of 
Victoria, 2005-06).  Over the period 1992/93 to 1995/96 Graph 4.1 shows an initial 
significant slowing down of expenditure, followed by a reduction of health 
expenditure in Victoria.  Visually it is apparent that during the period prior to budget 
cuts and the implementation of casemix funding, expenditure increased steadily.  It is 
also apparent that from 1996/97 the rate of growth of expenditure surpasses earlier 
growth (that is, the gradient becomes steeper). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 One of the difficulties with obtaining a dependable data series for Victoria over this period has been 
the lack of uniform data collection by the relevant authorities.  The data that forms the content for 
Graph 4.1 is reproduced from Victorian Budget Papers.  Its original source is the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Catalogue 5512.0.  No mention is made as to whether the expenditure is in current or 
constant dollars. 
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Graph 4.1: Victorian General Government Operating Expenditure for (Total 
 Health Expenditure) 1961/62 to 2003/04 – historical series 
General Government Operating Expenditure for Health - historical 
series
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
19
61
/62
19
63
/64
19
65
/66
19
67
/68
19
69
/70
19
71
/72
19
73
/74
19
75
/76
19
77
/78
19
79
/80
19
81
/82
19
83
/84
19
85
/86
19
87
/88
19
89
/90
19
91
/92
19
93
/94
19
95
/96
19
97
/98
19
99
/00
20
01
/02
20
03
/04
Year
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 ($
 m
ill
io
n)
 
 Source:  Victorian Budget Papers (2005-06) 
 
Graph 4.1 shows the existence of budget cuts over the period 1992-1995; however it 
is not apparent to what extent acute care hospitals were affected because the graph 
plots total health expenditure in Victoria.  Nevertheless the graph is interesting and 
reflects budget cuts and health reforms in Victoria. 
 
Walsh (1996) outlines some of the achievements under casemix funding in Victoria 
and suggests that since its inception hospital productivity has increased by 15 per 
cent, with a funding reduction of approximately 10 per cent.  He also notes that 
length of stay has fallen, with an increase in day-only cases of 30 per cent.  The 
author also goes on to list some disadvantages of casemix funding, including that 
hospitals that specialise in intensive care patients are disadvantaged by its use due to 
their increased resource use.  This has since been addressed to some extent, however, 
by the new DRG coding system.  Fox (1996) reports that in his experience in 
Victoria there has been a dramatic efficiency improvement under casemix funding. 
The average cost per DRG weighted inpatient at both the Alfred 
and Box Hill Hospitals has substantially reduced over the past two 
years. 
(Fox, 1996, p 135) 
 
These two references to ‘efficiency’ are based on the same incorrect presumption 
that is evident in a significant amount of the literature on casemix funding.  DRG 
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costs are not a measure of efficiency in themselves; merely a way to compare costs 
between hospitals.  Technical efficiency, however, is measured by the number of 
inputs that are used to produce health outcomes, or how successful a hospital is in 
minimising inputs to produce the same outputs.  Efficiency measurement, which 
allows us to compare the performance of hospitals, can be made using frontier 
methods, with DRG costs as output weights; one of the purposes of this study. 
 
4.10 Application of Casemix Funding to Rural Victoria 
The implementation of casemix funding for acute health services in Victoria was 
anticipated to impact on small rural communities.  In 1993 the Victorian Small Rural 
Hospitals Task Force was established ‘to review the progress and difficulties of small 
rural hospitals in Victoria following the introduction of casemix funding’ (DHS, 
2002, p3).  There were 57 small rural hospitals each with 30 or fewer beds in 1994.  
These hospitals are classified as Group D and Group E hospitals and include Multi-
Purpose Service and Healthstreams agencies (DHS, 2002).  The Taskforce 
acknowledged the diverse nature of rural Victoria in terms of topography, geography 
and socio-economic factors.  It also acknowledged that small rural hospitals should 
provide services based on identified community needs.  The Taskforce noted that 
communities should be made aware of the benefits associated with the redistribution 
of resources away from ‘high cost underused bed-based services to more cost 
effective and accessible community based services’ (DHS, 2002, p 3).  As outlined in 
section 4.9 and Table 4.1 variable payments to hospitals included a payment for 
rural/isolated patient transfer costs.  This payment was targeted specifically toward 
the cost of ambulance transfers between hospitals, which are more prevalent in 
remote rural communities.  The amount in both years in Table 4.1 represents 
approximately 0.1 per cent of funding (McLean, 1994). 
 
4.11 Victorian Public Hospitals 
It is interesting to note that hospitals located in the four Melbourne metropolitan 
regions serviced a population of 3,321,666 residents in 1997, whilst hospitals located 
in the balance of Victoria together serviced over 1.2 million residents (28 per cent of 
the resident population) (ABS Cat. 3234, 1997).  Table 4.2 below shows a 
breakdown of the resident population located in Melbourne and the ten statistical 
divisions outside of Melbourne in 1997. 
 83
 Table 4.2: Estimated Resident Population in Melbourne and 
 Non-metropolitan Victoria, 1997 
 
Statistical Division Estimated Resident Population 
Melbourne 3 321 666 
Non-Metropolitan Regions  
Barwon 240 906 
Western District 100 125 
Central Highlands 135 443 
Wimmera 52 027 
Mallee 87 590 
Loddon 158 656 
Goulburn 184 141 
Ovens-Murray 89 698 
East Gippsland 81 002 
Gippsland 153 894 
Total 4 605 148 
 Source: ABS Cat. No. 3234.2, 1997 
 
Appendix IV to this chapter sets out a summary table of the raw data utilised in this 
thesis21.  The data is grouped into hospital size (A, B, C, D and E)22 with each 
hospital named.  The period of observation is 4 years (1992/93 to 1995/96) and there 
are four characteristics for each hospital (two outputs and two inputs).  These are 
WIES, inpatients treated, EFT staff number (non-medical staff) and average 
available beds.  Table 4.3 is constructed from the same data, and provides a summary 
of the number of hospitals in each group over the period. 
Table 4.3:  Summary of Victorian Hospitals by size 1992/93 – 1995-96 
Group 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
‘A’ Teaching Hospitals 16 16 16 16 
‘B’ Large Regional Base and 
Suburban Hospitals 22 22 21
a 21a 
‘C’ Regional General Hospitals 24 24 23a 23a 
‘D’ Area Hospitals 22 22 20a 20a 
‘E’ Local Hospitals 33 31a 22b 21c 
Total 117 115 102 101 
Source:  Victorian Hospital Comparative Data, 1992/93 – 1995/96 
a = reduction from initial year due to closures, b = 5 closures, 6 amalgamations, c = 5 closures, 7 
amalgamations. 
 
                                                 
21 Source is the Victorian Hospital Comparative Data, 1992/93 – 1995/96. 
22 The size groups are defined in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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Table 4.3 shows that the total number of hospitals has decreased over the period from 
117 to 101.  The reduction in the number of hospitals shown is due to both hospital 
closures and amalgamations.  Appendix IV shows that Local hospitals (Group ‘E’) 
experienced the greatest number of closures of 5 hospitals over the period, and also 
the greatest number of amalgamations of 7 hospitals.  Thus, in the final year this 
group contains 12 hospitals less than it did in the first year. 
 
The data for each characteristic taken from Appendix IV is also summarised.  Table 
4.4 sets out totals for each of the outputs and inputs by group over the period.  Table 
4.4 shows that total WIES declined in the second year of observation and then 
increased to 750,528.  The total number of inpatients treated, however, rose over the 
period from 690,461 to 871,725.  This was at the same time that EFT staff fell 
dramatically in the second year from 37,962 to 33,725 and then rose again to 36,095.  
The figures for total average available beds are similar in that they fell dramatically 
in the second year from 11,094 to 10,849, but rose again to 11,026 in the final year. 
Table 4.4:  Summary of Victorian Hospital Data 1992/93 – 1995/96 
Group Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 Total 
WIES 460226 456012 504845 502109 1923192 
Inpatients Treated 430655 461581 522099 557691 1972026 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 23594 21367 21975 23306 90242 
A 
Average Available Beds 6207 6289 6400 6652 25548 
WIES 173568 169473 178045 184989 706075 
Inpatients Treated 183860 195231 208134 227297 814522 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 9672 8190 7997 8848 34707 
B 
Average Available Beds 3084 2892 2732 2860 11568 
WIES 45019 40751 42401 42167 170038 
Inpatients Treated 49361 51294 54234 59664 214553 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 2526 2266 2282 2311 9385 
C 
Average Available Beds 974 879 907 883 3643 
WIES 23396 15594 15097 14983 69025 
Inpatients Treated 17457 18940 18259 19603 74259 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 1081 963 896 917 3857 
D 
Average Available Beds 481 428 428 416 1753 
WIES 14333 8768 7528 6280 36909 
Inpatients Treated 9128 9123 8242 7470 33963 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 1089 939 736 713 3477 
E 
Average Available Beds 348 361 272 215 1196 
WIES 716542 690553 747916 750528 2905539 
Inpatients Treated 690461 736169 810968 871725 3109323 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 37962 33725 33886 36095 141668 
Total 
Average Available Beds 11094 10849 10739 11026 43708 
Source:  Victorian Hospital Comparative Data, 1992/93 – 1995/96 
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Table 4.4 also shows the differences in characteristics experienced by each of the 
groups.  Whereas the WIES figure rose for Groups A and B over the period, it fell for 
the remaining smaller hospital groups.  Inpatients treated rose for all groups with the 
exception of Group E hospitals, for which the figure fell.  The number of EFT non-
medical staff fell for all groups, whilst average available beds rose for Group A 
hospitals and fell for all others.  Viewing these characteristics in terms of inputs and 
outputs23, it is apparent that for Group A hospitals both outputs rose in quantity, with 
one input falling and the other one rising.  For group B hospitals the outputs rose and 
the inputs fell.  For group C hospitals one output rose and one fell, with both inputs 
falling.  Group D experienced one output that rose and one that fell, with both inputs 
falling.  Group E hospitals experienced reductions in both outputs and both inputs. 
 
Table 4.5 and Table 4.5a show the provision and utilisation of hospitals in Australia 
at the end of the period under investigation, with a relative percentage for the other 
States and Territories relative to Victoria.  Table 4.5 is reproduced from Duckett, 
1999 and shows public acute general hospitals, private acute general hospitals, their 
number and utilisation.  Table 4.5a has been constructed to show how, following the 
initial budget cuts and introduction of casemix funding in Victoria, Victorian 
hospitals compared to the other States and Territories that had not experienced health 
reform to the same extent.  The highlighted rows in Table 4.5a show beds per 1000 
population for public, private and total acute hospitals.  Clearly, on average all other 
States and Territories have a higher ratio for this category then does Victoria (with 
some minor exceptions).  The figures for South Australia show significantly higher 
ratios of 29, 11 and 23 percent above Victorian ratios respectively.  Utilisation 
figures for South Australia are also considerably higher than Victoria’s at this point 
in time. 
 
 
23 WIES and Inpatients Treated = outputs; EFT staff and Average Available Beds = inputs. 
 
Table 4.5:  Provision and Utilisation of Hospitals, 1995/96 
 
 NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT NT TOTAL 
Provision          
Public acute general          
Number 218 138 192 98 82 20 3 5 756 
Beds 21560 13139 11113 5547 5543 1468 780 570 59720 
Beds/1000 pop. 3.50 2.91 3.35 3.18 3.76 3.10 2.56 3.22 3.29 
Beds/hospital 98.90 95.21 57.88 56.60 67.60 73.40 260.00 114.00 78.99 
Private acute general          
Number 169 134 63 47 30 10   453 
Beds 6806 6241 4890 2438 2274 660   23309 
Beds/1000 pop. 1.11 1.38 1.47 1.40 1.54 1.39   1.28 
Beds/hospital 40.27 46.57 77.62 51.87 75.80 66.00   51.45 
Total acute general          
Number 387 272 255 145 112 30   1209 
Beds 28366 19380 16003 7985 7817 2128   83029 
Beds/1000 pop. 4.61 4.29 4.83 4.57 5.30 4.50   4.57 
Beds/hospital 73.30 71.25 62.76 55.07 69.79 70.93   68.68 
          
Utilisation          
Public acute general          
Separations/1000 pop. 202.7 191.8 190.6 190.5 216.5 152.1 186.4 260.1 196.7 
Bed days/1000 pop. 1058.8 809.5 835.1 769.9 920.5 802.3 760.9 1050.9 905.2 
Private acute general          
Separations/1000 pop. 78.9 93.6 105.5 65.3 94.1 111.6 45.3  87.7 
Bed days/1000 pop. 253.5 355.0 455.3 248.5 374.1 395.9 155.3  327.7 
Total acute general          
Separations/1000 pop. 281.6 285.4 296.1 255.8 310.6 263.7 231.7 260.1 284.4 
Bed days/1000 pop. 1312.3 1164.5 1290.4 1018.4 1294.6 1198.2 916.2 1050.9 1232.9 
Source:  Reproduced from Duckett (1999), Table 5.1 
Original Source:  Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Australian Hospital Statistics, 1995/96, tables 2.2 and 3.2; and AIHW periodical communications. 
Original Note:  ACT and NT private hospital data are included in NSW and SA respectively. 
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Table 4.5(a):  States and Territories % change relative to Victoria, Table 4.5, 1995/96 
 
 % NSW % QLD % WA % SA % TAS % ACT % NT % AVG. TOTAL 
Provision         
Public acute general         
Number +58.0 +39.1 -29 -40.5 -85.5 -97.8 -96.4  
Beds +64.1 -15.4 -57.7 -57.8 -88.8 -94.1 -95.7  
Beds/1000 pop. +20.3 +15.1 +9.3 +29.2 +6.5 -12.0 +10.6 +13.0 
Beds/hospital +3.9 -39.2 -40.5 -29.0 -22.9 +173 +19.7 -17.0 
Private acute general         
Number +26.1 -53.0 -65.0 -77.6 -92.5    
Beds +9.0 -21.4 -60.9 -63.5 -89.4    
Beds/1000 pop. -19.5 +6.5 +1.4 +11.6 +0.7   -7.2 
Beds/hospital -13.5 +66.7 +11.4 +62.7 +41.7   +10.5 
Total acute general         
Number +42.3 -6.2 -46.7 -58.8 -88.9    
Beds +46.3 -17.4 -58.8 -59.6 -89.0    
Beds/1000 pop. +7.4 +12.6 +6.5 +23.5 +4.9   +6.5 
Beds/hospital +2.8 -11.9 -22.7 -2.0 -0.4   -3.6 
         
Utilisation         
Public acute general         
Separations/1000 pop. +5.6 -0.6 -0.6 +12.8 -20.7 -2.8 +35.6 +2.5 
Bed days/1000 pop. +30.8 +3.1 -4.9 +13.7 -0.8 -6.0 +29.8 +11.8 
Private acute general         
Separations/1000 pop. -15.7 +12.7 -30.2 +0.5 +19.2 -51.6  -6.3 
Bed days/1000 pop. -28.6 +28.2 -30.0 +5.4 +11.5 -56.2  -7.7 
Total acute general         
Separations/1000 pop. -1.3 +3.7 -10.3 +8.8 -7.6 -18.8 -8.8 -0.3 
Bed days/1000 pop. +12.7 +10.8 -12.5 +11.1 +2.9 -21.3 -9.7 +5.8 
Source:  Constructed from Table 4.5. 
4.12 Discussion 
This chapter has provided a background to health reform and the implementation of 
casemix funding in Victoria within the context of the Australian healthcare system.  
The pressures for reform of Victoria’s acute hospitals stemmed from excessive State 
debt as well as an identified need to improve hospital funding efficiency, together 
with the issue of conforming to the new competition policy legislation.  Given the 
obvious increase in the rate of growth of health expenditure in Victoria since 1995/96 
(Graph 4.1) it is difficult to reconcile this with the initial objectives for adopting 
casemix funding. 
 
Also, the existence of budget caps directly opposes the incentives in place for 
hospitals to meet waiting list targets.  This may blunt hospitals’ inclination to 
increase throughput indefinitely since a reduction in waiting lists would entail 
overrunning their annual budget.  As no budget overruns will be funded under the 
current system, it becomes necessary for hospitals to allow waiting lists to grow; 
another contradiction of the initial objectives for adopting casemix funding.  The 
growing number of Category Three patients provides evidence that this is occurring.  
On the face of it, this combination of incentives appears to be directed at hospitals to 
better manage their limited resources.  However, the budget cap applies to a given 
number of WIES annually which have already been weighted for resource utilisation.  
Furthermore, the figures in Tables 4.5 and 4.5a indicate that relative to other States, 
Victoria provided less public hospital beds per 1000 population (with the exception 
of the ACT) immediately following the period under consideration.  These figures 
also point to the fact that waiting lists grew in Victoria, although the evidence in 
these tables is not overwhelming since data provided is for one year only. 
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Group A Hospitals – Summary Data Table 1992/93-1995/96 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 50942 53890 56183 55243 
Inpatients Treated 37234 44360 53914 53964 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 3051 2845 2844 2937 
Alfred 
Average Available Beds 637 710 666 682 
WIES 39234 36650 60101 53692 
Inpatients Treated 35218 32889 56413 54680 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 1920 1754 2518 3019 
Austin 
Average Available Beds 564 504 865 776 
WIES 20441 20562 21684 22143 
Inpatients Treated 19251 21279 23229 25384 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 861 818 812 823 
Box Hill 
Average Available Beds 312 275 254 262 
WIES 8935 9223 10576 11313 
Inpatients Treated 9108 8472 9011 8952 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 921 839 797 780 Cancer Institute 
Average Available Beds 132 133 135 136 
WIES 21974 22217 22828 21447 
Inpatients Treated 21065 23347 21918 23799 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 1046 1004 1043 1010 Dandenong 
Average Available Beds 256 290 279 335 
WIES 29987 28929 30449 31201 
Inpatients Treated 27653 29936 32460 34737 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 1370 1248 1284 1308 Geelong 
Average Available Beds 400 398 417 427 
WIES 14519 14301 19564 21023 
Inpatients Treated 12142 13444 20748 27460 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 726 671 737 762 
Mercy Womens 
(includes 
Werribee in 
94/95 - 95/96) Average Available Beds 236 306 300 309 
WIES 47714 42548 47657 49309 
Inpatients Treated 46330 45053 52000 58181 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 2428 1922 2022 2163 
Monash M.C. 
Average Available Beds 699 542 550 594 
WIES 26507 25204 25248 28661 
Inpatients Treated 26066 27763 27552 34409 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 1086 985 959 1161 
Mornington 
Average Available Beds 300 345 326 433 
WIES 19124 18856 19416 20263 
Inpatients Treated 19005 19793 20051 21718 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 888 797 786 947 
P.A.N.C.H. 
Average Available Beds 257 282 277 324 
WIES 27431 26025 26567 26981 
Inpatients Treated 25203 25388 26753 27810 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 1474 1411 1388 1382 Royal Children 
Average Available Beds 314 327 310 322 
WIES 51778 56587 59622 53582 
Inpatients Treated 51000 59298 63003 56862 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 2628 2445 2452 2628 
Royal Melbourne 
Average Available Beds 633 657 613 634 
WIES 8168 7314 7754 8390 
Inpatients Treated 11527 11680 11679 12645 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 425 392 392 359 
Royal Victorian 
Eye and Ear 
Average Available Beds 96 115 97 92 
WIES 24195 24427 25552 24182 
Inpatients Treated 28403 31959 33951 37812 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 1290 1072 1063 1014 Royal Women’s 
Average Available Beds 430 504 386 386 
WIES 35701 36943 36056 37600 
Inpatients Treated 29723 32530 32360 35762 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 1881 1732 1501 1603 St Vincents 
Average Available Beds 465 467 424 421 
WIES 33576 32336 35588 37079 
Inpatients Treated 31727 34390 37057 43516 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 1599 1432 1377 1410 Western 
Average Available Beds 476 434 501 519 
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Group B Hospitals – Summary Data Table 1992/93-1995/96 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 14622 14707 16490 16681 
Inpatients Treated 16164 16694 18444 19842 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 740 706 666 610 Ballarat Base 
Average Available Beds 217 225 211 210 
WIES 12975 12941 13949 16736 
Inpatients Treated 13537 14741 16323 18948 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 600 487 510 1149 Bendigo Base 
Average Available Beds 229 201 181 309 
WIES 4263  4608 4625 
Inpatients Treated 4203  4611 5011 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 423  358 355 
Bairnsdale (East 
Gippsland.  No 
data for 93/94) 
Average Available Beds 192  111 106 
WIES 3929 3766 4043 4143 
Inpatients Treated 4723 4671 5173 5790 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 271 244 245 253 Echuca 
Average Available Beds 74 56 57 55 
WIES 11610 6692 8101 11267 
Inpatients Treated 10865 11139 12285 12591 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 533 456 426 367 
Fairfield (Group 
A from 93/94 
onwards) 
Average Available Beds 137 134 134 134 
WIES 6390 6199   
Inpatients Treated 6105 6921   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 356 317   
Gippsland Base 
(closure) 
Average Available Beds 102 109   
WIES 10511 11686 11930 12477 
Inpatients Treated 11322 12146 12733 14052 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 613 582 569 609 
Goulburn Valley 
(Tatura) 
Average Available Beds 216 242 242 205 
WIES 4583 4959 5105 4336 
Inpatients Treated 5097 5481 5697 5274 
EFT Staff Number (non-medical staff) 352 323 301 272 Hamilton Base 
Average Available Beds 94 98 92 77 
WIES 13355 13341 14358 15889 
Inpatients Treated 13788 15476 18130 20691 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 821 684 591 789 
La Trobe 
Regional 
Average Available Beds 236 184 184 204 
WIES 13538 13782 14587 14647 
Inpatients Treated 11507 13692 15248 15416 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 562 606 598 657 Maroondah 
Average Available Beds 174 197 192 211 
WIES 11813 10524 10925 10647 
Inpatients Treated 13561 13029 13655 14618 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 705 440 539 534 Mildura Base 
Average Available Beds 179 160 152 154 
WIES 3425 2856 3084 3218 
Inpatients Treated 4263 3890 4177 4898 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 102 101 100 93 
Mordialloc 
(includes 
Cheltenham from 
94/95 onwards) Average Available Beds 68 68 68 68 
WIES 5550 5186 5444 5714 
Inpatients Treated 5229 5682 6138 6957 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 203 196 192 181 Sandringham 
Average Available Beds 92 93 70 70 
WIES 6697 9814 10493 9875 
Inpatients Treated 8899 9269 9279 9810 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 533 472 444 465 
St Georges Inner 
East 
Average Available Beds 243 222 221 216 
WIES 3575 3590 3666 3540 
Inpatients Treated 4364 4647 4951 5074 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 243 219 204 209 Swan Hill 
Average Available Beds 84 80 80 80 
WIES 9625 9220 9937 9317 
Inpatients Treated 10171 10472 11671 13639 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 365 331 310 307 The Angliss 
Average Available Beds 150 185 125 106 
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Group B Hospitals continued. 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 8362 9032 8775 8899 
Inpatients Treated 8504 9654 9801 10323 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 466 413 389 422 Wangaratta Base 
Average Available Beds 140 140 136 166 
WIES 8230 9039 9755 9548 
Inpatients Treated 9734 10916 11618 12104 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 591 600 548 489 Warrnambool 
Average Available Beds 124 154 155 151 
WIES 5377 5711 6260 6212 
Inpatients Treated 5375 7116 8378 9706 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 316 289 284 283 
West Gippsland 
(Warragul) 
Average Available Beds 84 86 83 83 
WIES 5174 6363 5686 5521 
Inpatients Treated 5404 6960 5958 6379 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 257 234 185 212 Williamstown 
Average Available Beds 92 98 82 79 
WIES 4988 4608 4922 5424 
Inpatients Treated 5096 5732 5972 6884 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 393 331 321 349 Wimmera Base 
Average Available Beds 80 71 71 89 
WIES 4976 5457 5927 6273 
Inpatients Treated 5949 6903 7892 9290 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 227 159 217 243 Wodonga 
Average Available Beds 77 89 85 87 
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Group C Hospitals – Summary Data Table 1992/93-1995/96 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 1118 1532 959 643 
Inpatients Treated 1247 1913 1219 1003 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 35 32 26 19 Altona 
Average Available Beds 25 25 25 13 
WIES 2366 2402 2571 2481 
Inpatients Treated 2865 2872 2943 3201 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 168 156 162 162 
Ararat (includes 
Willaura and East 
Grampians from 
94/95 onwards) Average Available Beds 65 45 53 53 
WIES 2101 2140 2273 2175 
Inpatients Treated 2703 3040 3288 3326 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 82 76 79 77 Bacchus Marsh 
Average Available Beds 41 41 41 41 
WIES 2883 2915 2699 2913 
Inpatients Treated 2960 3434 3275 3568 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 176 154 144 145 Benalla 
Average Available Beds 60 45 45 45 
WIES 1648 1385 1483 1565 
Inpatients Treated 1938 2313 2813 3997 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 28 30 30 30 Burwood 
Average Available Beds 15 18 18 18 
WIES 1082 1082 1309 1255 
Inpatients Treated 1186 1336 1434 1500 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 76 67 68 71 
Camperdown 
(includes LSM, 
Corangamite from 
94/95 onwards) Average Available Beds 31 27 33 28 
WIES 1093 1214 1184 1076 
Inpatients Treated 1357 1679 1541 1453 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 63 57 54 56 Cobram District 
Average Available Beds 30 30 30 30 
WIES 1071 945 998 927 
Inpatients Treated 1154 1074 1279 1300 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 49 50 50 49 Cohuna 
Average Available Beds 22 20 22 21 
WIES 3332 2931 3110 3092 
Inpatients Treated 3256 3381 3625 3856 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 223 214 211 229 Colac 
Average Available Beds 65 65 65 65 
WIES 1009 911 1092 1058 
Inpatients Treated 1234 1197 1475 1542 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 33 33 38 43 
Healesville 
(includes Yarra 
Ranges in 95/96) 
Average Available Beds 21 21 21 21 
WIES 1554 1287 1125 1172 
Inpatients Treated 1528 1541 1369 1587 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 85 77 71 71 Kerang 
Average Available Beds 32 32 26 24 
WIES 2337 2294 2517 2508 
Inpatients Treated 2455 3191 3618 3841 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 199 167 174 173 
Gippsland South 
(Korumburra) 
Average Available Beds 72 45 47 45 
WIES 2296 2191 2364 2430 
Inpatients Treated 2776 2983 3518 4200 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 109 105 106 108 Kyabram 
Average Available Beds 46 46 46 49 
WIES 1086 1354 1317 1323 
Inpatients Treated 1302 1705 1824 1927 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 71 60 62 62 Kyneton 
Average Available Beds 39 39 34 33 
WIES 1080 1114 1176 1237 
Inpatients Treated 1483 1563 1925 1964 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 58 53 53 55 Mansfield 
Average Available Beds 28 28 28 28 
WIES 2577 2507 2366 2469 
Inpatients Treated 2579 2865 2694 3019 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 179 167 161 165 Maryborough 
Average Available Beds 56 56 47 55 
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Group C Hospitals continued. 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 1954 1082 1590 1473 
Inpatients Treated 1091 1190 1587 1626 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 107 107 144 139 
Nhill (includes 
West Wimmera 
HS from 94/95 
onwards) Average Available Beds 40 35 48 50 
WIES 1352 1081 1225 1258 
Inpatients Treated 1387 1452 1421 1592 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 82 73 74 75 Numurkah 
Average Available Beds 33 33 33 33 
WIES 2799 3099 3208 3415 
Inpatients Treated 3131 3683 3846 4587 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 160 155 149 150 Portland 
Average Available Beds 55 55 64 65 
WIES 1602 1256 1442 1604 
Inpatients Treated 1720 1722 2061 2692 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 81 78 78 79 Seymour 
Average Available Beds 33 34 33 33 
WIES 2012 2005 2150 2049 
Inpatients Treated 2125 2153 2326 2357 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 119 115 112 116 Stawell 
Average Available Beds 40 40 49 40 
WIES 2326 n/a   
Inpatients Treated 2957 n/a   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 93 n/a   
Werribee 
(amalgamated 
with Mercy 
Womens) Average Available Beds 32 n/a   
WIES 2990 2684 2805 2779 
Inpatients Treated 3236 3130 3145 3440 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 165 159 158 161 Wonthaggi 
Average Available Beds 60 60 60 60 
WIES 1351 1340 1438 1265 
Inpatients Treated 1691 1877 2008 2086 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 85 81 78 76 Yarrawonga 
Average Available Beds 33 39 39 33 
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Group D Hospitals – Summary Data Table 1992/93-1995/96 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 1230 982 1110 1031 
Inpatients Treated 1215 1345 1690 1443 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 46 40 38 38 Alexandra 
Average Available Beds 30 30 30 30 
WIES 396 484 510 419 
Inpatients Treated 452 536 564 476 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 34 30 30 30 Coleraine 
Average Available Beds 15 15 15 15 
WIES 721 554   
Inpatients Treated 696 689   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 55 50   Corryong (closure) 
Average Available Beds 18 18   
WIES 781 702 990 1092 
Inpatients Treated 732 734 1030 1243 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 44 42 77 77 
Daylesford 
(includes Creswick 
and Western 
Highlands from 
94/95) Average Available Beds 20 20 30 30 
WIES 895 711 670 694 
Inpatients Treated 642 785 655 699 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 47 42 40 41 Edenhope District 
Average Available Beds 20 20 20 20 
WIES 1035 968 1040 1185 
Inpatients Treated 1165 1306 1444 1926 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 30 31 32 35 Kilmore 
Average Available Beds 20 20 20 30 
WIES 991 792 864 748 
Inpatients Treated 936 1018 1131 1205 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 57 56 55 58 Maffra 
Average Available Beds 15 15 19 15 
WIES 922 907 943 858 
Inpatients Treated 994 1223 1124 1180 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 64 53 57 58 Myrtleford 
Average Available Beds 23 23 23 23 
WIES 873 621   
Inpatients Treated 684 708   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 37 36   Orbost (closure) 
Average Available Beds 26 15   
WIES 731 417 460 401 
Inpatients Treated 488 430 436 457 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 67 55 55 53 Ouyen 
Average Available Beds 22 15 15 15 
WIES 957 565 529 490 
Inpatients Treated 445 550 510 541 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 48 43 42 40 Port Fairy 
Average Available Beds 41 14 16 20 
WIES 1087 944 901 916 
Inpatients Treated 1113 1221 1225 1291 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 67 62 59 59 Rochester (Elmore) 
Average Available Beds 24 24 33 24 
WIES 380 369 377 282 
Inpatients Treated 341 355 340 264 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 16 14 15 18 Skipton District 
Average Available Beds 10 10 10 10 
WIES 868 916 930 957 
Inpatients Treated 900 1019 1057 1152 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 23 25 26 26 South Gippsland 
Average Available Beds 16 16 16 16 
WIES 688 560 545 549 
Inpatients Treated 663 662 601 621 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 72 56 49 51 St Arnaud 
Average Available Beds 20 20 20 20 
WIES 665 644 614 590 
Inpatients Treated 816 855 829 796 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 39 39 40 43 Tawonga District 
Average Available Beds 15 15 15 15 
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Group D Hospitals continued. 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 1231 971 1173 1112 
Inpatients Treated 1079 1313 1400 1496 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 57 55 55 62 
Terang District 
(includes Mortlake 
from 94/95 onwards) 
Average Available Beds 27 27 39 27 
WIES 779 620 702 726 
Inpatients Treated 959 817 943 985 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 26 25 29 31 Timboon District 
Average Available Beds 20 20 20 19 
WIES 3157 663 576 679 
Inpatients Treated 711 740 559 726 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 127 99 88 79 Warracknabeal 
Average Available Beds 49 40 36 35 
WIES 1227 1136 1182 1180 
Inpatients Treated 1433 1560 1706 1778 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 47 42 42 45 Westernport 
Average Available Beds 21 20 20 21 
WIES 3224 561 549 530 
Inpatients Treated 464 558 529 749 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 49 42 42 47 Yarram 
Average Available Beds 16 18 18 18 
WIES 558 462 432 544 
Inpatients Treated 529 516 486 575 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 29 26 25 26 Yea 
Average Available Beds 13 13 13 13 
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Group E Hospitals – Summary Data Table 1992/93-1995/96 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 446 282   
Inpatients Treated 275 283   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 21 18   
Apollo Bay 
(closure) 
Average Available Beds 12 12   
WIES 761 164 130 90 
Inpatients Treated 167 193 145 94 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 12 12 11 11 Birregurra 
Average Available Beds 6 6 6 6 
WIES 525 371 388 381 
Inpatients Treated 421 424 465 540 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 28 27 29 30 Boort 
Average Available Beds 9 9 9 9 
WIES 503 528 605 523 
Inpatients Treated 486 640 784 711 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 21 27 29 33 Bright 
Average Available Beds 9 9 9 9 
WIES 912 530 577 585 
Inpatients Treated 615 619 826 942 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 55 52 52 53 Casterton 
Average Available Beds 18 18 18 18 
WIES 133 108   
Inpatients Treated 101 93   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 21 17   Clunes (closure) 
Average Available Beds 4 4   
WIES 575 337   
Inpatients Treated 419 334   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 22 31   
Creswick 
(amalgamated with 
Daylesford) 
Average Available Beds 10 10   
WIES 1430 447 439  
Inpatients Treated 561 529 543  
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 53 48 44  
Dimboola 
(amalgamated with 
Wimmera) 
Average Available Beds 18 18 18  
WIES 594 348 459 485 
Inpatients Treated 432 416 614 573 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 35 29 26 26 Donald 
Average Available Beds 20 18 18 18 
WIES 502 228 117 39 
Inpatients Treated 195 195 84 32 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 49 42 30 32 Dunmunkle 
Average Available Beds 11 12 4 4 
WIES 132    
Inpatients Treated 71    
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 8    Eildon (closure) 
Average Available Beds 5    
WIES 288 350 323 311 
Inpatients Treated 319 369 310 389 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 23 22 23 27 
Heathcote (renamed 
McIvor in 94/95) 
Average Available Beds 7 7 7 7 
WIES 516 235 287 252 
Inpatients Treated 261 197 263 196 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 28 29 34 40 Heywood 
Average Available Beds 12 12 11 11 
WIES 228 259 277 281 
Inpatients Treated 238 231 260 285 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 22 24 29 30 Inglewood 
Average Available Beds 10 10 10 10 
WIES n/a 118   
Inpatients Treated n/a 107   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) n/a 19   
Jeparit 
(amalgamated with 
Nhill, Kaniva – 
West Wimmera) Average Available Beds n/a 4   
WIES 355 207   
Inpatients Treated 191 171   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 32 27   
Kaniva 
(amalgamated with 
Nhill, Jeparit – 
West Wimmera) Average Available Beds 10 21   
WIES 434 14   
Inpatients Treated 112 112   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 33 22   Koroit (closure) 
Average Available Beds 7 7   
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Group E Hospitals continued. 
 
Hospital Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
WIES 202 86   
Inpatients Treated 111 75   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 18 17   
Lismore 
(amalgamated with 
Camperdown – 
Corangamite) Average Available Beds 6 12   
WIES 358 352 436 375 
Inpatients Treated 397 437 537 480 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 24 25 24 26 Lorne 
Average Available Beds 8 8 8 8 
WIES 76    
Inpatients Treated 104    
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 13    
MacArthur 
(closure) 
Average Available Beds 4    
WIES 158 147 154 136 
Inpatients Treated 122 145 165 126 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 22 21 26 31 Maldon 
Average Available Beds 8 8 8 8 
WIES 149 81 136 147 
Inpatients Treated 123 50 130 170 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 22 18 18 17 Manangatang 
Average Available Beds 6 6 6 6 
WIES 291 201   
Inpatients Treated 262 204   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 20 15   
Mortlake 
(amalgamated with 
Terang) 
Average Available Beds 12 12   
WIES 324 382 348 288 
Inpatients Treated 382 401 353 307 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 22 21 22 21 Nathalia 
Average Available Beds 10 10 10 10 
WIES 109 85 133 123 
Inpatients Treated 120 118 143 150 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 18 18 19 18 Omeo 
Average Available Beds 3 4 4 4 
WIES 1252 881 1017 540 
Inpatients Treated 718 759 901 687 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 294 180 156 147 
Beechworth 
(Ovens) 
Average Available Beds 48 48 48 23 
WIES 211 274 211 167 
Inpatients Treated 165 233 171 140 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 19 18 18 19 Penshurst 
Average Available Beds 7 8 7 7 
WIES 537 302 418 431 
Inpatients Treated 294 257 405 401 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 21 24 29 31 Ripon Peace 
Average Available Beds 15 10 10 11 
WIES 489 357 360 361 
Inpatients Treated 383 445 377 357 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 33 31 29 30 Tallangatta 
Average Available Beds 15 20 20 20 
WIES 554 389 208 182 
Inpatients Treated 422 357 186 193 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 22 21 21 22 Waranga 
Average Available Beds 12 12 12 8 
WIES 602 138   
Inpatients Treated 62 84   
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 19 15   
Willaura 
(amalgamated with 
Ararat – East 
Grampians) Average Available Beds 8 8   
WIES 403 360 299 308 
Inpatients Treated 373 403 339 382 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 19 34 33 33 Winchelsea 
Average Available Beds 8 8 19 8 
WIES 284 207 206 275 
Inpatients Treated 226 242 241 315 
EFT Staff (non-medical staff) 40 35 34 36 Wycheproof 
Average Available Beds 10 10 10 10 
 
Source:  Victorian Hospital Comparative Data 1992/93-1995/96 
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Chapter 5 
 
Examination of Economies of Scale  
in Victorian Hospitals 
 
5.1 Overview 
The central thesis of this chapter is to apply survivor analysis, the background of 
which is discussed in Chapter 3, to determine the minimum efficient scale for both 
private and public hospitals in the State of Victoria over the period 1991/92 to 
1995/96.  Survivor analysis was first proposed by Mill (1909) and later developed by 
Stigler (1958).  In his paper, Stigler (1958) states that the use of survivor analysis is 
favourable because it avoids the problems associated with historical cost valuations 
and with, what he terms, the ‘hypothetical’ nature of technological studies.  The 
basic postulate of survivor analysis is that by viewing competition between different 
sized firms, we can determine what is the optimal size range and which firms are, 
therefore, more efficient. 
 
A study by Frech and Mobley (1995), which applies this technique to US data, 
concludes that scale economies exist in the US hospital sector.  They find that the 
market share of small hospitals falls and that of large hospitals increases over time 
due to the competitive nature of the market.  The results support the view that health 
provision by smaller hospitals may be of an inferior quality and, therefore, the 
reduction in their market share is reflective of inefficiencies. 
 
Economies of scale exist when, as the size of a plant increases, long-run average total 
costs fall.  Thus, the long-run average total cost curve is ‘U’ shaped, making the ideal 
plant size positioned at its minimum point, or minimum efficient scale.  Reductions 
in average costs of production can be achieved for the following reasons: 
• Labour specialisation; 
• Managerial specialisation; 
• Efficient capital; and, 
• By-products 
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As the size of plant increases, workers can specialise in fewer tasks, making them 
more efficient.  Labour specialisation also allows skilled workers to leave more 
mundane tasks to unskilled workers (Jackson and McIver, 2004). 
 
The application of managerial skills to a large production process is less costly per 
unit of output than it is for small processes.  Supervising a small number of personnel 
represents underuse of managerial resources.  Also, in the same vein as labour 
specialisation, managerial specialisation lowers unit costs because managers are 
responsible for supervising a particular area, for example nursing staff (Jackson and 
McIver, 2004). 
 
Capital equipment is costly, and therefore efficiencies exist for large-scale producers, 
since effective use of capital demands a high volume of production.  Small-scale 
producers often do not generate sufficient output to justify the purchase of costly 
capital equipment.  Also, the production of by-products assists large-scale producers 
in that, due to the fact that they are in large quantities, producers are able to sell them 
to other firms.  Small-scale producers, however, are less likely to use their by-
products; leading to wastage. 
 
It is also possible for diseconomies of scale to exist.  In the case where an increase in 
firm size leads to an increase in bureaucratic red tape that inhibits communication 
flows, average total costs could rise.  This scenario is represented by a position to the 
right of minimum costs on the ‘U’ shaped long-run average cost curve (Jackson and 
McIver, 2004). 
 
In this analysis, hospitals are grouped into size according to average available beds, 
and total output is measured using average bed days.  The data for this analysis has 
been gathered from the Department of Human Services, Victoria (special request), 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and the Victorian Hospital Comparative Data set.  
The period under consideration is chosen because the changeover to casemix funding 
on 1 July 1993 signalled an increase in competition for government funding between 
public hospitals.  This is supported by the Victorian Department of Human Services’ 
outline of casemix funding and DRGs. 
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The overall aim of casemix funding was to enhance and expand 
the hospital system in Victoria through a process that was free 
from centralised bureaucratic control, engendered competition and 
economic incentives for hospitals, and rewarded efficiency and 
growth in services while at the same time guarded quality. 
(Brook, 2006, p2) 
 
A comparison with the private sector for survivor analysis shows whether there was 
any change in market share between private and public hospitals in Victoria. 
 
5.2 Survivor Analysis 
The following analysis is a description of the change in market shares of both public 
and private hospitals for Victoria and Australia.  Data has been gathered for the years 
1991/92 and 1995/96 for all hospitals with the exception of Australian public 
hospitals, which is data for 1993/94 and 1999/00.  This minor discrepancy arises due 
to the limitation of data availability, but nevertheless allows us to view, to some 
extent, how Victorian public hospitals have compared with the Australian market as 
a whole.  The analysis begins with three tables for Public Hospitals – Victoria (91/92 
to 95/96). 
 Table 5.1 - Public Hospitals and Bed Days by Hospital Size 
 – Victoria (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
No. of Hospitals Total Bed Days Average Available
Beds 
(Hospital Size) 91/92 95/96 91/92 95/96 
0-49 
50-199 
200-399 
400 + 
77 
25 
11 
8 
61 
25 
12 
8 
363028 
586501 
823438 
1281891
240310 
621929 
974777 
1528947 
Total 121 10624 3054858 3365963 
  
Source:  Victorian Hospitals Association, 91/92 and 95/96: Rainbow Hospital Indicators 
 
Using the Total Bed Days columns of Table 5.1, it is possible to measure the rate of 
change of bed days between the two periods.  Table 5.2 shows a clear reduction in 
bed days for the smallest hospital group with less than 50 average available beds, 
although total bed days have increased from 3,054,858 to 3,365,963 for the period. 
 
                                                 
24 The number of hospitals is more than the number reported at Appendix IV because 5 hospitals are 
omitted from Appendix IV due to the fact that their characteristic data was not consistent over the 
period. 
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 Table 5.2 – Public Hospital Bed Days (Rate of Change) 
 – Victoria (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
Average Available 
Beds 91/92 95/96 Change 
Rate of 
Change 
0-49 
50-199 
200-399 
400 + 
363028 
586501 
823438 
1281891 
240310 
621929 
974777 
1528947
-337 
97 
415 
677 
-0.338 
0.060 
0.184 
0.193 
Total 3054858 3365963
 Source:  Victorian Hospitals Association 91/92 and 95/96: Rainbow Hospital Indicators 
 
Table 5.3 illustrates market share using the proportions of the total market obtained 
from Table 5.2. 
 Table 5.3 – Market share and rate of change – Public Hospital Bed Days 
 – Victoria (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
Average Available 
Beds 91/92 95/96 Change 
Rate of 
Change25
0-49 
50-199 
200-399 
400 + 
0.119 
0.192 
0.270 
0.420 
0.071 
0.185 
0.290 
0.454 
-0.048 
-0.007 
0.020 
0.035 
-0.400 
-0.038 
0.074 
0.082 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 Source:  Victorian Hospitals Association 91/92 and 95/96: Rainbow Hospital Indicators 
 
In this group (Public hospitals – Victoria) the number of hospitals declined by 12 
percent over the period, with bed days rising by 10 percent.  From Table 5.2 it is 
clear that bed days fell by over 33 percent for the smallest hospital group (0-49 
beds), and rose for all larger groups.  Table 5.3 shows that market share of public 
hospital bed days fell for hospitals with up to 199 beds and rose for all larger groups.  
Of interest is the 50-199 beds group.  Although this group experienced an increase in 
bed days, the increase was less than the increase of larger groupings, and thus its 
share of the market declined.  In comparison, following are three tables for Private 
Hospitals – Victoria for the same period. 
 
                                                 
25 Using a Chi-squared test, the null hypothesis of no change is strongly rejected at the 1% level of 
significance. 
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 Table 5.4 - Private Hospitals and Bed Days by Hospital Size26
 – Victoria (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
No. of 
Hospitals Total Bed Days 
Average Available 
Beds 
(Hospital Size) 91/92 95/96 91/92 95/96 
0-25 
26-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201+ 
39 
35 
23 
9 
5 
33 
30 
24 
13 
4 
148700 
278600 
388200 
297100 
365100 
112900 
255200 
437500 
477700 
320600 
Total 111 104 1477700 1603900 
 Source:  Department of Human Services (special request) 
 
The change in bed days for this group is shown in Table 5.5. 
 Table 5.5 –Private Hospital Bed Days (Rate of Change) 
 – Victoria (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
Average Available 
Beds 91/92 95/96 Change 
Rate of 
Change 
0-25 
26-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201 + 
148700 
278600 
388200 
297100 
365100 
112900 
255200 
437500 
477700 
320600 
-98 
-64 
135 
495 
-122 
-0.24 
-0.08 
0.13 
0.61 
-0.12 
Total 1477700 1603900
 Source:  Department of Human Services (special request) 
 
 Table 5.6 – Market share and rate of change –Private Hospital Bed Days 
 – Victoria (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
Average Available 
Beds 91/92 95/96 Change 
Rate of 
Change 
0-25 
26-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201 + 
0.10 
0.19 
0.26 
0.20 
0.25 
0.07 
0.16 
0.27 
0.30 
0.20 
-0.03 
-0.03 
0.01 
0.10 
-0.05 
-0.30 
-0.16 
0.04 
0.48 
-0.19 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 Source:  Department of Human Services (special request) 
                                                 
26 Hospital size ranges differ from Public Hospitals Victoria because they are obtained from a 
different data source. 
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In this group the number of hospitals declined by 6 per cent over the period, with bed 
days rising by 8.5 percent.  Table 5.5 shows that bed days fell by over 13 percent for 
the two smallest combined groups with 0-50 beds.  Bed days also fell by 12 percent 
for the largest hospitals with over 201 beds.  Table 5.6 shows that the market share of 
private hospital bed days fell for hospitals with up to 50 beds, rose for those with 
between 51 and 200 beds, and fell by 19 percent for the largest hospitals with over 
200 beds.  One explanation for this reduced market share within the largest group is 
that there was one fewer hospital at the end of the period in this group (refer to Table 
5.4), resulting in fewer bed days. 
 
It is apparent from the analysis that there has been a movement away from smaller 
hospitals in Victoria, evidenced by their decreasing market share.  This is more 
apparent for Victorian public hospitals than for private hospitals, although both types 
experienced falling market share among hospitals with fewer than 50 beds.  In both 
Victorian groups the number of hospitals declined due to closure, or amalgamations 
that resulted in a larger hospital.  Amalgamation does not increase the number of 
hospitals in the larger groups, merely the number of bed days following 
amalgamation.  This is because amalgamations occur between small hospitals and 
large hospitals.  Furthermore, in total, bed days increased suggesting an increase in 
throughput over the period.  The following data shows a similar analysis for public 
and private hospitals Australia-wide over a slightly different time period, since data 
prior to 93/94 is not available. 
 Table 5.7 – Public Hospitals and Bed Days by Hospital Size 
 – Australia (93/94 to 99/00) 
 
No. of 
Hospitals Total Bed Days 
Average Available 
Beds 
(Hospital Size) 93/94 99/00 93/94 99/00 
0-49 
50-199 
200-399 
400 + 
474 
174 
53 
36 
512 
154 
52 
25 
2250882 
4810622 
4115792 
6706420 
2197822 
4677741 
4705252 
4666999 
Total 737 743 17883716 16247814 
 Source:  AIHW, 1999-00 
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 Table 5.8 –Public Hospital Bed Days (Rate of Change) 
 – Australia (93/94 to 99/00) 
 
Average Available 
Beds 93/94 99/00 Change 
Rate of 
Change 
0-49 
50-199 
200-399 
400 + 
2250882 
4810622 
4115792 
6706420 
2197822 
4677741 
4705252 
4666999 
-145 
-364 
1615 
-5587 
-0.024 
-0.028 
0.143 
-0.304 
Total 17883716 16247814
 Source:  AIHW, 1999-00 
 
 Table 5.9 – Market share and rate of change –Public Hospital Bed Days 
 – Australia (93/94 to 99/00) 
 
Average Available 
Beds 93/94 99/00 Change 
Rate of 
Change 
0-49 
50-199 
200-399 
400 + 
0.126 
0.269 
0.230 
0.375 
0.135 
0.288 
0.290 
0.287 
0.009 
0.019 
0.059 
-0.088 
0.075 
0.070 
0.258 
-0.234 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 Source:  AIHW, 1999-00 
 
For this group the number of hospitals rose over the period by 0.8 percent, with bed 
days falling by a total of 9 per cent (Table 5.7).  This result is the opposite of that for 
Victorian public and private hospitals.  Bed days fell by 2.6 percent for hospitals 
with between 0 and 199 beds and fell by 30 percent for hospitals with more than 400 
beds.  The medium size range with between 200 and 399 beds increased bed days by 
over 14 percent (Table 5.8).  Despite the reduction in total bed days, all size groups 
with less than 400 beds experienced an increase in market share (Table 5.9).  The 
only group with reduced market share was the largest group (23.4 percent).  The 
number of hospitals with over 400 beds fell from 36 to 25 (31 percent) (Table 5.7).  
It is expected that a fall in the number of hospitals within the largest hospital group 
would result in a marked reduction in market share since it is the largest hospitals 
that provide the bulk of bed days.  In other words, the actual supply of public 
hospital beds Australia-wide became smaller over the period, with the largest public 
hospitals bearing responsibility for the reduction. 
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The following three tables show results for Private Hospitals – Australia (91/92 – 
95/96), which is an identical time period to the Victorian analysis. 
 
 Table 5.10 - Private Hospitals and Bed Days by Hospital Size 
 – Australia (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
No. of 
Hospitals Total Bed Days 
Average Available 
Beds 
(Hospital Size) 91/92 95/96 91/92 95/96 
0-25 
26-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201+ 
68 
100 
98 
40 
13 
67 
92 
102 
46 
16 
244900 
798600 
1534000 
1353800 
960100 
229900 
747400 
1721000 
1864300 
1281600 
Total 319 323 4891400 5844200 
 Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, Australia, Cat. 4390.0 
 
 Table 5.11 –Private Hospital Bed Days (Rate of Change) 
 – Australia (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
Average Available 
Beds 91/92 95/96 Change 
Rate of 
Change 
0-25 
26-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201 + 
244900 
798600 
1534000 
1353800 
960100 
229900 
747400 
1721000
1864300
1281600
-41 
-140 
512 
1399 
881 
-0.06 
-0.06 
0.12 
0.38 
0.33 
Total 4891400 5844200
 Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, Australia, Cat. 4390.0 
 
 Table 5.12 - Market share and rate of change – Private Hospital 
 Bed Days - Australia (91/92 to 95/96) 
 
Average Available 
Beds 91/92 95/96 Change 
Rate of 
Change 
0-25 
26-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201 + 
0.05 
0.16 
0.31 
0.28 
0.20 
0.04 
0.13 
0.29 
0.32 
0.22 
-0.01 
-0.04 
-0.02 
0.04 
0.02 
-0.21 
-0.22 
-0.06 
0.15 
0.12 
Total 1.000 1.000 
 Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, Australia, Cat. 4390.0 
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Within this group the total number of hospitals rose by 4 or 1.25 percent (Table 5.10) 
and bed days rose by 19.5 percent, significantly more than either of the Victorian 
groups (8.5 percent for private and 10 percent for public hospitals).  Bed days fell by 
6.3 percent for the two combined smallest groups of between 0 and 50 beds, and rose 
for all larger hospital sizes (Table 5.11).  Although bed days rose for the 51-100 
sized hospitals, their market share fell by 6 percent (Table 5.12).  The three smaller 
groups with 100 beds or less lost market share to the two larger groups.  The larger 
groups gained market share with an increase in both the number of hospitals and bed 
days. 
 
It is evident from this analysis that, with the exception of Public Hospitals – 
Australia, all groups experienced falling market share among smaller hospitals over 
the period.  The market for public hospitals Australia-wide became smaller over the 
period 1993/94 to 1999/00, which is consistent with the large increase in Private 
Hospital usage (19.5 percent increase in bed days between 1991/92 and 1995/96) 
(Tables 5.10 and 5.11). 
 
Public Hospitals in Victoria clearly experienced economies of scale over the period, 
with smaller hospitals losing market share due to both a reduction in the number of 
hospitals and a reduction in bed days.  These findings are supported in the literature 
(Frech and Mobley, 1995 and Dranove, 1998)27, and they are also supported by the 
economies of scale discussion in section 6.6 of this thesis. 
 
These results should also be viewed in conjunction with the results of various 
reviews undertaken of Victorian rural hospitals.  As noted in section 4.10 the Small 
Rural Hospitals Taskforce was established in 1993.  This was followed by the Multi-
Purpose Services Program Evaluation, Review of Group D and E Hospitals, Fabric 
Survey, and Rural Healthstreams Evaluation, among the subsequent reviews (DHS, 
2002).  This DHS discussion paper notes that the reviews found difficulties within 
the system that need to be addressed.  These difficulties relate to system drivers, 
funding structures, access to services, priority setting, financial viability, funding 
                                                 
27 Weaver and Deolalikar (2004) find that economies of scale and scope depend on category of 
hospital, as well as bed number and volume of output. 
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cycles, compliance and reporting, and comparative performance (DHS, 2002).  The 
effect of these issues on rural agencies could also explain the number of closures and 
amalgamations that were experienced by mostly rural hospitals over the period of 
this analysis. 
 
‘System drivers’ refers to the funding system that determines the service profile.  The 
reviews find that health and community services are not adequately provided under 
this system, and ‘…the approach…needs to be more responsive to service need 
whilst operating within a capped funding system’ (DHS, 2002, p13).  The various 
funding structures also create problems in rural areas.  These problems are due to 
inequitable resource allocation methods, insufficiently funded programs, 
inadequately identified patients’ impairment needs, and the fact that funding is based 
on average state-wide costs that are skewed toward metropolitan costs (DHS, 2002). 
 
It is acknowledged that rural areas have a higher incidence of disease rates due to 
lower access to health services in Victoria.  Also, in terms of priority setting, it is 
found that funders are not ‘…sufficiently aware of the services that are being 
‘purchased’, or whether these have any bearing on service needs or service priorities’ 
(DHS, 2002, p15).  The financial viability of rural health agencies is also taken into 
consideration because ‘[a]gencies are substantially influenced by…changes to 
funding conditions and levels’ (DHS, 2002, p15).  Their ability to absorb costs, 
generate revenue or change services is hampered by agencies’ small size.  Rural 
areas are also sensitive to the departure of even one General Practitioner from a 
town. 
The dependence on external operators for the delivery of core 
services places agencies in a very vulnerable position, which is 
accentuated when funding is provided on an output basis. 
(DHS, 2002, p15). 
The annual funding cycles exacerbate uncertainty in rural areas because agencies 
may not be aware of their annual allocation until after the financial year.  The DHS 
recommends a switch to three year funding agreements to overcome this problem.  
The issue of compliance and reporting adds a further administrative burden on small 
agencies due to insufficient staff with adequate expertise.  Comparative performance 
measurement is also difficult due to unreliable baseline data, and therefore ‘…the 
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system has difficulty in really knowing the level of efficiency of the health and 
community services sector generally’ (DHS, 2002, p17).   
 
5.3 Victorian Public Hospitals – Amalgamations and Closures 
The following tables list Victorian Public Hospitals for the years 1991/92 and 
1995/96 by average available beds.  The discussion outlines the separation of 
amalgamations and closures for each group size, and whether these occurred in 
metropolitan or regional Victoria.  The hospital movements are captured by the 
Victorian Hospitals’ Association’s Rainbow Hospital Indicators. 
 
Table 5.13 – 77 Public Hospitals – Victoria 91/92 
Average Available Beds 0 – 49 
 
Alexandra Heywood Penshurst 
Altona (M) Inglewood Port Fairy 
Apollo Bay Jeparit Portland 
Bacchus Marsh (M) Kaniva Ripon Peace 
Birregurra Kerang Rochester 
Boort Kilmore Seymour 
Bright Koroit Skipton District 
Burwood (M) Korumburra South Gippsland 
Camperdown Kyabram St. Arnaud 
Casterton Kyneton Stawell 
Clunes Lismore District Tallangatta 
Cobram District Lorne Community Tatura 
Cohuna Macarthur Tawonga District 
Coleraine Maffra Terang District 
Corryong Maldon Timboon District 
Creswick Manangatang Waranga Memorial 
Daylesford Mansfield Werribee (M) 
Dimboola Mortlake District Westernport (M) 
Donald Myrtleford Willaura 
Dunmunkle H.S. Nathalia Winchelsea 
Dunolly Nhill Woorayl 
Edenhope District Numurkah Wycheproof 
Eildon Omeo Yarram 
Elmore Orbost Yarrawonga 
Healesville (M) Ouyen Yea 
Heathcote Ovens District 
 
M = Metropolitan area 
 
Table 5.13 shows that in 1991/92 there were 77 public hospitals in Victoria with 0-49 
average available beds.  Only 6 hospitals were situated within the metropolitan area.  
These were Altona, Bacchus Marsh, Burwood, Healesville, Werribee and 
Westernport.  Of these metropolitan hospitals, only Werribee was no longer 
operating as a separate hospital in 1995/96 (see Table 5.14) since it joined the Mercy 
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Public Hospitals in 1994/95 and entered the 200-399 size grouping.  Healesville was 
renamed Yarra Ranges Health Services in 1995/96. 
 
Of the non-metropolitan hospitals in this size range, 9 closed (Apollo Bay, Clunes, 
Corryong, Dunolly, Eildon, Koroit, Macarthur, Orbost and Woorayl) and 11 became 
amalgamated to form hospitals in the same size grouping (Table 5.14).  Beechworth 
Hospital contains Ovens District, Gippsland Southern contains Korumburra, 
Rochester and Elmore combined, Corangamite contains Camperdown and Lismore, 
Hesse contains Winchelsea, Western Highlands contains Daylesford and Creswick, 
and Terang and Mortlake combined. 
 
A number of amalgamations resulted in larger hospitals.  In the 50-199 size the West 
Wimmera Health Service is an amalgamation of Nhill, Jeparit and Kaniva Hospitals.  
Dimboola amalgamated with Wimmera, and Willaura amalgamated with Ararat to 
form East Grampians Health Service, both within the 50-199 size.  Tatura and 
eventually Waranga Memorial merged with Goulburn Valley and entered the 200-
399 size group.  Heathcote was renamed McIvor in 1994/95 and remains in the 0-49 
size.  One hospital (Portland) experienced an increase in average available beds and 
moved into the 50-199 size range.  The net effect was a reduction of 16 public 
hospitals with between 0 and 49 average available beds over the period in Victoria.  
Table 5.14 shows that by 1995/96 this group size contained three new hospitals (Far 
East Gippsland, Otway Health and Upper Murray Health), and two that were in a 
larger group size in 91/92 (Benalla and Warracknabeal).  Table 5.14 thus outlines the 
remaining 61 hospitals within this size range in 1995/96. 
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 Table 5.14 - 61 Public Hospitals – Victoria 95/96 
Average Available Beds 0 – 49 
 
Alexandra Inglewood Seymour 
Altona (M) Kerang Skipton District 
Bacchus Marsh (M) Kilmore South Gippsland 
Beechworth Hospital, The Kyabram St. Arnaud 
Benalla Kyneton Stawell 
Birregurra Lorne Community Tallangatta 
Boort Maffra Tawonga District 
Bright Maldon Terang and Mortlake H.S. 
Burwood (M) Manangatang Timboon District 
Casterton Mansfield Upper Murray Health 
Cobram District McIvor Health and C.S. Waranga Memorial 
Cohuna Myrtleford Warracknabeal 
Coleraine Nathalia Western Highlands 
Corangamite Numurkah Westernport (M) 
Donald Omeo Wycheproof 
Dunmunkle Otway Health and C.S. Yarra Ranges H.S. (M) 
Edenhope District Ouyen Yarram 
Far East Gippsland H.S. Penshurst Yarrawonga 
Gippsland Southern H.S. Port Fairy Yea 
Hesse R.H.S. - Winchelsea Ripon Peace 
Heywood Rochester and Elmore D.H.S. 
 
M = Metropolitan area 
 
 
Table 5.15 – 25 Public Hospitals – Victoria 91/92 
Average Available Beds 50 – 199 
 
Ararat Maroondah (M) Warracknabeal 
Benalla Mordialloc (M) Warrnambool 
Colac Peter McCallum C.I. (T) (M) West Gippsland 
East Gippsland Royal Vic. Eye and Ear (T) (M) Williamstown (M) 
Echuca Sandringham (M) Wimmera Base 
Fairfield (T) (M) St. George’s (M) Wodonga District 
Gippsland Base Swan Hill Wonthaggi (M) 
Hamilton Base The Angliss (M) 
Maryborough Wangaratta Base 
 
T = Teaching Hospital M = Metropolitan area 
 
Table 5.15 shows hospitals with between 50 and 199 average available beds in 
1991/92.  Of the 25 hospitals, 10 were located in the metropolitan area (Fairfield, 
Maroondah, Mordialloc, Peter McCallum Cancer Institute, Royal Victorian Eye and 
Ear, Sandringham, St Georges, The Angliss, Williamstown and Wonthaggi) and the 
remainder were located in non-metropolitan regions.  Of the metropolitan hospitals, 
Maroondah and St Georges entered the 200-399 bed size by 1995/96.  There were no 
amalgamations in metropolitan public hospitals of this size. 
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 Ararat and Willaura (see Table 5.13) amalgamated to form East Grampians Health 
Service (Table 5.16).  Benalla moved into the smaller grouping (see Table 5.14), as 
did Warracknabeal.  East Gippsland Centre amalgamated to form Bairnsdale 
Regional Health Service, and Gippsland Base was the only hospital closure in this 
group. 
 
Table 5.16 shows the existence of a new hospital, namely Central Wellington, and 
the inclusion of Portland, which was previously grouped in 0-49 average beds.  This 
table also shows Mt. Alexander Hospital, which is the amalgamation of Castlemaine 
and Mt Alexander (Geriatric and Rehabilitation) hospitals.  Mildura Base (Table 
5.16) was previously in the 200-399 sized group, and West Wimmera Health Service 
was the result of the amalgamation of three hospitals previously in the 0-49 group 
(Nhill, Jeparit and Kaniva Hospitals). 
 
Table 5.16 - 25 Public Hospitals – Victoria 95/96  
Average Available Beds 50 – 199 
 
Bairnsdale R.H.S. Mordialloc (M) Warrnambool 
Central Wellington Mt. Alexander West Gippsland 
Colac Peter McCallum C.I. (T) (M) West Wimmera H.S. 
East Grampians H.S. Portland Williamstown (M) 
Echuca Royal Vic. Eye and Ear (T) (M) Wimmera 
Fairfield (T) (M) Sandringham (M) Wodonga District 
Hamilton Base Swan Hill Wonthaggi (M) 
Maryborough The Angliss (M) 
Mildura Base Wangaratta Base 
  
T = Teaching Hospital M = Metropolitan area 
 
Table 5.17 shows hospitals with between 200 and 399 beds in 1991/92.  Of the 11 
hospitals listed, 6 were located in the metropolitan area and 5 in the non-metropolitan 
area.  Non-metropolitan hospitals are Ballarat Base, Bendigo Base, Goulburn Valley 
Base, La Trobe Regional and Mildura Base.  Of these non-metropolitan hospitals, 
one (Mildura Base) moved into the 50-199 size group.  Of the metropolitan hospitals, 
Mercy Women’s amalgamated with Werribee Mercy Hospital (Table 5.13) to form 
Mercy Public Hospitals Inc (Table 5.18).  Mornington moved into the 400+ bed size. 
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Table 5.17 - 11 Public Hospitals – Victoria 91/92 
Average Available Beds 200 – 399 
 
Ballarat Base Goulburn Valley Base Mornington (T) (M) 
Bendigo Base La Trobe Regional P.A.N.C.H. (T) (M) 
Box Hill (T) (M) Mercy Women’s (T) (M) Royal Children’s (T) (M) 
Dandenong (T) (M) Mildura Base  
 
T = Teaching Hospital M = Metropolitan area 
 
From Table 5.18, Maroondah and St George’s were previously in the 50-199 group, 
and Royal Women’s was in the 400+ group. 
 
Table 5.18 - 12 Public Hospitals – Victoria 95/96 
Average Available Beds 200 – 399 
 
Ballarat Base Goulburn Valley P.A.N.C.H. (T) (M) 
Bendigo H.C. La Trobe Royal Children’s (T) (M) 
Box Hill (T) (M) Maroondah (M) Royal Women’s (T) (M) 
Dandenong (T) (M) Mercy Public Hospitals Inc (T) (M) St. George’s (M) 
 
T = Teaching Hospital M = Metropolitan area 
 
Table 5.19 shows hospitals with 400+ average available beds.  Of the 8 hospitals, 
one (Geelong) is located outside the metropolitan area.  MMC Clayton amalgamated 
with Moorabbin to form Monash Medical Centre (Table 5.20), and Royal Women’s 
entered the 200-399 size group. 
 
Table 5.19 - 8 Public Hospitals – Victoria 91/92 
Average Available Beds 400 + 
 
Alfred (T) (M) MMC Clayton (T) (M) St. Vincent’s (T) (M) 
Austin (T) (M) Royal Melbourne (T) (M) Western (T) (M) 
Geelong (T) Royal Women’s (T) (M) 
 
T = Teaching Hospital M = Metropolitan area 
 
All 8 remaining hospitals in Table 5.20 are teaching hospitals. 
 
Table 5.20 - 8 Public Hospitals – Victoria 95/96 
Average Available Beds 400 + 
 
Alfred (T) (M) Monash Medical Centre (T) (M) St. Vincent’s (T) (M) 
Austin (T) (M) Mornington (T) (M) Western (T) (M) 
Geelong (T) Royal Melbourne (T) (M) 
 
T = Teaching Hospital M = Metropolitan area 
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5.4 Discussion 
The results from survivor analysis clearly show a reduction in market share of 
Victorian public hospitals with less than 200 average available beds, whereas the 
market share for larger public hospitals increased over the period.  This would 
suggest that there has been a movement away from small hospitals that are 
predominantly located in regional areas.  Of course, these results may not be solely 
attributable to increased competition for casemix funding between hospitals. 
 
The undersupply of rural doctors (see Humphreys et al., 2002 and Donato and 
Scotton, 1999) may also account for the fact that closures and amalgamations 
occurred in regional Victoria.  The reduction in the number of hospitals (77 to 61) in 
the smallest group (0-49) supports this finding.  However, the various difficulties 
reportedly experienced by rural agencies subsequent to the implementation of 
casemix funding suggest that the system does not have the ‘…capacity to meet the 
desired principles that support funding and service delivery provision’ (DHS, 2002, 
p13).  These difficulties are particularly exacerbated by an output based funding 
system, and also support the results obtained from survivor analysis. 
 
Despite these observations, survivor analysis has its limitations (section 3.2), the 
most significant of which is that its estimates of optimality are descriptive, not 
normative.  The healthcare sector is one industry where normative estimates are 
warranted because of market imperfections.  The survivor technique also relies on 
competition to drive efficiency and, although the implementation of casemix funding 
mimics the competitive market to some extent, the Victorian healthcare system is not 
a competitive market.  Limited health budgets do, however, dictate where services 
will be delivered, and output based funding has clearly had an impact on small 
hospitals located predominantly in regional Victoria. 
 
The market for private hospitals in Victoria exhibits similar findings, with the 
exception of a hospital closure in the 201+ bed size.  The Australia-wide results are 
very different in the public sector in that they show an increased market share for 
smaller hospitals, and a reduced market share for those with over 400 beds.  Clearly 
the amount of closures (11) within the largest group is responsible for this anomaly.  
A more reflective result for economies of scale lies in the results for private hospitals 
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Australia-wide.  Smaller hospitals in the 0-100 bed range exhibit reductions in 
market share, and those with over 101 beds show an increase over the period. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
 
6.1 Overview 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) involves the use of linear programming methods 
to construct a non-parametric frontier over the data so that each firm’s performance 
can be compared to this frontier (Coelli, 1996b).  As outlined in Chapter 3 work on 
modern efficiency measurement began with Farrell (1957) who drew upon the work 
of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) to define a simple measure of firm 
efficiency that could account for multiple inputs under the assumption of constant 
returns to scale.  Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) advanced the original work by 
accounting for variable returns to scale. 
 
This application of efficiency measurement to Victorian public hospitals firstly uses 
Farrell’s original ideas, which were input-orientated measures using two inputs and 
one output in an input-output ratio.  With this method the technical efficiency score 
measures the degree of efficiency, or proximity to the efficient frontier under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale using the standard multi-stage DEA model.  
The second analysis compares technical efficiency results under the assumption of 
constant returns, with results under the assumption of variable returns to scale 
(Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984).  Technical efficiency is defined by Coelli 
(1996b) as the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs.  
It can also be defined as minimising inputs to produce a given level of output. 
 
Since data have been gathered for five hospital groups (according to size) over four 
years, each hospital’s technical efficiency scores within each group in a given year 
can be compared to its own scores in other years, as well as to other hospitals’ 
scores.  The first analysis also bundles total hospitals for each year, so that each 
hospital may be compared with all other Victorian hospitals.  Since there are closures 
and amalgamations occurring over the period, the total sample becomes smaller over 
time. 
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Hospital size is determined by the number of separations per annum, with total 
output measured using weighted inlier-equivalent separations (WIES) and total 
inpatients treated.  Inputs include non-medical staff (nursing, admin/clerical, medical 
support and hotel and allied) and average available acute beds.  The data for this 
analysis has been gathered from the Victorian Hospital Comparative Data set 
(Victorian Hospitals’ Association, 92/93-95/96). 
 
6.2 Analysis Assuming Constant Returns to Scale 
The first DEA utilised in this study uses Farrell’s (1957) original ideas.  These were 
input-orientated measures using two inputs and one output in an input-output ratio.  
Therefore, we take inputs x1 and x2, which are used to produce output y under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale.  Since data are segregated into hospital 
groups according to their size (ie number of separations per annum), variable returns 
are not assumed within this model.  The results are shown in graphical form in 
Appendix 1 at the end of this thesis. 
 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, all inefficiencies are of a technical 
nature.  Technically efficient firms always lie on the frontier and, indeed, form the 
efficient frontier.  The following diagram is similar to the one shown in Chapter 3, 
and depicts the basic model. 
 
 Figure 6.1 – Piecewise Linear Convex Isoquant 
       x2/y 
      •  D 
         D1   •  A 
   • B 
           A1 
           C • 
  0             x1/y 
 
Figure 6.1 shows a constant returns to scale DEA model showing technical 
efficiencies.  Since the model is input-orientated and we are attempting to minimise 
inputs, all firms lie either on or to the right of the technically efficient frontier.  The 
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degree of technical efficiency is measured by a ray from the origin to a firm (eg, firm 
A).  Where this ray passes through the frontier is the optimum input/output 
combination (A1).  The distance A1A represents the amount by which inputs should 
be reduced without incurring a reduction in output.  Hence, the technical efficiency 
score is obtained by the ratio 0A1/0A. 
 
Points B and C lie on the frontier.  This would make their technical efficiency score 
equal to 1 since there is no input reduction necessary.  Firm D will lie on the frontier 
at point D1, however, this is not an optimal point since the frontier at this point is 
parallel to the axis.  At point D1 there exists input slack equal to the distance BD1.  
The input slacks obtained for this first analysis can be found in Appendix 2 (raw 
results)28.  Thus, it is clear that technically efficient firms determine the shape of the 
frontier and set the benchmark for all firms. 
 
Fig. 6.1 illustrates the DEA frontier corresponding to equation 6.1 below. 
 minθλ θ, 
 st -yi + Yλ ≥ 0, 
  θxi – Xλ ≥ 0, 
 λ ≥ 0, (6.1) 
where θ is a scalar and λ is a N x 1 vector of constants.  The value of θ obtained will 
be the efficiency score obtained for the i-th hospital.  It will satisfy θ ≤ 1, where a 
value of 1 indicates a hospital which is technically efficient and which lies on the 
frontier.  The λ’s represent peer weights where input slack exists (eg., point D1 in 
Fig. 6.1) and where, even though there is no input slack (eg., point A1), the 
technically efficient point occurs between two input combinations that determine the 
frontier (eg., points B and C). 
 
DEA is useful in its application to hospitals because it helps to identify best practice 
in the use of resources.  It should be noted, however, that efficiency is only one 
element of a hospital’s objectives.  The provision and quality of medical care are 
clearly the main objectives of public hospitals, and no attempt is made in this study 
to compare hospitals for quality outcomes. 
                                                 
28 Appendix 2 contains raw results that are produced on in excess of 1,000 pages, making them too 
bulky for attachment.  The author is able to provide a copy of Appendix 2 upon request. 
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 6.3 Data 
Data for this study has been drawn from the Victorian Hospital Comparative Data set 
for each of four years (Victorian Hospitals’ Association, 1992/93-1995/96).  In 
particular, this DEA model requires one output and two inputs for each firm.  
Although the data set contains a multitude of possible input/output combinations, it 
was decided to use the number of equivalent full-time non-medical staff (ie, nursing, 
administrative and clerical, medical support, and hotel and allied) (input x1) and the 
number of average available acute beds (input x2). 
 
Following scrutiny of the data, it was decided to use two different outputs for 
comparative purposes.  The first is weighted inlier equivalent separations (WIES) 
(output YA).  The second part of this analysis uses the same inputs with total 
inpatients treated (output YB).  In this way it also becomes clear how the DRG 
weights in the WIES figures affect each hospital’s technical efficiency score. 
 
There are some data inconsistencies that are acknowledged.  The output YB initially 
used is inpatients treated, however this is substituted for acute separations for the 
final two years of the study due to a change in data assembly.  This inconsistency is 
applied to all hospitals; therefore although comparisons are less than completely 
reliable from year to year, cross-sectional comparisons are not affected.  Also, 
continuity of hospital numbering requires that any new hospitals established over the 
period that were not the result of amalgamation, be ignored.  Where an amalgamation 
occurs, the combined hospitals’ data are entered as data of the larger pre-existing 
hospital. 
 
6.4 CRS Results 
Appendix 3 shows the technical efficiency scores obtained, and Table 6.1, which 
follows, is a proportional summary of technical efficiency scores obtained from this 
DEA model.  The most technically efficient hospitals in each year have a score equal 
to 1, with the least efficient hospitals scoring <0.5.  The results show some very 
interesting patterns.  Firstly, scores for Group ‘A’ Teaching Hospitals show an 
increase in the percentage of hospitals lying on the frontier toward the end of the 
time period, in particular for output YA (WIES).  This group has no hospitals 
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performing in the <0.5 range, with the exception of the final year for output YB 
(inpatients treated/acute separations) when over 6 per cent of hospitals operate within 
this range.  The bulk of hospitals’ results are in the mid range, with their percentage 
falling over the period for both outputs. 
 
Table 6.1 - Percentage of Hospitals by Group within Technical Efficiency Score 
Ranges, 1992/93 – 1995/96 for WIES29 (YA) and Inpatients 
Treated30 (YB) for Constant Returns to Scale 
 
92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 Hospital 
Group 
Out- 
put 
<0.5 0.5<1 = 1 <0.5 0.5<1 = 1 <0.5 0.5<1 = 1 <0.5 0.5<1 = 1 
YA 0 93.75 6.25 0 87.5 12.5 0 87.5 12.5 0 81.25 18.75 Group ‘A’ 
Teaching 
Hospitals YB 0 93.75 6.25 0 87.5 12.5 0 87.5 12.5 6.25 81.25 12.5 
YA 9.1 77.27 13.64 0 85.7 14.3 0 95.2 4.8 4.8 81 14.3 
Group ‘B’ 
Large 
Regional 
Base 
and 
Suburban 
YB 4.5 82 13.64 0 85.7 14.3 4.7 81 14.3 14.3 76.2 9.5 
YA 83.3 12.5 4.2 21.7 69.5 8.8 26 69.5 4.5 21.7 73.8 4.5 Group ‘C’ 
Regional 
General 
Hospitals YB 79 16.8 4.2 70 25.5 4.5 87 8.5 4.5 95.6 0 4.4 
YA 86.4 9.1 4.5 13.5 82 4.5 15 75 10 35 60 5 Group ‘D’ 
Area 
Hospitals YB 36.4 50 13.6 32 59 9 50 40 10 45 45 10 
YA 90.6 6.3 3.1 42 54.8 3.2 50 45.5 4.5 28.5 62 9.5 Group ‘E’ 
Local 
Hospitals YB 46.9 50 3.1 55 42 3 63.5 32 4.5 52.5 38 9.5 
YA 94.8 4.3 0.9 40.7 56.6 2.7 41 57 2 40.6 58.4 1 
All 
Hospitals 
YB 75.8 23.3 0.9 66.4 32.7 0.9 74.5 24.5 1 96 3 1 
 
 
The results for Group ‘B’ (Large Regional Base and Suburban Hospitals) show a 
similar increase in technical efficiency over the period.  There was one closure in this 
group; a hospital situated in regional Victoria.  Although this closure occurred at the 
end of 93/94, the hospital does not appear to have been performing poorly prior to 
closure.  Clearly, the bulk of hospitals within this group performed in the mid range 
over the period with little fluctuation over time. 
                                                 
29 WIES = Weighted inlier equivalent separations 
30 YB is inpatients treated for the first two years and acute separations for the final two years. 
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 Group ‘C’ (Regional General Hospitals) contains hospitals which have between 1000 
and 4000 separations per annum.  This set of results shows the bulk of hospitals 
occurring in the <0.5 range at the beginning of the period.  In the final year this 
figure falls considerably for output YA (21.7%) and rises for output YB (95.6%).  
The percentage of hospitals lying on the frontier is fairly stable throughout the period 
with most of the redistribution occurring between the two lower ranges. 
 
Group ‘D’ (Area Hospitals) contains hospitals with between 500 and 1000 
separations per annum.  Efficiency scores for output YA improve over the period 
with a reduction of hospitals in the lowest range and an increase in the mid range.  
Results for output YB show a slight increase in the proportion of hospitals in this 
range.  There were two hospital closures in this group, both at the end of 93/94. 
 
The group with the smallest hospitals is Group ‘E’ (Local Hospitals) with less than 
500 separations per annum.  This group exhibited the bulk of closures (6) and 
amalgamations (9).  All hospitals in group ‘E’ are located in regional Victoria.  In 
regard to output YA, it is clear that the bulk of hospitals occur in the smallest range 
at the beginning of the period, with the bulk (62%) of hospitals in 1995/96 being in 
the mid range.  There is an improvement in the proportion of hospitals lying on the 
frontier for both outputs.  This figure rises from 3.1 per cent to 9.5 per cent over the 
period. 
 
The results show that teaching hospitals were more closely aligned with each other at 
the beginning of the period than were any of the other groups.  With an increase in 
efficiency came a slightly wider distribution of hospitals within this group.  Of 
interest when viewing the five hospital groups separately is that, of the hospitals that 
performed on the technically efficient frontier at any point in the period, none was 
required to either amalgamate or close. 
 
The results for All Hospitals show a slight increase in the proportion of hospitals that 
lie on the frontier and (for YA) a redistribution from the lowest range of efficiency to 
the mid range, which represents an improvement.  Output YB shows a deterioration 
since the number of inpatients treated (or acute separations) does not take into 
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account case complexity and, therefore, is not an accurate measure for comparison 
across hospital sizes.  All hospitals that eventually closed performed poorly relative 
to the others just prior to closure, as did most of the hospitals that eventually 
amalgamated.  A large proportion of the hospitals that resulted from amalgamation 
experienced an improvement in their technical efficiency scores for WIES, but not 
necessarily for inpatients treated/acute separations. 
 
Appendix 1 contains graphs of the DEA results in 1992/93 and 1995/96 for each 
separate group and each input/output combination, as well as for all hospitals.  The 
graphs illustrate that the majority of hospitals improve their technical efficiency over 
the period.  This is evident in both the overall movement of hospitals in a south-
westerly direction as well as the re-positioning of the efficient frontier. 
 
The frontiers for Group ‘A’ and Group ‘B’ hospitals have clearly shifted down and to 
the left over the period for both outputs.  The frontier for Group ‘C’ hospitals has 
also improved slightly with the hospitals that were operating at a greater distance 
from the frontier in 92/93 improving their position.  Group ‘D’ hospitals experienced 
an improvement for output YB in both positioning of the frontier and efficiency 
improvement among the poorer performers.  Their performance in terms of output 
YA appears to have deteriorated over the period.  Group ‘E’, with the exception of 
hospital 10, also experienced an improvement for output YB and deterioration in the 
ratio of inputs to YA.  The graphs for all hospitals tell a similar story for both 
outputs, with the exception of hospital 30, which shows a distinct reduction in 
efficiency over the period. 
 
The results suggest that some improvement has occurred in hospitals’ technical 
efficiency over time.  Since the study covers the time period 92/93 to 95/96, and 
since casemix funding was implemented on 1 July, 1993, it can be inferred that 
casemix funding had some impact on these results.  The fact that Group ‘E’ hospitals 
experienced poor efficiency scores when compared with all other hospitals, suggests 
that these hospitals found it difficult to compete under the new output based funding 
regime.  The evidence of amalgamations within this group also suggests that these 
small, regional hospitals attempted to remain competitive by increasing their size in 
order to secure funding (see section 5.3). 
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 6.5 Variable Returns to Scale 
The major assumption of Farrell’s (1957) model is that of constant returns to scale.  
This may be oversimplifying the analysis since it suggests that all hospitals in the 
study operate at optimal scale, namely at the minimum of long-run average costs.  It 
is conceivable that this is not the case, in fact, due to the many financial constraints 
that hospitals face.  In particular, the adoption of new technology in the longer term 
results in increasing costs for hospitals, as opposed to cost savings in other industries 
(Rice, 1998). 
 
This section utilises the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) DEA model which 
extends Farrell’s (1957) work, and which accounts for variable returns to scale 
situations.  This model removes the scale efficiency effects, leaving measures of 
technical efficiency.  (See Appendix 4 for technical efficiency scores, and Appendix 
5.1 and 5.2 for raw results, and 5.3 for graphs). 
 
The Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) model contains both VRS and CRS DEA 
results generated from the same data in order that comparison between the two can 
be made.  Where there is a difference between the two technical efficiency scores, 
this indicates the existence and degree of scale inefficiency (Coelli, 1996b).  This 
model uses one input and one output, namely EFT non-medical staff and WIES 
respectively.  The shape of the frontier is a convex hull which envelopes the data 
points more tightly than the CRS conical hull (Coelli, 1996b).  Since this is the case, 
technical efficiency scores will be greater than or equal to those obtained using the 
CRS model. 
 
Whereas in the model used earlier in this chapter efficiency was measured by a ray 
from the origin, this model measures efficiency horizontally.  This shows by how 
much the use of the input should be reduced to produce the same level of output.  
Figure 6.2 illustrates the model and shows how efficiency is obtained. 
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Figure 6.2 – Scale Efficiencies 
 
 
           Y 
 
 
 
             VRS Frontier 
          CRS        DRS 
 
 
        IRS 
            A•    B•   • C       • D 
 
 
      X 
 
 
In Figure 6.2 the distance DC shows technical inefficiency of point D under the 
assumption of VRS, whilst under CRS the technical inefficiency is the larger 
distance DB.  This can be expressed as follows: 
 TECRS = AB/AD 
 TEVRS = AC/AD 
 SE = AB/AC 
 TECRS = TEVRS x SE 
 AB/AD = (AC/AD) x (AB/AC) 
 
Therefore, scale efficiency multiplied by technical efficiency under the assumption 
of variable returns to scale is equal to technical efficiency under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. 
 
6.6 VRS Results 
The results for CRS, VRS and scale obtained using the Banker, Charnes and Cooper 
(1984) model are summarised in Table 6.2.  Between 1992/93 and 1995/96 there is a 
reduction in the proportion of hospitals in the least efficient range (<0.5) for CRS and 
VRS assumptions, and scale.  A reduction in the figure for scale in this range 
suggests an improvement in scale economies since hospitals in this group either 
increased output or reduced input (see Figure 6.2 for clarification).  There also 
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appears to have been a redistribution of hospitals from the least efficient range to the 
mid range in Table 6.2, with the proportion of hospitals lying on the VRS frontier 
increasing.  The VRS frontier has, therefore, shifted up over the period, leaving those 
hospitals that did not improve their relative position (eg. hospital 85 in Appendix 5.3 
graphs) operating at a greater distance from both frontiers.  It is also clear from 
Appendix 5 that hospital 62’s position has deteriorated, with a proportionally larger 
increase in input than output. 
 
Table 6.2 - Percentage of All Hospitals within Technical Efficiency 
Score Ranges for 1992/93 and 1995/96 for CRS, VRS and 
Scale31
 
92/93 95/96 Technical 
Efficiency <0.5 0.5<1 = 1 <0.5 0.5<1 = 1 
CRS 95 4.1 0.9 85 14 1 
VRS 70 27 3 59 35 6 
Scale 22 76 2 5 94 1 
 
The results (graphs) obtained using the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) model 
show that between 1992/93 and 1995/96 hospitals 2, 6, 109 and 66 improved their 
relative positions.  With the exception of hospital 6, these hospitals form the north-
western frontier.  The VRS frontier has shifted up over the period, leaving those 
hospitals that did not improve their relative position over the period (eg. 85) 
operating at a greater distance from both frontiers.  It is clear that hospital 62’s 
position has deteriorated, with a larger proportional increase in input relative to 
output. 
 
This model also gives results for increasing and decreasing returns to scale.  
Hospitals producing output at less than the CRS level of output exhibit increasing 
returns to scale (IRS), and hospitals producing above the CRS level of output exhibit 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS).  The results show that over time the IRS section of 
the VRS frontier becomes smaller.  This is due to the following.  Firstly, the hospital 
operating at CRS in 1992/93 (hospital 119) used 49 inputs to produce 3224 outputs 
                                                 
31 Scale represents the distance AB/AC from Fig. 6.2 above. 
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(1.5 percent of the output figure).  In 1995/96 hospital 15 was operating on the CRS 
frontier and used 30 inputs to produce 1565 outputs (1.92 percent of the output 
figure).  There were 72 hospitals operating on the IRS section of the frontier in 
1992/93, compared with 52 hospitals in 1995/96.  These results are consistent with 
the amalgamation behaviour outlined in Chapter 5 and Section 6.3 above. 
 
Comparing these technical efficiency scores to those obtained using Farrell’s (1957) 
model, the results show the same hospitals operating on the CRS frontier.  In 
1992/93 (Appendix 3.6) hospital 119 has a score equal to 1.000 for output YA 
(WIES).  In 1995/96 (Appendix 3.6) there are two hospitals in this position (15 and 
84).  Using the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) model, hospital 84 is 44.8 
percent efficient (CRS) and 74.4 percent efficient (VRS) in 1995/96.  Bearing in 
mind that the Farrell (1957) model analysis earlier in this chapter includes an 
additional input (average available beds), it is apparent that the absence of beds in the 
analysis reduces the efficiency score for hospital 8432, although average available 
beds are not the sole determinant of efficiency. 
 
Not surprisingly, all Group ‘A’ teaching hospitals and Group ‘B’ large regional 
hospitals appear on or near the DRS portion of the frontier.  That is, an increase of 
the input would result in a less than proportional increase in output.  In 1995/96 
hospital 15 (C5) is the only hospital operating at the minimum point of its long-run 
average cost curve.  This is consistent with the Farrell (1957) model results and 
shows that the two models support the finding that hospital 15 operated at the 
optimal input/output combination in 1995/96 under the assumptions of both CRS and 
VRS. 
 
6.7 Discussion 
This chapter has illustrated the use of linear programming methods to construct non-
parametric frontiers over Victorian hospital data.  Both methods used have generated 
technical efficiency scores for the data, allowing us to compare hospitals’ 
performance over time.  It is interesting to note that there was only one hospital (15) 
that performed consistently on the efficient frontier using these methods.  This was a 
                                                 
32 The Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) model analysis uses only non-medical staff as the input. 
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medium sized hospital located in the metropolitan area.  Of note is the result that 
hospitals that either closed or amalgamated did not register an efficiency score equal 
to 1 for the entire period.  Although one or two may have been operating at above 70 
per cent efficiency, on the whole closures were poor performers relative to their 
peers. 
 
The CRS graphs for the first and final years of observation (Appendix 1) illustrate 
the input/output ratios between the two periods.  These graphs suggest that the 
pressure of budget cuts and competition for casemix funding had only a slight impact 
on individual public hospital efficiency.  A movement in the frontier over time 
suggests that there was room for improvement even among hospitals that were 
technically efficient at the beginning of the period.  Hospitals operating at a greater 
distance from the frontier, that later moved in a south-westerly direction, appear to 
show some improvement in efficiency. 
 
The literature contains considerable debate33 over whether or not hospital efficiency 
should be measured using frontier estimation techniques; there is also division within 
frontier approaches.  Proponents of SFE note that DEA does not estimate the frontier, 
rather the frontier is derived.  This leaves DEA results sensitive to the sample, such 
that the technical efficiency scores cannot determine if hospitals on the frontier are 
also inefficient (Craycraft, 1999).  SFE, however, is a parametric approach that is 
based on ‘statistical assumptions that allow the frontier to be estimated from the data’ 
(Craycraft, 1999, p 23).  Kooreman (1994b) suggests that the two techniques (DEA 
and SFE) address different questions and serve different purposes. 
At the present, state of the art of the two approaches should 
primarily be viewed as complements rather than substitutes.  Further 
research, preferably based on panel data, should try to combine the 
strengths of both. 
(Kooreman, 1994b, p 345) 
 
In an effort to bring together the strengths of both techniques, therefore, our analysis 
continues in the following chapter with an application of SFE to Victorian hospital 
data over the same period. 
                                                 
33 The debate is outlined here in Chapter 2 and was originally published in the Journal of Health 
Economics, 1994, Vol 13, Issue 3. 
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Chapter 7 
Stochastic Frontier Estimation 
 
7.1 Overview 
The stochastic frontier production function was independently proposed by Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977), and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977).  This new 
approach to estimating production functions involves the ‘specification of the error 
term as being made up of two components, one normal and the other from a one-
sided distribution’ (Aigner et al., 1977, 21).  Thus, the stochastic frontier model has 
the advantage over DEA in that it is now able to decompose the two sources of error 
into random noise and inefficiency (Dor, 1994).  In its original form the model was 
specified for cross-sectional data, as outlined below in equation (7.1), although the 
entire error term (vi - ui) could not be decomposed. 
 Yi = xiβ + εi (7.1) 
Where Yi is the production (or the logarithm of the production) of the i-th firm; 
xi is a k x 1 vector of (transformations of the) input quantities of the i-th firm; 
β is a vector of unknown parameters; 
εi = vi - ui 
vi is a two-sided error term representing statistical noise which is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed as N(0,σv²) and independent of ui, 
where, 
ui is the one-sided error term representing technical inefficiency and satisfies:  
ui ≥ 0 
 
Aigner et al. (1977) acknowledge that there is economic logic in stating that the 
production process is subject ‘…to two economically distinguishable random 
disturbances, with different characteristics’ (Aigner et al., 1977, 24).  They go on to 
state that since each firm’s output must lie either on or below its frontier, any 
deviation from the frontier must be due to either factors under the firm’s control 
(technical and economic inefficiency) or, what the authors term, bad luck, climate 
and machine performance. 
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In Jondrow et al., (1982) the authors refine the stochastic production function34 by 
considering the expected value of u, conditional on (v – u) and decomposing the 
error term into random noise and technical inefficiency.  This advance allows the 
estimation of technical inefficiency ui for each observation. 
 …this was Farrell’s (1957) original motivation for introducing 
production frontiers, and the ability to compare levels of efficiency 
across observations remains the most compelling reason for 
estimating frontiers. 
 (Jondrow, et al., 1982, p 234) 
 
In Schmidt and Sickles (1984), the authors outline their application of the stochastic 
frontier production function using panel data for U.S. domestic airlines to identify 
firm-specific productive efficiency.  The paper recognises that the use of cross-
sectional data results in the SFE having three major deficiencies.  The first of these is 
that technical inefficiency (ui) for a firm cannot be estimated consistently.  Despite 
the fact that the whole error term (v – u) can be estimated consistently, it contains 
statistical noise as well as inefficiency.  Simply increasing the sample size does not 
eliminate variance of the distribution of technical inefficiency.  According to 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) this problem is overcome with the use of panel data 
since increasing the observations on each firm (T → ∞) results in better information 
being obtained than by adding more firms. 
 
The second problem identified relates to assumptions about the distribution of 
technical inefficiency.  Technical inefficiency is assumed to be distributed half-
normally, and statistical noise is assumed to have a normal distribution.  Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984) point out that these assumptions may not reflect the results obtained.  
In particular they note that evidence of technical inefficiency is skewness of the 
production function error, however it is not necessarily the case that skewness should 
be regarded as evidence of inefficiency.  By using a panel, there is no need to make 
strong distributional assumptions.  This is because inefficiency can be found in 
constancy over time as well as in skewness. 
 
Finally, Schmidt and Sickles (1984) find that cross-sectional models require that 
inefficiency is independent of the regressors.  However, as they note, if a firm knows 
                                                 
34 Prior to Jondrow et al., (1982) only the composed error term, εi, was estimated for each observation. 
 130
its level of technical inefficiency, then they would change their input choices.  The 
use of a panel eliminates the need to make such an assumption, since estimates of the 
parameters and of the firms’ inefficiency levels can still be obtained. 
  
Battese and Coelli (1995) define a stochastic frontier production function using panel 
data to estimate technical inefficiency effects.  The authors note that previous papers 
involve a two-stage approach to this estimation.  The first stage involves estimating 
the stochastic frontier production function and predicting the technical inefficiency 
effects under the assumption that these inefficiency effects are identically distributed.  
In the second stage the predicted technical inefficiency effects are regressed.  This 
contradicts the assumption of identical distribution made in the first stage.  In their 
article the authors propose a one-stage model which allows for the estimation of both 
technical change in the stochastic frontier and time-varying technical inefficiencies.  
This is the model applied in this section for estimation of a production function using 
Victorian Comparative Data for the years 1992/93 to 1995/96. 
 
7.2 Model for Panel Data 
The use of panel data involves observing data on hospitals (cross-sectional) over 
time (time-series).  The one stage stochastic frontier production function proposed by 
Battese and Coelli (1995) takes the general form: 
Yit = exp(xitβ + Vit – Uit) (7.2) 
 Where Yit = production at the t-th observation (t = 1,2,….T) for the i-th firm (i 
= 1,2,….N). 
WIES have been chosen as the dependent variable since these are separations 
weighted by DRG. 
xit = a (1 x k) vector of values of known functions of inputs of production for 
the i-th firm at the t-th observation. 
These independent variables (regressor variables) are average available beds, 
nursing staff, administration/clerical staff, medical support staff, hotel and 
allied staff and year of observation. 
β = a (k x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. 
Vit = assumed to be iid N(0, ) random errors, independently distributed of 
the Uits. 
2
vσ
Uit = non-negative random variables associated with technical inefficiency of 
production, which are assumed to be independently distributed, such that Uit is 
obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with mean, zitδ and 
variance (Coelli, 1996a). 2σ
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 The inputs chosen for the stochastic frontier model all had available data for at least 
one year of observation, which is a requirement of the model.  Staff numbers were 
chosen because they are a significant factor in a hospital’s production.  Labour is also 
an area where we would expect some variation between hospitals depending on 
hospital size and location.  We would expect increased use of labour to have a 
positive effect on output due to the assumption of monotinicity in the properties of 
production functions (Chambers, 1997, p 9). 
 
Average available beds were chosen since bed availability would be expected to vary 
among hospitals and be positively correlated with output.  We would expect that 
hospitals with larger bed numbers are able to support more weighted inlier equivalent 
separations (Chambers, 1997).  There is doubt in the literature as to the 
appropriateness of using available beds as a measure of hospital size.  Butler (1995) 
states that this is an imperfect measure of the scale of a hospital’s operations because 
beds are not all interchangeable.  Butler cites Berki (1972) in pointing out that 
intensive care beds, paediatric beds and obstetric beds are not substitutable for 
medical or surgical beds.  For the purpose of this study, however, WIES are a 
function of available beds, although it is possible for beds to be underutilised at any 
point in time. 
 
The technical inefficiency effect, Uit from model (7.2) is specified as: 
Uit = zitδ + Wit (7.3) 
Where zit is a (1 x m) vector of explanatory variables associated with technical 
inefficiency of production of firms over time. 
δ  is an (m x 1) vector of unknown coefficients. 
Wit is the random variable defined by the truncation of the normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance, σ², such that the point of truncation is -zitδ, i.e., 
Wit ≥ -zitδ. 
 
The explanatory variables in the inefficiency model are three dummy variables, 
which have been used so that some explanation can be given for inefficiency.  The 
first of these has hospitals grouped into Metropolitan with a value of 1 and Non-
metropolitan with a value of 0.  This explanatory variable will show whether or not 
geographical location has any effect on inefficiency, given the different level of 
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concentration in each location.  Vogel and Miller (1995), a study of market 
concentration among hospitals, show that highly concentrated markets (monopolies) 
result in lower costs. 
 
Vogel and Miller (1995) examine the variations in rural hospital costs using U.S. 
data, and find that hospitals located in highly concentrated rural communities have 
lower costs per day than other non-metropolitan hospitals.  They also find that 
metropolitan hospitals follow a similar trend in that increased competition in this 
market leads to increased costs.  Specifically, metropolitan hospitals exhibit cost-
increasing competition due to what they term a ‘technological arms race’ (Vogel and 
Miller, 1995, p 81).  This form of competition based on acquisition of the latest 
technology is not evident in highly concentrated rural communities.  The authors also 
find, however, that in other non-metropolitan hospital markets (with > 1 hospital) 
increased competition brings about lower costs, which is consistent with economic 
theory. 
 
The second dummy variable groups hospitals into Teaching with a value of 1 and 
Non-teaching with a value of 0.  Some metropolitan hospitals in this study are non-
teaching, and one non-metropolitan hospital is a teaching hospital.  This variable 
should also give an indication as to whether or not teaching responsibilities have an 
impact on inefficiency.  The increased burden on teaching hospitals may have an 
impact on efficiency since it would involve increased costs of teaching and research 
not associated with non-teaching hospitals (Duckett, 1999).  However, there is 
evidence to suggest that, once adjustment is made for casemix, the existence of 
university funds (for staff salaries etc.) and the utilisation of lower paid students, the 
impact of teaching is not as significant as previously thought (Butler, 1995, p 247). 
 
The final dummy variable is the year of observation.  This will show how 
inefficiency has changed over time.  As discussed earlier, the objective of casemix 
funding is for hospitals to improve efficiency over time in order to secure increased 
funding.  In this study, year of observation appears in both models (7.2) and (7.3).  In 
the stochastic frontier model (7.2), the year variable accounts for Hicksian neutral 
technological change, and in the inefficiency model (7.3), the year of observation 
shows that the inefficiency effects may change linearly over time. 
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 Within the inefficiency model we would expect larger metropolitan hospitals to be 
less inefficient than their regional counterparts, representing economies of scale in 
production.  Since most teaching hospitals are located in the metropolitan area, we 
would expect that these are also less inefficient than non-teaching hospitals.  Over 
time we would expect inefficiency to decline since casemix funding imposes 
pressure on hospitals to reduce input costs. 
 
7.3 Results35
The results for the one stage model comprising both stochastic frontier production 
function and technical efficiency effects using the above variables are set out in 
Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.  All variables in Table 7.1 have been logged so that 
coefficients may be read as elasticities. 
 
Table 7.1: Stochastic Frontier Results 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
Constant 4.2005 (0.138) 30.320 
ln Average Available beds 0.797 (0.061) 12.905 
ln Nursing Staff 0.178 (0.077) 2.301 
ln Admin/Clerical Staff 0.271 (0.049) 5.527 
ln Medical Support Staff -0.005 (0.029) -0.176 
ln Hotel and Allied Staff -0.196 (0.066) -2.937 
Year -0.030 (0.017) -1.707 
 
 
Table 7.2: Inefficiency Model Results 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
Constant -0.357 (0.164) -2.174 
Metropolitan location -3.275 (0.330) -9.922 
Teaching -1.391 (0.239) -5.815 
Year 0.008 (0.058) 0.149 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 For full raw results, refer to Appendix 6 attached. 
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 Table 7.3: Statistical Summary 
 
Statistic Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
Log Likelihood Function -108.45   
σ² 0.412 (0.041) 9.984 
est γ 0.9018 (0.0209) 43.025 
L-R Test of one-sided 
error 114.69   
 
 
 
 
 
The signs from the results are mostly as expected.  In the stochastic frontier model 
positive signs for average available beds, nursing staff and admin/clerical staff 
suggest that a one unit increase in each of these variables results in an increase in the 
WIES figure.  The sign for medical support staff is small and negative; indicating 
negative marginal product, but the t-ratio is less than 2.  The sign for hotel and allied 
staff is also negative and shows that a one unit increase in this input results in a 
0.19% decrease in WIES.  Although this is not a large percentage change, it suggests 
that this input also has negative marginal product, which is a counterintuitive result.    
The first three inputs, and hotel and allied staff, are statistically significant with t-
ratios exceeding 2.  
 
The majority of signs in the inefficiency model are as expected.  The result for 
metropolitan/non-metropolitan hospitals suggests that if a hospital is located in the 
metropolitan area, it reduces the inefficiency effect by over 3 per cent.  Teaching 
hospitals also have a negative relationship and therefore teaching hospitals also 
reduce the inefficiency effect compared to non-teaching hospitals.  This is consistent 
with Butler’s (1995) findings.  The fact that most teaching hospitals are located in the 
metropolitan area may explain this result.  Over time it is not evident whether the 
inefficiency effect changes linearly since the result is not statistically significant. 
 
The null hypothesis that the inefficiency parameters equal 0 (δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = 0) is 
rejected at the χ20.95, 3 value36.  In Table 7.3 the estimate for the variance parameter 
(gamma) is close to 1; therefore, taken together, the inefficiency effects are likely to 
be highly significant in the analysis of weighted inlier equivalent separations. 
                                                 
36 Ho: δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = 0 has a Log (Likelihood) = -131.073 
Therefore:  λ = -2{-131.073 – [-108.45]} = 45.22 
Where χ20.95, 3 = 7.81, 45.22 > 7.81, therefore reject Ho. 
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The δ parameter in equation (7.3) is a time-invariant parameter.  In order to test this 
assumption, an OLS model was estimated in three different specifications; one, 
allowing δ to differ across four years for both variables, and for the two remaining 
specifications, allowing δ to differ across four years for one and then the other 
variable.  The time variation in the parameter was tested by comparing the first 
specification with each of the two restricted specifications.  The F-test statistic fails 
to reject Ho that the coefficients do not change over time.  Thus, the null hypothesis 
is accepted that the δs do not change significantly over the four years. 
 
Table 7.4 sets out a summary of the technical efficiency estimates for the hospitals in 
this study. 
 
 Table 7.4: Summary of Technical Efficiency Estimates by Year of 
  Observation (Number and %) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note:  Using a Chi-squared test, the null hypothesis was not rejected, indicating that there 
  has not been any significant change in proportions over time. 
  Χ2 = 17.382 < Χ20.95, 15 = 24.996 
 
Year 
 
< 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Total Hospitals 
No. 5 9 11 26 31 34 0 
1 
% 4.3 7.8 9.5 22.4 26.7 29.3  
116 
No. 18 4 13 22 32 23 0 
2 
% 16 3.6 11.6 19.6 28.6 20.5  
112 
No. 10 8 6 26 22 30 0 
3 
% 9.8 7.8 5.9 25.5 21.6 29.4  
102 
No. 8 7 7 24 27 28 0 
4 
% 7.9 6.9 6.9 23.8 26.7 27.7  
101 
In Table 7.4 technical efficiency is a measure between 0 and 1 with 1 being 
technically efficient and 0 being completely inefficient.  It is clear that no hospital 
lies on the efficiency frontier (= 1), unlike the case for the DEA model where the 
frontier is derived from the data.  Overall, the number of hospitals in the study fell 
from 116 to 101.  This was due to hospital closures and amalgamations.  Over the 
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four year period, the number of hospitals that are 90 per cent efficient fell from 34 to 
28.  Similarly, the number of hospitals operating within the 80 per cent efficiency 
group fell from 31 to 27.  These numbers as a percentage of the total do not change 
to any extent for both of these groups.  Table 7.5 below shows hospitals’ technical 
efficiency score groups prior to closure or amalgamation. 
 
 Table 7.5: Efficiency Score Results of Hospitals Prior to Closure 
  or Amalgamation 
 
Hospital* Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
31 R# <0.5  0.7 
34 R 0.5   
54 R <0.5   
103 M 0.9   
4 R 0.8 0.6  
19 R 0.6 0.5  
24 R 0.7 0.6  
25 R 0.8 0.6  
37 R 0.8 0.8  
44 R 0.5 <0.5  
47 R 0.8 <0.5  
52 R 0.7 <0.5  
66 R 0.6 <0.5  
72 R 0.7 0.8  
107 R 0.9 <0.5  
28 R 0.9 <0.5 <0.5 
  * None of the above hospitals (except 31) was operating in Year 4. 
  #Hospital 31 did not close, but data was not available for Year 2.  It 
  is included here so that  total hospital numbers correspond with Table 7.4. 
  R = Regional Hospital M = Metropolitan Hospital 
  
With the exception of hospitals 37, 72 and 103, all hospitals that closed or 
amalgamated experienced declining efficiency just prior to ceasing operations.  It is 
possible that either the threat of reduced funding, or the fact of it, has been the cause 
of these closures.  Of the results shown in Table 7.5, none of the hospitals noted were 
teaching hospitals, and only one was located in the metropolitan area. 
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 From Table 7.4 it is clear that the number of hospitals operating at <0.5 efficiency 
rose initially and then fell at the end of the period.  The same can be said for those 
operating at 0.6 efficiency.  The hospital numbers operating within 0.5 and 0.7 
efficiency remained fairly stable over the period.  These results also suggest that 
even the most efficient hospitals could reduce inputs by approximately 10 per cent 
and still maintain current output levels. 
 
7.4 Discussion 
The SFE results suggest that casemix funding does not appear to have had an effect 
on hospital efficiency over the four year period.  It does appear, however, that 
casemix funding has had an effect on hospital closures in the Victorian public 
hospital sector, especially in regional areas.  According to the results, efficiency 
gains were only made in metropolitan teaching hospitals.  The stochastic model 
shows a positive relationship between the first three inputs (average available beds, 
nursing staff and admin/clerical staff) and output, and a negative relationship 
between hotel and allied staff, and output, indicating negative marginal product for 
this input.  Medical support staff also exhibits negative marginal product.  This input, 
together with the year of observation, is not statistically significant and therefore not 
a good indicator of production. 
 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show that technical efficiency has not improved over time.  The 
falling number of hospitals from 116 to 101 is a result of closures and amalgamations 
over the period, most of which occurred following a period of inefficiency.  It is 
notable that most of the closures observed occurred in regional Victoria where 
hospitals are smaller and cater to a smaller and more widespread population.  Also, 
there is only one teaching hospital located in the non-metropolitan area, suggesting 
that the lack of teaching facilities in regional Victoria corresponds with a reduction in 
efficiency in those locations. 
 
These results suggest that casemix funding benefits large metropolitan teaching 
hospitals, at the expense of small regional hospitals that are less capable of 
competing for government funding.  The fact that casemix has been taken into 
account in this analysis suggests that hospitals have been compared on an equal 
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footing.  Nevertheless, geographical location, perhaps due to differences in 
concentration, population size, demographics, and hospitals’ limited access to the 
pool of highly skilled nursing and administration staff, appears to have had a 
significant impact on these results. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The central aim of this thesis has been to analyse the Victorian public hospital sector 
and determine to what extent, if any, the introduction of casemix funding using 
DRGs has contributed to improved efficiency in that State’s delivery of acute 
hospital services.  In arriving at the conclusion that there does not appear to have 
been an improvement in individual hospitals’ technical efficiency over time, it is still 
evident that casemix funding has altered the way that scarce resources (that is, 
government funding) are distributed to acute hospitals.  Although this funding 
arrangement was originally designed, among other things, to improve efficiency in 
response to various reports on Victoria’s acute health system, the evidence produced 
here shows that this objective was not completely realised.  If, in fact, overall cost 
savings were achieved in Victoria, they were due to closures and amalgamations of 
small regional hospitals during the period.  The evidence on economies of scale in 
the hospital sector supports this conclusion by providing a survivor analysis of 
Victorian public hospitals.  In any event, the existence of increased health 
expenditures, coupled with evidence of growing waiting lists in Victoria, also casts 
doubt on whether the objective of increased efficiency was realised. 
 
The literature that informs this thesis is varied and complex.  Issues of implementing 
appropriate hospital reimbursement schemes, and their impact on the adoption of 
new technology, patient mix and treatment options, afford a greater understanding of 
the drivers of adverse selection and moral hazard effects in healthcare.  It is also 
apparent from the literature that both DEA and SFE techniques have been applied to 
health data elsewhere, and have been the subject of intense debate concerning their 
legitimacy in general, as well as in their application to healthcare.  Clearly the 
importance of hospital funding to the provision of public health necessitates 
considerable scrutiny to ensure that efficiency measures provide policymakers with 
accurate information.  The frontier techniques are examined generally in the 
literature to provide an understanding of their strengths and weaknesses.  There also 
exists significant literature that addresses Australia’s (and Victoria’s) health sector 
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and funding arrangements in place during the period of observation of this thesis; 
namely, the development of casemix funding using DRGs.  Evidence is also 
provided on hospital merger activity resulting in increased concentration, and the 
resulting effect on competition and efficiency. 
 
Three techniques are used in this thesis to examine acute public hospitals in Victoria 
and provide information on their scale and efficiency.  Survivor analysis is used to 
reveal the optimum size of hospitals by calculating changes to market share for each 
size group over time.  The strengths and weaknesses of this technique are outlined, 
along with a justification for its application to hospitals.  DEA is a non-parametric 
frontier technique that was developed to envelope the data based on best results 
obtained in practice.  DEA was the first method in the development of modern 
efficiency measurement, and this thesis provides a description of the assumptions 
behind the technique.  Although DEA measures both technical and allocative 
efficiency, it is preferable to measure technical efficiency only since it avoids 
altering the production isoquant, which is a problem inherent in measuring allocative 
efficiency.  Technical efficiency measurement does not require input price data and 
is less sensitive to the introduction of new observations.  The third technique 
considered and outlined is the SFE.  This thesis sets out the main characteristics of 
the technique, including the development of the fixed-effects and random-effects 
model with time-varying or constant technology.  Its main advantage is that SFE is 
able to separate random noise from inefficiency through a decomposed error term.  It 
has been shown that firms’ operations are suboptimal and, therefore, analysis of 
production frontiers is more realistic than that of production functions.  Also, the use 
of panel data provides richer results than cross-sectional data due to the data being 
broader. 
 
The context within which Victorian health reforms were implemented is an important 
consideration in this thesis.  The Australian healthcare sector provides both universal 
public health services under Medicare, together with voluntary private health 
insurance.  This creates strong demand for public hospitals as even privately insured 
patients may elect to receive treatment as public patients in public hospitals.  Health 
funding arrangements in Australia contain both Federal and State elements, leading 
to issues of vertical fiscal imbalance and Constitutional conflict.  The application of 
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DRGs in casemix funding has allowed efficiency comparisons of public hospitals, 
such that funding can now be directed to those hospitals that show efficiency 
improvements, and away from those that do not.  This new arrangement in the 
funding process was made necessary due to excessive State debt, in particular in 
Victoria, and spiralling health costs in general.  Health reforms in Victoria were thus 
driven by a combination of the reported inefficient delivery of acute health services 
and spiralling government debt.  AN-DRGs were modelled on the U.S. version of 
DRG weights initially but were later modified to better reflect Australian casemix. 
 
Hospital waiting lists received considerable attention in the form of throughput 
targets being met with financial incentives.  However, the early unexpected success 
of increased throughput resulted in greater than expected demand on these funds.  
Subsequently, the Victorian government imposed a limit to accessing throughput 
funds, resulting in a return to increased waiting lists, bed closures and staff 
reductions.  Evidence shows that the combination of budget caps and waiting list 
targets clearly act to counter each other, leading to a reduction in Category One and 
Two patients on Victorian waiting lists, but an increase of Category Three patients.  
There is also evidence presented that total health expenditure in Victoria decreased 
initially, following the implementation of casemix funding, but then increased at a 
faster rate after 1995/96.  At this point in time it is clear that Victoria provided less 
public hospital beds per 1000 population relative to the other States and Territories, 
suggesting that the increase in total health expenditure was not directed to this area. 
 
The application of survivor analysis to private and public hospitals in Victoria and 
Australia shows that economies of scale exist, especially in hospitals with less than 
50 beds.  This is evidenced by decreasing market share over time, as well as by the 
number of closures and amalgamations among this group.  In Victoria the smallest 
hospitals are situated in rural regions, and so these results suggest that the change to 
an output based funding system, such as casemix funding, had the effect of reducing 
their market share. 
 
The DEA models derive a frontier from the data, and so it appears that some 
hospitals are technically efficient and continue to be so over time.  The graphs of 
frontiers using this method show that hospitals appear to improve efficiency slightly 
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over the four year period, although not by any significant amount.  Results obtained 
using SFE show no improvement over time; however the inefficiency effects model 
shows that hospitals in the metropolitan area and teaching hospitals reduce the 
inefficiency effect.  Table 6.1 shows the results obtained from DEA under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale.  These results show that teaching hospitals 
were more closely aligned with each other at the beginning of the period than were 
the other groups, but some teaching hospitals achieved higher technical efficiency 
scores toward the end of the period for WIES but not necessarily for acute 
separations.  Graphs in Appendix 1 illustrate that the majority of hospitals marginally 
improve their technical efficiency score over time with a south-westerly shift of 
frontiers.  The DEA model based on Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) accounts 
for variable returns to scale and generates scale efficiency results in addition to 
constant returns to scale scores.  These results group all hospitals together in Table 
6.2 and show that there has been an improvement overall in technical efficiency 
scores, especially under the assumption of variable returns to scale.  Scale 
efficiencies have improved, with fewer hospitals in the lower performing group at the 
end of the period. 
 
An important point when interpreting results using DEA models is that these 
frontiers have been derived from the data.  They do not represent an ideal 
combination of inputs to produce outputs, merely the best combination, given the 
data.  Improvements over time are shown by, both, a grouping of data points closer 
to the efficient frontier in the graphs (Appendices 1 and 5.3), and a movement in the 
frontier.  In the former case, using DEA methods does not provide information on 
absolute improvements, merely relative improvements in technical efficiency scores.  
Frontier movements are only apparent visually from the graphs, and these are only 
slightly so. 
 
The parametric results obtained from the SFE model using panel data show the 
absence of any improvement in technical efficiency scores over time.  The 
inefficiency effects model shows that there is a strong relationship between 
geographical location and efficiency, and type of hospital and efficiency.  
Observation of the technical efficiency scores of hospitals prior to closure or 
amalgamation (Table 7.5) shows that these hospitals, for the most part, experienced 
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very low scores, were situated in regional Victoria and none of them was a teaching 
hospital. 
 
The fact that the SFE model estimates the frontier from the data suggests that 
realistically hospitals have performed, at best, within 10 percent of achieving a 
position on the frontier.  Continued cutbacks and expectations of efficiency 
improvements do not appear to be justified under this scenario since there does not 
appear to have been any significant improvement in efficiency in individual 
Victorian public hospitals following casemix funding.  Cost savings, if any, are a 
direct result of closures and amalgamations that occurred in regional Victoria among 
small hospitals that were experiencing increasing returns to scale, but that were 
unable to expand due to the limited size of population and, consequently, their 
patient base, and lack of available doctors.  In these circumstances, therefore, 
casemix funding using DRGs has not delivered the improvements that it promised, 
and future research should be directed at using SFE with panel data to analyse the 
implication of casemix funding applications Australia-wide. 
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